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This thesis examines the theological implications of marriages of people with a 
learning disability or post-menopausal (and childless) marriages. In addition, the 
implications of changes in the parenting role, especially where children exist before 
marriage are examined. The work is based on a new methodology which I have 
developed and named Evidential Theology, which is used to establish which prior 
theological assumptions about marriage are inconsistent with evidence from the world 
around. The methodology is founded on the principle that God's incarnation, acting in 
and through the whole of the created order, is an on-going process which means that 
our knowledge and perception of God's intentions for humanity is on-going, changing 
and unlimited. A new contribution to Disability Theology is made in order to address 
specific issues with learning disability which are distinct from physical disability. 
Detailed consideration is given to whether a contractual basis for Christian marriage is 
helpful and an extensive examination is made of both a possible right and a duty to 
have children and it is concluded that neither exists absolutely. Major changes in the 
role of parenting are documented, especially that more marriages take place now in 
which either or both partners already have children, together or separately.
  In order to cope with a number of apparently irreconcilable tensions between 
different aspects of marriage theology, a theory of Uncertain Theology is proposed 
which asserts that the more certain we want to be about a particular ethic, the less we 
know about God, and vice versa.
  The thesis proposes that the church, especially the Church of England, should 
abandon its legal registration role and adopt a more flexible covenant approach which 
focuses more on under-pinning marriage through its existence, rather than 
establishing exit conditions which only apply when it comes to an end. It is further 
advocated that the church should provide, within a marriage liturgy, the opportunity 
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In this thesis I will examine the theology of marriage through three case studies using 
a new theological methodology which combines the incarnational view that God 
continues to act and speak through the whole of the created order with the principle 
that objective evidence can, as in Popper (1959), be used to refute arguments, thus 
acting as a counter-weight to tradition and dogma. I have named this approach 
Evidential Theology. Apparently contradictory issues which emerge from this 
examination will lead me to a further methodological development to called Uncertain 
Theology. One of the case studies concerns people with a learning disability1 and I will 
seek to develop from disability theology (which frequently focusses on physical 
disability) a better perception of how learning disability is to be understood within 
Christian theology.
For centuries, the church’s2 teaching on marriage has been close to the centre of its 
essence – no-one suggests that marriage theology is a necessary component of what 
Christianity is about but, in practical terms, its influence on both followers and the 
wider societies within which the church has operated, has been crucial. Attitudes to 
marriage, as a subset of those about human relationships more generally, have not 
only been very influential in how people behave, but also have been used to explain 
otherwise mysterious aspects of faith.
As a result, the church has not only sought to define how marriage (both in terms of 
an event as well as a life-time activity) should be conducted, but also have used that 
definition of marriage to explain the relationship between God and humanity3. I will 
look critically at this use of 'marriage as a paradigm' and show that it is a major flaw in 
many strands of traditional thinking.
In consequence, change in how marriage is defined and perceived is hampered by its 
perceived effect on the understanding of God – and vice versa. Too frequently, the 
development of Christian theologies on human relationships, and marriage in 
particular, has been slow to recognise both errors and incompatibilities with their 
contemporary society. Emotional tradition (ideas brought forward from the past which 
are difficult to contemplate losing) has held back theological thinking and its wider 
acceptance within the church, which has simultaneously lost control of the situation 
when the wider society moves in ways which are independent of and out of step with 
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current church teaching. The consequence is often a loss of the prophetic role just at 
the time when secular experience needs to be challenged and pressed to understand 
how best to experience relationships with the insights that the gospel message can 
express.
In this thesis, these problems are addressed by considering three issues, all of which 
have had little historical development (sometimes for cultural reasons but mainly 
because the issues simply did not exist) but which speak both to the concept of 
marriage theology as well as our understanding of the God-humanity relationship.
To do so it is necessary to develop a methodology which enables the introduction of 
these new situations into the overall mix, whilst remaining aware of general trends in 
theological and philosophical methods. It will be found that this leads to apparent 
conflicts between aspects of traditional thinking and the needs of these new contexts 
and so it will also be necessary  to find a methodology for handling these 
discrepancies.
The methodology develops in two stages. At first we set out Evidential Theology, a 
way in which we can use the evidence from the world around us as a corrective to a 
dependence only on tradition and a traditional understanding of scripture. In the 
second stage, we need to understand how it may be possible to accept that a unified 
understanding of God, and within that a unified approach to enduring relationships, 
can still lead to apparently different outcomes in different situations. This we call 
Uncertain Theology.
The purpose is not fatally to deconstruct the concept of marriage (either in a Christian 
or a secular sense) but to seek a better theological formulation that enables the church 
to be more effective in supporting human relationships in response to current 
dilemmas as well as, through its methodology, to those of the future.
1.1 From the Margins to the Centre
In scientific progress, it is often by worrying about marginal cases which do not quite 
fit the general rule, that new knowledge is discovered. It is not sufficient to find ways 
of explaining the margins on their own, the real challenge is to combine a successful 
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explanation of the awkward data whilst at the same time explaining equally well those 
cases which were already handled well.
In Introducing Body Theology, Isherwood says, “An incarnational religion that declares  
universal salvation must pay attention to all that is incarnate” (Isherwood and Stuart, 1998, 
p114). In other words, if we assert that God is in and acts through the totality of the 
created world and that salvation is for all people, then we cannot confine our theology 
to fit the circumstances of a convenient subset. A theology of marriage cannot fit only 
the ‘easy’ cases – it must evolve to incorporate ‘all sorts and conditions’ of humanity.
By looking in more detail at three quite different situations: 
• Learning Disability Marriage
• Changes in Parenting Role
• Post Menopausal Marriage
we aim not only to provide a successful theological basis for each of them but also to 
be able to carry that back into our understanding of marriage in the broader case.
If we are to establish an inclusive theology – for this is a pre-condition of this thesis - 
then anything which can be shown to be unworkable in any one of these cases ought 
to be removed from the mainstream. To anticipate the more detailed discussions 
below, let us take one example.
The concept of the marriage vow has long been central to an understanding of marriage, 
a vow which carries with it a contractual nature. Indeed, without it some would 
consider that the marriage never existed. As Coontz (2006a) points out, it was not 
until the 16th century that it was generally considered necessary for a man and a 
woman to do other than to exchange ‘words of consent’ and that until 1754 the 
English state did not require a license for a marriage to be valid.
However, there has been little consideration of what happens if one or other partner is 
unable in a full legal sense to enter into a contractual obligation, through an assumed 
inability to understand the implications. Adults with a learning disability may or may 
not be able to enter into legally-binding situations – this is a secular, not theological 
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consideration. If they are not, but otherwise are able to establish a personal 
relationship that seeks marriage, there may be doubts about proceeding.
If we accept the principle that being able freely to marry is a basic human right, almost 
regardless of the theological context, and that some people given such a right are 
unable to enter into the marriage contract, it may be necessary to question the need 
for such a contractual vow.
The choice of the three contexts identified above has been made deliberately: there is 
limited, if any, cultural hangover from earlier generations, especially those from the 
times when scripture was written. The issues simply did not exist. We can use these 
examples to look at contemporary secular phenomena without a priori moral or 
religious assumptions that cloud the debate when considering changes in attitude to, 
for example, slavery or same sex relationships.
Moore identifies, from a Catholic church4 perspective, why it has become necessary in 
the modern period:
when so many do not recognise the divine right of the church to speak on such  
matters. It can no longer lay down the law, and must earn the right to be  
heard by those who disagree with it. It can only do so if it seeks to persuade  
and convince of the rightness of its position, if it appeals to reason
(1992, p viii).
By the time we reach our conclusion, we shall have found a way of better identifying 
the domain in which the church (or theology) can properly intervene and where it 
ought not.
Chesterton is alleged to have said “When people stop believing in God, they don’t believe in  
nothing – they believe in anything” The same could be said just as tellingly about society’s 
reaction to the church’s teaching on marriage. Having rejected the confines of the 
teachings of most church authorities, and many Christian writers, the world has 
adopted such a variety of marital and quasi-marital arrangements that it is tempting to 
claim that “anything goes” – a caricature of post-modern philosophies.
It is, perhaps, better to see the current times more as a huge social experiment in 
relationships, whether or not they are formally or legally defined, with many different 
ideas being tried out. As yet, no all-encompassing principle seems to have emerged 
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which speaks with a clear voice to all of the many different situations to which people 
are seeking solutions.
In the US, even more than in the UK, marriage has undergone radical change in 
practice – if not in public and political policy. Coontz responds to US Census Bureau 
results by saying, “For the first time in 150 years, households headed by single adults and  
unmarried couples now outnumber married-couple families” and continues, “It doesn’t mean 
marriage is doomed. It does mean we have to start thinking differently about the way we design  
our social policies” (2006b).
It may well be that a kind of post-modern principle endures – that the only test of 
whether a particular marital arrangement is acceptable is how it plays out in each 
individual case. On the other hand, the church seeks to speak more clearly and to use 
the collective experience of humankind, from past generations as well as the present, 
in helping individuals to lead better lives than they would if left entirely alone to 
devise their own solutions. A possible difficulty with postmodernism is that it may not 
readily permit successive generations to distil their experience for the benefit of those 
that follow. In any event, pastoral needs dictate that an ability to forewarn of future 
dangers (or to encourage best practice) is better than a post hoc analysis of what went 
wrong.
To achieve the aim of speaking more effectively to contemporary society about the 
nature and experience of relationships we need to develop a methodology which is 
neither modernist (in which observations might be expected to ‘prove’ a particular 
theological assertion; for example, it might be asserted that certain activities are 
morally wrong because they are not natural) nor postmodernist (in which 
generalisation from the particular, or the induction of certain conclusions based on 
objective evidence, is considered unjustified). Instead we need to establish a means by 
which we can look, as objectively as we can manage, at the experience of marriage in 
specific contexts and use those observations in some way as we establish a more 
comprehensive theological analysis.
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1.2 Why Is Marriage a Theological Issue?
Much Christian writing about marriage, both contemporary and historical, makes the 
tacit assumption that this is a proper subject for theological concern. However, it 
bears consideration why this might be so and, if it be so, whether it merits different 
consideration from other inter-personal matters. The following discussion draws in 
detail on the history of the UK but, until the Reformation, the situation in most 
Christian cultures was broadly consistent.
In our present culture it is important to set aside a number of possible reasons for 
theological intervention into the notion and practice of marriage – both the event and 
the extended experience that follows a specific ceremony.
Firstly, the advent of the Hardwicke Act5 established the church as both a religious 
and a civil partner in the process. In order to counter the trend in clandestine 
marriages, with all the subsequent legal wrangling, the church was the only available 
nation-wide authority with the means to provide a registration service. The extent to 
which such legal disputes existed can be seen in Leneman (1999), Probert (2009) and 
Bannet (1997). The sporadic record-keeping that preceded the Hardwicke Act did not 
necessarily bode well and it took a few years for an efficient system to be in place. 
(Lemmings, 1996, p344) From at least as far back as the twelfth century, both state 
and church had regarded a simple ceremony in which words of consent were 
exchanged and witnessed as being sufficient to establish a valid marriage. Gradually, 
the requirement to perform this ceremony in front of a priest became established, 
primarily as a means of exercising some control over the situation. Increasingly 
frequent litigation led to calls for greater controls but legislation was not immediate. 
(Lemmings, 1996, p345)
However, there was still a clear distinction between the religious and the civil 
processes – marriage at the church door being both simpler and less expensive. It was 
not until much later that it was assumed that all church-based weddings would 
include some form of genuine Christian ceremony. Probert (2009) and Outhwaite 
(1995) both indicate that for a considerable time, many marriages conducted by 
clergymen were often perfunctory. The 1949 Marriage Act does not specify anything in 
relation to the marriage ceremony itself, other than to refer to the Rites of the Church 
of England. Indeed, almost all of the marriage legislation, prior to more recent civil 
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marriage arrangements, focused entirely on the preliminaries, such as the calling of 
banns.6 
The debate at the time of the Hardwicke Bill shows that it was by no means 
universally accepted that the church and state had compatible interests. Outhwaite 
(1995) reports that Dr Henry Stebbings, Chancellor of the diocese of Salisbury, wrote 
in defence of the prevailing ecclesiastical orthodoxy, that marriage was a divine 
institution, not a mere civil contract. (p102)
Church liturgies have prescribed Trinitarian references for a long time (in medieval 
times a blessing from a priest was considered a requirement although a Eucharist was 
optional - Coleman 2004, p165). Yet, as Probert (2009, p8) indicates, the involvement 
of the church was predominantly for legal and social reasons, not religious. For 
example, in the Book of Common Prayer Solemnization of Matrimony: 
Then shall the Priest speak unto the people. Forasmuch as N and N have  
consented together in holy wedlock, and have witnessed the same before God  
and this company, and thereto have given and pledged their troth either to  
other, and have declared the same by giving and receiving of a ring, and by  
joining of hands; I pronounce that they be man and wife together, In the  
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
The baggage left over from this historical period is the assumption that the church has 
a natural role in marrying couples, regardless of their faith background, including 
those of none. However, even in the very terminology used there is a tension: whilst 
many people still believe that the church marries people (an active and transitive 
process) the church itself has long held that it is the couple that do the marrying – the 
church is but a witness.7 The expression Solemnization of Matrimony, as used in the 
Book of Common Prayer, underlines that situation. Further, defects in the role played 
by the church (such as being conducted by a person not properly appointed so to do) 
do not in themselves invalidate the marriage, theologically.
From early middle ages, impediments to marriage were first developed by the church 
(Outhwaite, 1995, p3) with further controls to follow such as the extension of the 
need to call “banns extended to all Christendom generally by Pope Innocent III (in 1215)” 
(Outhwaite, 1995, p4). However, it was not until the Council of Florence (1431-1446) 
that the Catholic church moved to identifying marriage as a sacrament  (Lehmkuhl, 
1910; Coontz, 2006a; Outhwaite, 1995, p5). Even so, there are clear distinctions 
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between marriage and other sacraments – in particular whether or not the church or 
its priests play a necessary part in making the action effective (HOB, 1999, p4).
Waller concludes that the Reformation move away from seeing marriage as a 
sacrament was instrumental in allowing Protestant churches to accept divorce, which 
was 'merely' dissolving a contract of human construction. (2009, p 39 ff)
Although some churches, notably the Catholic church (for example, see Sretenovic 
(2009)), have difficulty with wholly civil marriages, the Church of England manages to 
recognise them if perhaps in an impaired way. After all, the Church of England policy 
on divorce and second marriages does not depend on whether the first marriage has 
taken place in church. For example, the General Synod Resolution in 2002 dealt with 
marriage after divorce. Since divorce is a civil matter (at least for the Church of 
England) it clearly encompasses cases where the first marriage was a civil ceremony. 
The Catholic church, as indicated by Sretenovic, recognises the legitimacy of civil 
marriages, but only in sorrow and with great reluctance. It would rather see such 
marriages as different in nature from those undertaken in the context of a sacrament 
and some will distinguish, as do Orthodox churches, between marriages which are 
licit and those which are valid. (Green, 2009 and Harakas, 2009) Some go further as 
in: 
The Catholic Church recognises the marriage of a Catholic only when it takes  
place within a Catholic church. Occasionally, for good reason, permission will  
be given for the marriage to take place in a church which is not Catholic.  
Weddings in hotels or similar, and wedding packages abroad, are generally  
not valid  (Northampton Diocese, 2010, p1).
However, the relationship between church and state with regard to marriage 
ceremonies varies from one country to another. In some cases, such as in France, a 
separate mandatory civil ceremony precedes an optional church ceremony, which itself 
does not confer legality.
The formation of marriage as a theological concept dates back to the first attempts by 
the church to regulate the matter, perhaps in the 12C8 (Outhwaite, 1995, p1-2) and 
much of what both church and state legislated for over the subsequent centuries 
related to the legality of marriage.
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In parallel with the evolution of the regulatory role of the church there was a similar 
development in the understanding of the ways in which marriage may be described as 
a sacrament. Some theologians and some churches remain firmly of the view that 
marriage is a sacrament on a par with baptism and holy communion whilst others 
exclude the sacramental nature altogether – and there has been a range of expressions 
in between. We shall return to this aspect in a later section.
The regulation of who may marry began in a church context. The age at which 
marriage may first take place has changed over time: as recently as the sixteenth 
century, children as young as five could be married in wealthier families (Fass, 2003; 
Owston, 2009). The Hardwicke Act determined that both partners must be “of Full  
Age”, which subsequent legislation set at 14 for males and 12 for females – a disparity 
which was only removed in 1929 when the age was raised to 16 for both sexes (Age of 
Marriage Act 1929). In more recent times, the de facto age for church marriages has 
increased significantly (ONS, 2006) – perhaps partly driven by the perceived high cost 
of a wedding – to such an extent that this lower limit is barely a matter of debate!
However, there is no universal age limit across all cultures and legal jurisdictions 
(Mechiorre, 2004; Wikipedia, 2009) with some still as low as 12 under certain 
circumstances and some, such as China, setting it at 20. In some countries it has 
remained a contentious issue. (Blackburn & Bessell, 1997)
It is therefore almost impossible for the church now to claim that it has a particular 
role to play in this specific item of regulation – change has been driven more by social 
factors and altered perception of adulthood and it cannot be claimed that there is 
some inherent Christian theological perception that sets the age at a particular level.
However there is a problematic ethical consequence, made more acute by the recent 
rise in antipathy towards anyone labelled as a ‘paedophile’. Unfortunately, and often 
incorrectly, anyone who is convicted (sometimes merely alleged) of a legal offence 
with an under-age person is called a paedophile and suffers extensive social 
condemnation. (Sex with an under age person is now defined by the Sexual Offences 
Act (Parliament, 2003) as rape.) Activities covered by such legal restrictions are 
clearly widely considered immoral. A problem arises not just with the sexualisation of 
young children but with the fact that the age limits vary between legal codes. Hence, 
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something that will be considered a heinous crime and result in a person being 
ostracised from their society may be perfectly acceptable elsewhere. For a theology, or 
a church, that claims universality in its statements, this is a problem on a large scale 
and, indeed, in analogous situations is threatening serious schism.
As a consequence, it is important now to distinguish between the involvement of the 
church in the principle of marriage and the wedding ceremonies for particular 
individuals. It is quite possible and reasonable for the church to make statements 
about what marriage is, how the event should take place and how the couple should 
conduct themselves thereafter in terms which imply universality of relevance, whilst at 
the same time retreating from the regulatory role. Indeed, it is perhaps from this 
recognition that it may be possible to evolve a more relevant position with regard to 
the thorny issues of divorce, second marriage and same-sex ceremonies.
To put it another way, the church can claim the right to make statements about 
marriage because it cares about the lives of the people involved (including children 
and second partners) rather than making regulatory statements about what is or is not 
a marriage. Social change has, probably irrevocably, taken away the opportunity to be 
effective in the regulatory domain. Better then to focus on the caring role.
By the end of this investigation we shall seek to establish a firm basis on which to 
make a clearer distinction between matters properly in the theological domain and 
those which are not.
1.3 Overview of Thesis
The thesis begins with a literature review of taxonomies of marriage theology and also 
the contemporary pressures which the church faces, from which a set of questions will 
be identified.
To undertake the subsequent investigation it is necessary first to establish a new 
methodology – which I shall entitle Evidential Theology - which will allow us to use 
the evidence that is subsequently presented about the three application areas 
identified above. 
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The first area to be considered is that of learning disability. It will be necessary to 
develop the theology of  learning disability (which in turn will require us to look in 
some depth at the phenomenon of learning disability) and it will be seen that this 
points to significant differences from work done on the theology of physical disability. 
In practical terms, the legal context for marriage is important including the 
implications of various aspects of Human Rights legislation. Having thus established 
the context, both theologically and legally, it is possible to give specific consideration 
to what is meant by marriage when one or both of the partners has a learning 
disability.
Attention is turned next to Post Menopausal Marriage. This is developed into a 
consideration of the implications for Christian theology of marriage where procreation 
is not a part of the relationship, whether by choice or not.
The third area of examination is the way in which the parenting role has changed and 
how this has profound implications for how the church, both in theory and in practice, 
is expected to respond. The historical assumption of a sequence from betrothal and 
marriage to intercourse and thus to child bearing is generally no longer the case and, 
at the very least, this has implications for the detail of marriage liturgy.
These three separate areas of examination will challenge some of the inherited 
theological assumptions about the nature of marriage.  In response, Evidential 
Theology leads us to reject some of the aspects of marriage which traditionally have 
been seen to be essential. For example, the theological need for contract as a basis is 
rejected in favour of a covenant. In turn this establishes a reason to separate the 
functions of the state from those of the church in regard to marriage, both considered 
as the event (or change in status) as well as what we shall call support for Enduring 
Relationships. The result is to present a very different role for the church from that 
which has hitherto been the dominant expectation.
At this point, the discordance between some traditional formulations of Christian 
marriage and the evidence presented in earlier sections will be seem to be intractable 
using solely the methodology of Evidential Theology. A further new development – 
Uncertain Theology -  will provide a  means of handling the apparent 
incompatibilities.
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Finally, having identified a need to adapt traditional formulations about Christian 
marriage in specific ways, various challenges to the Church will be set out in a way 
that is intended to give a greater focus and relevance in a context where the church 
has lost considerable ground of influence.
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1 In general, the term learning disability is used to denote conditions of intellectual/mental 
impairment or dysfunction which arise either at birth, soon after, or in some instances, as 
a result of life events, such as road accidents. It is used without capitals as it refers to a 
general description, in comparison with specific conditions, such as Downs, which are 
capitalised. The term learning difficulty is avoided since there has been a tendency to use 
this to refer to syndromes which exist within people who are otherwise considered to fall 
within the ‘normal’ range of capability, such as Attention Deficit Disorder or Dyslexia.
2 In this thesis, the word church is generally used to indicate organised Christian religion, 
formed into ecclesiastical institutions. Where it is necessary to be specific about a 
particular institution then this will be indicated.
3 As far as possible, the language used is not gender-specific, unless the context dictates 
otherwise. However, in reference to the genetic species homo sapiens, terms such as 
humanity and humankind are used in preference to mankind. It may be that occasionally the 
use of Man (with a capital M) is used to reflect the historic linguistic practice which is 
clearly gender-inclusive.
4 The Catholic church is named thus, rather than the more divisive Roman Catholic church 
and its members are referred to as Catholics, accepting that this might raise issues for 
those from other churches who claim catholicity.
5 The Parliament : Hardwicke Act, 1754, is generally cited without the date or context.
6 The Marriage Ceremony (Prescribed Words) Act 1996 only set out words to be used in 
civil marriages, not religious ones.
7 This position makes the recent practice of performing a Blessing of Marriage for a 
subsequent marriage following a divorce all the more difficult to put on a rigorous basis.
8 Specific centuries are denoted thus: 20C.
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2. Literature Review
The claim by churches and theologians to define and regulate marriage is long and well 
established. A number of writers (e.g. Coontz, 2005; Ruether, 2001) have reviewed the 
way in which marriage as a theological concept and as an historical or sociological 
phenomenon has developed over at least two millennia. Christian theology has evolved 
substantially (Coleman, 2004; Witte, 1997), passing through a number of distinct 
phases, each of which has had notable differences from its predecessor. These 
historical reviews make it difficult to consider marriage as a fixed theological concept 
which neither cannot nor should not change in response to the cultural context. 
Indeed, some of the aspects of marriage which today’s traditionalists consider essential 
were themselves at one time innovations which were not readily accepted. For 
example, what was, in Old Testament times a polyandrous construct, is now almost 
unarguably monogamous. Later, the emergence of marriage in the eighteenth century 
as a romantic ideal – rather than an economic or political achievement – was a major 
shift. (Coontz, 2005, p145ff)
All of these writers demonstrate that the contemporary social context, now as much as 
in the past, presents a challenge to preceding theologies of marriage. We need to 
categorise both the different stages of historical development as well as the ways in 
which contemporary writers meet the challenge of reconciling traditional theologies 
with the current secular pressures for change.
2.1 Taxonomies
It is possible to categorise marriage theologies in two ways:
1. Vertical (or Historical)
In this taxonomy, we track the different phases of mainstream marriage theology in 
each stage of evolution. Although Coontz, Ruether and Coleman each have their own 
different perspectives, that by Ruether has the clearest historical correlation, albeit 
from a distinctly American viewpoint:
• Jewish and Graeco-Roman
• Early Christian




• 1890-1940 (Impact of women in paid employment)
• 1940-1975 (Post-war return of women to domestic roles followed by 
various equality developments)
• Contemporary
Each phase in this taxonomy is defined primarily in terms of the broad social and 
political climate, indicating how theology has responded. Witte, on the other hand, is 
more concerned to track the contractual perspective as marriage has evolved from a 
sacramental concept to the more recent emphasis on the contractual nature.
Witte & Ellison (2005) also examine the way in which the older tradition of marriage 
as a covenant has become transformed into a specific, arguably very different, idea in 
the Covenant Marriage movement in North America.1
A quite different perspective on this historical process is given by Isherwood in which 
she examines the way in which Christianity has viewed the body: “any attempt to  
examine the Christian tradition . . . reveals a complex, constantly shifting relationship with the  
body which goes right back into the tips of Christianity's roots” (Isherwood & Stuart,1998, 
p52). It is not surprising that her trajectory closely parallels those of marriage which 
the other writers have traced.
What each of these writers has shown is that contemporary theologies treat ‘tradition’ 
variably, drawing on different aspects of this evolution. One person’s tradition is 
another’s history.
2. Horizontal (or Contemporary)






Traditional theologies include those which seek to promote what they believe is a 
theology of marriage from an earlier age. However, it is important to recognise that 
what is considered to be 'traditional' can be drawn from any of the vertical categories. 
There is no more common cause amongst traditionalists than in the other two 
horizontal categories.
The Christian Right in north America, African Evangelicals and European 
Conservatives have all sought to promote one or other form of traditional marriage, 
especially in reaction to Radical writers5 who wish to expand the concept into entirely 
new contexts – notably same sex relationships. Some issues in human sexuality (HOB, 
2003) attempts to hold together a wide spectrum of ‘traditional’ teachings in a way 
that lacks a coherent view of marriage itself. This is perhaps because it is more 
concerned to discern a common view on same-sex relationships which does not depend 
on a specific view of heterosexual marriage.
Lawler (1993, p95), in analysing the Catholic church’s theology of marriage – and its 
relationship to annulment – has to recognise that, far from being consistent and 
simplistic, the church has had a complex response to changing situations, even if it has 
changed less willingly and more slowly than other denominations or secular society. 
Elsewhere, we summarise the statements which Pope Benedict XVI has consistently 
made in support of what is claimed to be a traditional view of marriage and sexuality.
Adaptive theologies seek to make the minimum evolutionary change from what each 
considers to be the traditional position, reacting most strongly to those aspects which 
jar the greatest with the contemporary social context.6
Thatcher, for example, has made an attempt to relate Christian marriage to 
contemporary concerns. In particular, he has promoted the concept of betrothal as a 
means of distinguishing between couples in a pre-marriage situation from those who 
have no intention of formalising their relationship in either a secular or religious 
ceremony. Cohabitation is examined further by Dormor (2004).
As we shall see in a later section, Thatcher remains broadly in the same camp as the 
‘traditionalists’ when it comes to the essentials of a Christian marriage. We will show 
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that this approach is not especially successful in addressing the three specific issues 
which form the basis of this study.
Radical theologies redefine marriage, from a theological point of view, from first 
principles, as it were, not so much without reference to tradition as not being bound 
by it. The guiding principle is to reduce the concept to its essentials and then allow 
those essentials to develop in response to emerging needs.
This category contains those developments which seek to identify the absolute 
minimum essence from tradition in order to encompass new situations. Some of these 
are driven by a feminist imperative and have focused on the male agenda in most, if 
not all, previous evolutions of marriage theology. Others have a gender incentive as 
they seek to define relationships (including marriage as well as friendship) in terms 
that are equally applicable to both same-sex and mixed-sex partnerships (Stuart, 1995) 
or to reject a patriarchal framework (Isherwood, 2001).
Drucker (1998) challenges the argument that marriage is the best context for child-
rearing by setting out the case for families built around a same sex partnership and 
concludes that, from a pragmatic point of view, such families are at least as successful 
in child rearing as mixed-sex parents.
Whilst most Radical theologies retain some role for the church in defining and 
controlling marriage, there are those who, in response to the restrictions on human 
behaviour which this has brought in the past, define a theology of human nature, 
including sexuality, independently from Church (Isherwood, 2000, p20ff) .
2.2 Contemporary Pressures
The advent of civil marriages and the licensing of a variety of premises for civil 
ceremonies has accelerated the reduction in the proportion of those marriages held in 
churches (ONS, 2008). Whilst there may be a number of reasons behind this trend, 
this thesis is based on a concern that the Christian theological approach is perceived 
not to be relevant to a range of people entering into particular relationships.
The range of relationships and family contexts has evolved and expanded well outside 
the limited situation envisaged in approved liturgies(Book of Common Prayer, 
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Common Worship etc). Some of these difficulties have been addressed from the point 
of view of a traditional theological concept of marriage (Lawler, 1993) but formal 
statements from the main churches tend to be infrequent and lag well behind 
contemporary behaviour (House of Bishops, 2003; Thomas, 1983, p11).
In any event, the past two decades have seen the churches focus on same-sex 
relationships (with divisive consequences) and have allowed the rest of the marriage 
agenda to lag behind. Once most churches (with the obvious exception of the Catholic 
church) had resolved their fundamental position on divorce, little further development 
in official statements has taken place.
Evidence is available from national statistical sources on such factors as the age at first 
marriage, first child in relation to marriage, proportion of children with parents 
formally married, numbers of serial child-bearing relationships and so on. Overall, as 
analysed by Coontz (2005 and others), the pattern is of a trend towards fewer child-
bearing and child-rearing domestic contexts being characterised as enduring marriage 
followed by child-bearing. There is also a marked growth in the numbers of fertile 
women and couples making a conscious decision not to have children, whilst others go 
to any medical lengths to do so.
In order to provide a critical insight into some of the assumptions within the 
traditional framework, three situations have been selected where little or no evidence 
of work having been done has been found, especially as they are generally new 
phenomena. There is, of course, extensive literature about the phenomena themselves 
but not of the consequences for marriage theology.
One consequence of the changes in life expectancy, combined with the rise on serial 
marriages, is that a growing number of relationships are formed post-menopausal.7 
The particular significance for marriage theology is that the specific relationships have 
no possibility of child bearing8 and therefore need to look elsewhere for their purpose, 
theological context and religious pastoral support.
However, these are not the only marriages where child bearing is not on the agenda 
and growing numbers (Berrington, 2004) choose to be deliberately childless (although 
this is not a new issue: Veevers, 1974; Ramu, 1985). The matter is becoming of 
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interest to the more conservative elements in US (for example) and some of the 
underlying reasons are discussed by McAllister (1998). Franke (2001) discusses, from 
a feminist point of view, the extent to which society views childbearing as normative.
The importance of the post-menopausal case, however, is that the element of choice – 
and hence moral integrity – is not present. It may be argued, as has Bishop Nazir-Ali 
(BBC, 2000), that choosing to be childless is contrary to a Christian view of marriage. 
Nonetheless, any comprehensive theology of marriage has at least to handle the case 
where childlessness exists but has not been chosen.
The statistics also record an apparent growth in deliberate single status  - other than 
religious celibacy - and Wilson (2005) has made an attempt to reconcile this situation 
with other Christian approaches to relationships, including marriage.
At the same time the continuing trend to disregard the church as a focus for marriage 
has been documented (Kasriel & Goodacre, 2007). Clearly it is important to 
discriminate between the possibilities that either the church is failing to recognise the 
changes taking place in society or that the church needs to be even more assertive of 
what it believes to be its traditional position, embodying an unalterable insight into 
the will of God.
Whilst many churches have, as we shall see in a later chapter, gradually accommodated 
many changes, including contraception and divorce, the Catholic Church is notable by 
its determination to resist this evolution. Pope John Paul II's series of addresses The  
Theology of the Body (1979) extensively examined many traditional views on sexuality, 
but served largely to extend rather than change Catholic theology. (See Section 5.6 
below for further consideration)
More recent statements from Pope Benedict XVI further reinforce the position. For 
example, he stated in a recent homily that families must be set in: “the generous and  
indissoluble love of a man and a woman” and “men and women who contract marriage and form  
a family” (2010b) is popularly interpreted as “Pope Rails Against Same-Sex Marriage”  
(Huffington, 2010). In a speech to the participants in a Congress on the Family he 
said: “God’s gift to us of marriage and family life enables us to experience something of the  
infinite love that unites the three divine persons – Father, Son and Holy Spirit” (2010a).
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In Germany, he said:
However, the Church sees with concern the growing endeavour to eliminate  
the Christian concept of marriage and family from society's conscience.  
Marriage is manifested as a lasting union of love between a man and a  
woman, which also always aspires to the transmission of human life (2010c).
and also: “the Church cannot approve legislative initiatives that entail a re-evaluation of  
alternative models to married and family life. They contribute to weakening the principles of  
natural law” (2010c).
In 2008, Benedict XVI focussed his New Year message on “the human family, a  
community of peace”. He refers to: “the natural family, as an intimate communion of life and  
love, based on marriage between a man and a woman” (2008).
Pope Benedict XVI's statements have been summarised by Gallagher and Baker (2010) 
and they highlight the significance: “Pope Benedict, no less than his predecessor John Paul II,  
views our contemporary marriage and family debate as core to understanding, indeed defining,  
our human dignity” (p1). As I shall examine in later chapters, this continuing use of 
marriage as a paradigm for insights into the relationship between God and humanity 
lies at the heart of many difficulties in responding to cultural change.
However, the tensions which exist with other expressions of the Catholic position can 
be seen, for example, in an interview with Archbishop Nichols, in which he said: “Fear  
is never a good motivation. The whole point of the Catholic journey is that it is a journey, and we  
try to hold together high ideals and understanding. That is the same for people who struggle in  
whatever way with their sexuality” (Tweedie, 2010).
Nevertheless, the overwhelming official position of the Catholic church is one which 
makes no effective accommodation for a theology of marriage which incorporates 
current social trends in inter-personal sexual and parenting relationships, but seeks as 
robustly as possible to sustain what it sees as a traditional description of Christian 
marriage.
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2.3 Learning Disability Theology
Theological thinking about disability has been dominated by Eiesland's 1994 book 
which broadly coincided with the secular shift from a medical to a social framework for 
thinking about disability. Specific aspects of disability have been considered, such as 
sight loss with the work by Hull (1997) based on his own personal experiences.
In general, new thinking about Disability Theology has come from those who 
themselves experience some form of physical disability but who are able to articulate 
that experience in a way that illuminates a wider debate.
It is, on the other hand, not entirely surprising that almost all secular writing on 
learning disability comes from those who do not have such a condition. Specialists 
such as Craft (1994) have done much to progress the way in which services for people 
with a learning disability are provided.
There are now a number of effective ways of looking at physical disability from a 
theological perspective, but the same is not true of learning disability. In particular, the 
Social Model approach introduced by Oliver (1986) assumes that any difficulties 
encountered by people with a physical disability should be resolved by changes in the 
environment and in society..
Hauerwas (1986a) included learning disability within his theological considerations 
but his underlying approach now jars with the secular understanding of the 
relationship between people with a learning disability and the whole of society.
Pailin (1992) wrote from a personal experience, not of being a person a with a learning 
disability, but from one who provided pastoral support to someone with a severe 
disability.
More recently, Swinton (2004a) has provided a contemporary framework, closely 
associated with developments in the practical support to people with a learning 
disability.
In general, however, there does not appear to be any significant work on how the 
theology of learning disability might differ from that about physical disability, despite 
the self-evident differences in the contexts. More particularly, work on marriage does 
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not appear to have been considered. It has yet to be established that marriage theology 
should adapt itself to the consequences of disability.
Hauerwas (e.g. 1986) and Pailin (1992) have considered learning disability primarily 
from the point of view of the non-disabled. That is, how – theologically – the non-
disabled should view the existence of such disabilities. What is missing is a sense of 
how marriage, for example, can be theologically defined for people with a learning 
disability. There are also various pastoral and ethical issues which such marriages 
generate and which have not been accommodated – for example the ability of parents 
with a learning disability to nurture their children or their capacity to enter into legal 
contracts. 
2.4 Contemporary Theological Questions
At present, then, we have a number of questions about marriage theology which 
appear either not to be covered by existing writings or where established ideas fail to 
meet the implications of these  phenomena.
These questions include, but are not limited to:
Q1. How far is child bearing and rearing a necessary part of a Christian marriage?9
Q2. Are there limits to a presumed right to marry and found a family?10 11
Q3. What is the relationship between covenant and contract as the formal basis of  
marriage?12
Q4. Is there a right to children, in parallel with a duty to have children?13
Q5. What is the consequence of either or both of a couple being married already having  
children, either together or from other relationships?
Q6. The parenting task has expanded, especially in length of time. Does this have an  
effect on the traditional duty of child rearing?14
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Q7. How far can people with a learning disability participate fully in liturgies which  
appear to demand a particular level of mental capacity?
Q8. Can the church seek to set limits on who can enter into Christian marriage which are  
more tightly drawn than secular principles, especially rights legislation?
Q9. What are the essential components of a marriage when child bearing is
not possible?15
Q10. What are the implications of intentional childlessness?16
Q11. Outside of deliberate celibacy, what can we make of intentional single status?17
Q12. Is the concept of cohabitation as a precursor to marriage a satisfactory response to  
the growth of long-term non-married parenting relationships?18
Summary
We have examined a number of surveys of marriage theology and 
their corresponding taxonomies. Despite the very substantial body of 
writing about marriage in general,  a number of questions have been 
found which are currently either unanswered or poorly addressed in 
this literature. 
In particular it is necessary to make a critical examination of 
traditional concepts such as marriage as a covenant, marriage as a 
paradigm for other theological constructs, the contractual and legal 
role of the church in marriage and the assumption that child bearing 
follows marriage, but first a methodology to be used in the analysis is 
needed.
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1 Care must always be taken not to confuse the general use of covenant in describing 
marriage with that of Covenant Marriage, mostly in a North American context, which is 
largely a re-statement of a traditional, patriarchal model.
2 Traditional writers include Pope Benedict XVI, Pope Paul VI, Lawler, Levering, Jeffery, 
Thomas, Ward, Barton
3 Adaptive writers include: Thatcher, Williams, Dominian, Jordan, Vardy, Witte, Loughlin
4 Radical writers include: Stuart, Isherwood, , Sullivan, Ruether, Rogers, Heyward
5 Not to be confused with Radical Orthodoxy.
6 We have avoided the use of the term ‘liberal’ for this category on the grounds that it relates 
more to other aspects of theology and ecclesiology and not to the underlying driving force. 
In addition, both Liberal and Catholic – to use ecclesiological connotations – may seek to 
be Adaptive.
7 Although direct data is not easy to find, Population Trends 127, 2007 shows that the 
number of people marrying aged 55 or above rose from 4% in 1991 to 7% in 2005.
8 Although the thesis does not examine it, a similar situation arises for men who, perhaps as 
a result of prostate treatment, are unable to procreate.
9 Most apologists for Christian marriage make an assumption that child bearing is sine qua 
non (e.g. Nazir-Ali, 2000; Thomas, 1983) and it is clear that until the present, there has 
been little written that does not begin from that point. As a result, whilst there is a wealth 
of writing about the role of child rearing within Christian marriage, there is scant attention 
to the question of the theological legitimacy of marriage when, for whatever reason, there 
are no children.
10 There is extensive literature based on the developments in the second part of the twentieth 
century to establish codes of human rights and to enshrine them in law.
11 An unresolved discussion from 2005 precipitated by the marriage of Prince Charles to 
Camilla Parker-Bowles concerned the possibility that state legislation might have prevented 
the marriage. Since the marriage proceeded as the result of a legal interpretation which 
removed the obstacle, it was not necessary to address the human rights case (the right to 
marry limited by national laws.
12 Woods identifies the negative implications of creating a legalistic – contractual – basis for 
Christian marriage (which “betrays a legalistic view of God's moral demands” (2001, 
p396). However, with Thatcher, he attributes the problems to a patriarchal institution, 
rather than seeking to find radical alternatives such as that found in a covenant.
24
13 Considerable work has been done (e.g. Warnock, 2002) to establish a secular ethical basis 
for assisted conception, but controversy over techniques has clouded the theological 
debate. As a result, it does not appear that there has been a theological basis for a right to 
have children which goes beyond the right to try to have children. The difference lies in 
what rights exist when all 'natural' attempts at conception have failed.
14 Evidence of the UK social pattern is available from the Office of National Statistics 
However, it does not appear that there has been any theological consideration of whether 
there are any implications as a result. In a contractual view of marriage, it is clearly 
important to understand the commitments of that contract and what might happen if those 
elements of the contract change materially.
15 Child rearing has long been seen to be part of the core definition what makes a Christian 
marriage. As we will identify later, increasing numbers of marriages involve older people 
with many women being post-menopausal. Not only does this present a pastoral issue 
(similar to that with single people) but also has wider theological implications and it is 
surprising that this problem does not seem to have been the focus of attention.
16 Typically, Christian marriage is assumed to imply child bearing (e.g. Nazir-Ali, 2000; 
Thomas, 1983). Stanton has summarised the phenomenon of voluntary childless people 
and the church's attitude towards it. Whilst she affirms, with Stuart, the legitimacy of this 
lifestyle “as another way of following Christ” (2001, p239) she ends by admitting that this 
is still work in progress.
17 One of the few writers to recognise the existence of deliberate singleness (not celibacy) is 
Wilson (2005). He has been particularly concerned to highlight the lack of pastoral care for 
people in such a situation. He concludes with four questions one of which includes a 
summary of the church's position as “Marriage good, everything else bad”. What he does 
not do is to examine the implications for marriage theology if the pattern of singleness is 
accepted as one option for a Christian lifestyle.
18 Thatcher (2001) has been advocating a re-appraisal of betrothal for many years as a 
response to the extensive cohabitation that is practised even by those who subsequently 
wish to marry in church. Dormor (2004) also argues for a re-appraisal by the church. 
However, both of these writers make the assumption that cohabitation should only be 
advocated as part of a process that intentionally leads to marriage. They do not address the 
growing situation in which many cohabitees have no intention of entering into formal 
marriage – in some cases explicitly ruling out that option.
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3. Methodology
In this chapter we will establish a methodology on which subsequent 
arguments are based, one in which we begin by expecting to find 
knowledge about God in and through the world around us. This will 
lead to a consideration of Natural Theology – what God has created 
is the best, if not the only, evidence of what we should use as the 
basis of the approach. Recognising that there are limitations to 
Natural Theology, we will develop the notion of Evidential Theology, 
namely that any ethical or theological principle must be consistent 
with nature as we observe it. This goes beyond post-modernism: just 
as the latter rejected the modernist view that evidence could prove 
positively certain ethical or theological principles, we now limit the 
apparent unprincipled post-modern approach by using evidence to at 
least negate some hypotheses. We will also compare Evidential 
Theology with other ideas which derive inspiration from scientific 
methods or discoveries.
The methodology used in this thesis combines scientific method with a particular 
understanding of incarnation. As will be outlined, scientific method is based on the 
verifiable collection of data about the world around us and its organisation into 
summarised forms which assist in an ability to predict how future behaviour will 
occur. Incarnation in a Christian context asserts that God – who exists outwith our 
universe and knowledge – nevertheless chooses to reveal himself through the world. 
Our knowledge of God is entirely limited by the way in which we perceive that world. 
Even revelation in scripture is through the physical reality of its authors.
In addition, I will make use of particular scientific ideas, such as those drawn from sub 
atomic physics, to generate new ways of looking at theological issues, new paradigms 
for the manner of  'Doing God'. Too often, theology – and more especially statements 
made by church leaders – are founded on theological philosophical principles which 
have been unchanged by parallel developments in scientific philosophy. That is to say, 
the essential building blocks of how a theological argument is constructed too 
frequently rely only on Aristotelian or Newtonian ways of thinking. Just as those ways 
failed to solve the presenting issues of sub atomic physics around the outset of the 
20C, so too have they failed to resolve theological and ethical problems which 
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continue to present themselves in a world that seeks global solutions which are 
identical in every place, time and culture.1
Natural Theology is neither new nor specific. Recent work by McGrath (2008) not only 
sets out its long history but also reinvigorates it with new insights. We do not have 
space here to review all that McGrath has said – especially as we will shortly establish 
a distinctive alternative version of the use of nature – but it will have to suffice to 
quote briefly.
McGrath identifies five themes:
1. The idea of a transcendent God who chooses to self-disclose in history 
and nature
2. The belief that there is an analogous relationship between God and 
nature, grounded in the created character of the natural order
3. The principle that humanity is created in the image of God, and thus 
endowed with some capacity to discern traces of God within or through 
nature
4. The concept of the “economy of salvation” which situates reflection on 
nature within a framework based on its “fall” and future restoration
5. The doctrine of the incarnation, which holds that God entered into the 
natural order in Christ, in order to transform and redeem it.
(2008, p178)
He reinforces his view of nature as a means of discerning God: 
While needing to be seen in a certain way, the natural world has an intrinsic  
ability to disclose the things of God. The parables of Jesus allow us to see God  
through nature; the 'I am' sayings suggest we are to find God within nature. 
(2008, p 132).
This, however, neglects that not all of the 'I am' sayings reference truly natural 
comparators. For example 'I am the true vine' (John 15:1) refers not to a naturally 
occurring plant but to a cultivated development. Equally, 'I am the Good Shepherd' (John 
10:11, 14) : the shepherd is symbolic of how humans adapt what occurs naturally to 
their own needs. We should, therefore, expect to find God, and to relate to God, 
through human-made constructs as much as those that we consider, perhaps 
artificially, as natural. This gives us a much larger canvas than Natural Theology.
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McGrath's Natural Theology is primarily about using the created world to gain greater 
knowledge about God per se, whilst in the context of this thesis we especially want to 
use the same evidence to discern what God expects of humanity and the way 
individuals behave towards each other. In Science and Religion (2010) he develops his 
theme primarily into the realm of showing the compatibility between the quite 
distinct methodologies of science and religion – a rebuttal of the arguments presented 
by Dawkins et al.
However, I do not (as some might) assert that incarnation is complete and therefore, 
that whilst our knowledge about God is incomplete, all that there is to know is already 
there, waiting to be accepted. Instead, a position is adopted that incarnation is a 
continuing process, that God is not limited by time or by a particular point in time. As 
argued by Robinson: “Could it have been God’s plan all along to reveal more and more of  
himself and his will as the church grew and matured?” (2008) Since the manner in which 
God reveals himself2 is in and through the created world, especially through humanity 
in all its forms, we recognise that the incarnation is itself on-going. Not only is there 
more to discover about the world around us through the application of thought, 
investigation and experimentation, but there is ever more to be discovered.
Stuart also writes:
One problem that many of us have with the Trinity is that it seems to portray  
God as self-sufficient; we can be left feeling like the wallflowers at the party.  
This is why it is essential to remember the ancient Christian tradition that we  
are the body of Christ on earth; we are part of God the incarnate; we are  
taken up in the dance of passion; we are part of the Trinity (1995, p245).
So, our ability to discern God and his will for us is dependent on our willingness to 
look critically at what is going on around us and  be prepared to incorporate this 
evidence into our theology. “Could it be that even the Bible is too small a box in which to  
enclose God? … God seems infinitely more engaged with humankind that that … continually  
attempting to lead us closer and closer to God’s will” (Robinson, 2008). This search for 
God’s will by carefully examining the modern universe I shall call Evidential Theology, 
indicating that a primary responsibility is to seek understanding through an unending 
observation of the incarnation. 
This implies that we are under an enduring obligation to revise our theology in the 
light of what we discover of the revelation of God especially the incarnation in 
humankind. It further follows that some theological assertions may have had validity 
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in a particular context, based on the knowledge available at that time, but as our 
knowledge extends previous understandings, so also must our theology. An example 
is Badham who tends towards the view that “precisely in order for the continuity of the  
Church’s life to be preserved it must change the expression of its beliefs” (1998, pp 15-25). It is 
equally important to accept that anything which we assert today will evolve in the 
future and that we must not cling to particular past views which are inconsistent with 
the evidence we collect from the world around us, including our knowledge of how 
human beings are constructed, behave and interact.
There are strong resonances with the manifesto statement made by Isherwood and 
Stuart:
1. Incarnation, by which we mean that which we call divine, is redeemingly present in and  
between people and nature . . .
2. Sin and redemption are not just metaphysical realities but lived . . . in the real lives of  
people
3. [This] experience is central in the creation of theology [and is] sited in the body which  
includes the mind (1998, p10)
Whilst, in context, they are speaking specifically about the experiences of women, the 
statement has wider applicability, not least in the three case study areas we shall 
examine later.
Whilst Hauerwas asserts that we know God through both his son, in Scripture and in 
his body, the church, (Coffey, 2009, p9) he has been deeply sceptical of a tendency to 
allow contemporary beliefs to be moulded by concurrent secular understandings. The 
knowledge of God, known as set out above, is more fixed by traditional interpretations 
of scripture than by developments in scientific knowledge. He suggests that our fixed 
understanding of God should cause us to modify how we see the world.
There are two distinct situations: on the one hand it may be asserted that it is the task 
of the church to correct mistakes which were made in the writing of scripture 
(Badham, writing about Coleridge) but on the other hand the process may be seen as 
one of gradual evolution and revelation. Badham (1998) asserts that the progressive 
character of revelation is almost universally accepted.
Such revelation is not guaranteed to be universally unidirectional. Since revelation is 
received and distributed by humans, it is inevitable that the process includes blind 
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alleys. Even without such evolutionary ‘mistakes’, a progressive, on-going and yet 
incomplete revelation and incarnation implies that there are theological principles yet 
to be established. The fact that some of those will bring into question any 
simplification (even to the point of error) of what we have established so far does not 
in itself imply that what goes before should be seen as ‘wrong’. It means that we have 
only been granted partial revelation. 
As well as deriving evidence from the objective observation of the world about us we 
can consider the growing body of material in ‘rights language’. Various declarations – 
some relating to all humanity, some relating to particular groups – form widely 
accepted norms for moral behaviour, individual and collective. Whilst there is no 
guarantee that such material has its basis in principles which are consistent with 
Christian theology3 (and at various times and contexts quite clearly has not) it is 
important to be especially certain before enunciating anything which diverges from 
this base. Whilst this approach is, in principle, different from liberation methodology, 
it has close relationships and may at times seek the same, or similar, goals.
It is also distinctive about Christian theology that this revelation is particularly 
focused in the historical person of Jesus. Our knowledge of that person is initially and, 
for some, wholly, derived from the scriptural records. Whilst it might be argued that 
God deliberately chose to give humanity a specific perception through that historical 
record, the methodology of this thesis, whilst asserting the primacy of scripture, also 
asserts that it is the person of Christ that lies behind and beyond that written record 
which we need to elicit in order to formulate reliable statements about matters of faith 
and action. Specifically, we need to ask not  “What would Jesus – in his historical 
context – have done about x?” but, instead, “What does the person of Christ as we 
have come to understand that personality, now direct us to do about x?”
Thatcher, setting out his methodology for developing his theology of families, begins 
with:
First, God’s revelation in Christ must be given priority over God’s revelation  
in scripture. Second, as a matter of theological method, Christology precedes  
ethics and shapes them (2007, pp 44-45).
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Harries characterises Jesus, from an ethical teaching perspective, as having  four 
elements: 
• radical inwardness: what we specify for others must have an integrity with 
our own behaviour
• inclusive: ethical principles must have universal application
• unlimited: there is no limit on what may be required of us
• service: what we do for others is determined solely on the basis of their 
need, not what we get in return (2008, pp 61-62)
However, as I have already asserted, our knowledge and understanding of God is 
progressive, requiring us to evaluate the evidence from all sources. In this regard, the 
methodology has links with Radical Orthodoxy. Long writes: “Radical Orthodoxy cannot  
develop theology solely by professing basic Christian dogma; it develops theological doctrine  
always at the same time that it discusses politics, economics and ethics” (2003, p131). 
However, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to return to a specific traditional pre-Scotus 
theology which, at best, treats evidence as second class material.
An important distinction between Evidential Theology and Natural Theology lies in 
the treatment of the evidence, alongside traditions and scripture. Evidential Theology 
gives unavoidable weight to the evidence insofar as it is incontrovertible. As in past 
controversies, if it is certain that the earth is round, it does not matter how many 
verses from scripture are advanced to the contrary, it will make no difference to the 
shape of the earth.
But this is not simply scientific method because, as with Long (2003), Evidential 
Theology also recognises that the experience of God – especially in our Christological 
understanding – affects our ethical and moral dimension – although this direction is 
not particularly explored by McGrath (2009, Lecture 2, p11ff) who is more attracted to 
its explanatory ability. (See also Polkinghorne, 2000)
The approach adopted by people such as Dawkins is a radical atheism which asserts 
that no truth exists that cannot be demonstrated by scientific method. Such truths are 
absolute and independent of the observer. As a result, concepts such as ‘God’ are 
rejected as being incapable of such ‘proof’. In any event, this provides little or no basis 
for determining what is right or wrong in human behaviour.
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On the other hand, Postmodernists assert the pre-eminence of the person and that 
there is no such thing as an absolute truth in the sense that scientists claim.4 
Everything is dependent on the position (culture, philosophy, experience) of the 
observer. Different observers may thus validly reach different conclusions and both 
have a partial claim on truth.
In sub-atomic physics in the early 20C, a similar realisation struck a hard knock to the 
Newtonian view that we had a complete model of how all matter operates5 and it 
would only be a question of time to apply these principles in order to predict universal 
behaviour entirely. The advent of such concepts as the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle established that there are necessary limits on what we can and cannot 
establish and we shall return to this problem later when we introduce the concept of 
Uncertain Theology.
It may be argued that Evidential Theology is essentially a Liberal Modernist approach, 
reverting back to the notion that evidence can establish facts independently of the 
observer and having universal validity. However, the aim is very different: namely that 
with Popper (1959), we can only use scientific method to establish a negative. In this 
sense it remains a useful process since we can identify which theological proposals 
could only be accepted if we reject the observations of our own eyes. 
This does not go quite as far as Nelson when he introduces his notion of correlation: 
“The middle course between these two options [deontological and libertarian] is one of  
correlation -- not a correlation by deduction from a divine edict but a correlation between  
religious teaching and the empirical data” (Nelson, 1988, p388).6 This 'correlation' is 
similar to O'Murchu's use of quantum physics to establish theological methods 
(2004).
The use of evidence is intended to prevent us from straying into the unacceptable and 
is concerned that the postmodern approach has given credibility to unscientific 
assertions which place belief above scientific method:
1. Homeopathy: The spat between the Bad Science writer Goldacre and the proponents 
of homeopathy sets his analysis that there has been no evidence of its efficacy that 
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meets the same criteria as other medication against the strongly held belief that 
homeopathy ‘works’, despite the lack of controlled tests to support this.
2. Creationism and Intelligent Design: The desire by certain Christian groups to assert 
the literal reading of the Bible is set against scientific descriptions of evolution 
with both sides reaching very different conclusions about the age of the universe. 
The recent advancement of Intelligent Design is, by its proponents, intended to set 
a constraint on what science may conclude: if a scientific theory clashes with 
Creationism then, by definition, it must be wrong.
3. Same-sex relationships and HIV/AIDS: evidence of the existence of same-sex 
relationships, both historically in humans and in animals is rejected by those who 
wish to promote a view that scripture unambiguously rejects such behaviour as 
absolutely sinful. Further, some go on to reject work by biochemists and medical 
scientists in developing medical treatments for HIV/AIDS and the availability of 
barrier contraceptives to diminish its transmission.
The methodology used here challenges cultural trends which make the above 
examples possible and which postmodernism seeks to codify and to justify.
On the one hand, it is important to recognise that science cannot address many issues, 
especially those of theology. As such, it is not a ‘way of life’ nor can it ever ultimately 
justify ethical or theological assertions.
On the other hand, scientific observation can, and must, establish constraints within 
which theological and ethical thinking take place. Unlike postmodernist (in the 
caricature above) permission to pursue the pre-eminence of any belief over objective 
observation, the methodology of this thesis begins with the objective and works 
towards the subjective. However, the subjective must be subordinate to the objective – 
and that objectivity is a valid goal, even if at any point in time we are only in 
possession of part of it.
In this sense we stand with Galileo in saying, “But it moves”, when faced with the 
determination of the church not to alter its views on an earth-centred universe despite 
the observations of Galileo and other astronomers. More precisely, as Lakeland cites 
from Brecht, “The aim of science is not to open the door to everlasting wisdom, but to set a  
limit on everlasting error” (1997, p 36).
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In each of the three areas of marriage that we shall consider, we start by establishing a 
factual base on which to build a better theological understanding that remains at all 
times constrained, but not determined, by the evidence.
For example, if  it is evidenced that some people with a learning disability are able to 
establish a marriage that has all the hallmarks of a Christian marriage, then it is 
unrealistic to assert a theology which states that all people with a learning disability 
cannot make a valid marriage – as has been asserted in the past.
On the other hand, no amount of evidence about marriages collectively can – in the 
hindsight of post-modern critiques – establish a universal paradigm for the 
relationship. This will present problems when confronting the use of human 
experience, such as that of marriage, as a paradigm for the relationship between God 
and humanity.
Yet we shall retain at least one element of modernism, namely that even though we do 
not – maybe even cannot – know universal truths about God, that does not prevent 
their existence nor devalue the innate tendency of humanity to search for them. This 
is not the “late modernism” of Lakeland (1997, p 17). Instead, it seeks to avoid the 
danger that Lakeland identifies, that post-modern ethics can be driven too much by an 
emotional subjectivity, rather than a recognition that all experiences have to be 
accommodated (1997, p28). Instead, we adopt the principle that each new piece of 
evidence – even if it is ‘merely’ another subjective experience – must somehow be 
incorporated into the generality. Any existing generalisation has to be expanded, 
possibly even rejected, if it is in conflict with the evidence. Without this approach it 
becomes increasingly difficult to establish validity for ethical guidance or direction; life 
itself is too complex always to operate from first principles. Generalisations provide a 
short cut to other people’s learnt experiences and thus prevent us from falling prone 
to the disasters that underpinned that accumulated wisdom. Sadly, history suggests 
that the alternative to over-adherence to tradition is not freedom but prejudice. We 
need simultaneously to avoid being prevented from making new and valid 
developments just because they appear to challenge previous advice or tradition.
In many ways this is a greater challenge for those who gather the evidence – whether 
or not they call themselves scientists – and not, as Lakeland suggests a 'more modest  
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goal'. Rather, “Science does not tell us what we must think, but it does tell us what we may not  
think”(1997, p37). It is a start to bridging the gulf which the late 20C allowed to 
develop between ‘science’ and ‘religion’ in a way that previous generations would not 
have recognised.
There is, in a way, a fallacy in the phrase ‘the ethics of science’: the collection of 
evidence is, in itself, unbounded by ethical constraints (other than are found in the 
manner of collecting the evidence). The problems lie in engineering: how we apply 
that knowledge. It is not so much the having of knowledge that is the problem, rather 
what we do with that knowledge. In this sense, we need to re-interpret the Genesis 
account of The Fall, recognising that it is more about obedience to God than about the 
acquisition of knowledge.
Lakeland writes: 
Habermas and others have argued that postmodern culture is a product of  
neoconservatism, which rejects modernity’s celebration of autonomy and its  
championing of human and civil rights. Preferring a vapid amorality, it  
promotes materialism, consumerism, and social and political indifference,  
often dressed up with the rhetoric of ‘traditional values’ (2007, p63).
If this is indeed an accurate assessment (broadly shared by Radical Orthodoxy) – 
others might reject such a negative view - then I too want to maintain a distance from 
this version of post-modernism.
Whilst the formulation of rights, especially in legal codes, cannot of itself provide the 
basis for a theological morality, there is considerable value in using various 
expressions as the basis of evidence that certain lines of thinking are no longer viable.7 
Whilst they might be criticised as having a too heavy dependence on the validity of the 
concept of Natural Law8, they remain an important part of our culture and cannot be 
ignored. In the same way as the so-called laws of nature are an aid to discerning what 
theological arguments run counter to the evidence, so also Rights codes can act in a 
similar way by indicating principles which would require very special argument to be 
dispensed with inside a theologically-based code of ethical behaviour.
There is assumed to be merit in both the view:
While Christianity can utilise the insights of social science, it accommodates  
itself to the paradigms of secular science at its peril. Christianity does not  
have to conform itself to the assumptions of the world: rather, the world has  
to conform to the vision of the Christian tradition (Lakeland, 1997, p69).
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as well as its converse, namely that Christianity has to be big enough to accept that 
other religions, as well as the secular world, are capable of gaining valid insights into 
moral principles. In this way we adopt one of Lakeland’s conclusions, “The task of  
understanding or interpreting society, if attempted at all, must be conducted through piecemeal,  
tactical, pragmatic and tentative means” (1997, p88).
In other words, we cannot confine ourselves to traditional methodologies nor can we 
expect to be able to progress uniformly and consistently but must be willing to draw 
on a variety of evidence, accepting the evidence itself, and not be deflected simply on 
the grounds of its origin. Equally, it may well be that some conclusions may have 
localised validity. The continuing debate in the Anglican Communion about sexuality 
is driven – to destruction – by a desire to establish universal tenets rather than being 
willing to consider differing solutions in differing cultures.
It is important, therefore, to recognise that much of what is considered in this thesis is 
evidence from contemporary Britain. This does not devalue the efforts to establish 
broader truths, but serves as a cautionary reminder not to draw paradigms that 
depend unduly on that context as the basis for generalisations.
Specifically, as we shall see, the notion of marriage has changed fundamentally over 
time yet there remain attempts to use it as an unchanging paradigm of the 
relationship between God and humanity (Gomez 2001). We need to accommodate the 
fact that not only can the notion of marriage change over time, but also that it can vary 
over space.
The distinctiveness of this methodology can be seen in comparisons with alternatives. 
For example, Gomez looks directly  at the specific issue of the public blessing of same-
sex unions, an issue which is sufficiently close to the considerations of marriage in 
this thesis to justify the comparison.
There are several important differences between Gomez’s methodology and Evidential 
Theology, including:
1. There is no recognition of the postmodern critique of a universal truth – or at least 
the inability of humanity confined by finite comprehension to be able to discern 
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that which is defined as infinite. The Gomez assumes that there is a single truth 
and is ambivalent about alternative biblical hermeneutics.
2. The argument is unashamedly pragmatic and institutional. It is driven by a desire 
to conserve the church as a coherent institution as well as be affected by 
independent pastoral needs which are determined by the nature of the world as it 
is found by practitioners. In this respect it echoes the Radical Orthodoxy project
3. Gomez adopts the position that incarnation was a fixed process, set in the past and 
documented by Scripture. In comparison, Evidential Theology is predicated on 
incarnation not being constrained into the time dimension
4. The response to reality is relative: it seeks to deal with pastoral issues as they arise 
rather than to search for an overall framework within which a broad range of 
issues can be resolved. This is similar to Situational Ethics and prefers to allow 
special cases to resolve problems rather than tackle the shortcomings of the general 
case.
5. Gomez limits his sources to interpreted scripture  and finds no room for evidence 
from the world around us to act as a corrective in resolving hermeneutical 
conflicts.
6. As a consequence, Gomez espouses a clear belief that the whole of truth can be 
discerned by a combination of scripture and tradition – in the shape of 
institutional dictats. There is no role for other evidence.
Whilst this methodology may well have served the purposes of the report (Gomez, 
2001) in seeking to demonstrate that the blessing of same-sex unions should not be 
permitted, it is clearly defective when it comes to looking at issues which are entirely 
new in the experience of humanity. Since the aim of this thesis is exactly that – to take 
questions relating to marriage which are a product of recent sociological and 
technological developments hitherto unknown - a necessarily different approach is 
required.
The parallels and differences can perhaps be seen by taking the following question 
from Gomez: “How do we understand the rise of homosexual identity and community in certain  
cultures?” and substituting ‘learning disability’ for homosexual, or even deaf church 
(churches specifically for deaf people). These latter variations do not carry with them 
the same baggage and therefore are more readily debated without recourse to familiar 
historical formulae. This is similar to the way in which a change in the reported 
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incidence of a particular phenomenon is erroneously used to suggest that there has 
been an actual change of incidence. One of the aims of this thesis is to use these new 
situations to reach conclusions that could not readily be reached by existing routes.
The use of scientific evidence is also highlighted: 
the Church must draw with discernment on the available scientific research  
while taking care to avoid letting its actions and teaching be shaped by as yet  
tentative findings on the origins and nature of ‘sexual orientation’. Even  
when greater clarity is reached through further scientific enquiry, however,  
the Church must avoid drawing false conclusions from science. Although  
certain findings may lead to greater understanding and different pastoral  
responses, scientific findings in and of themselves cannot determine the  
Church’s moral teaching or public liturgies (Gomez, 2001, p15).
The principal problem here lies in the assumption that some scientific findings may 
not be tentative; that is, we can categorise scientific enquiry into that which is ‘work 
in progress’ and that which is complete. Although there are some findings which it 
would be hard to challenge (denying the existence of gravity does not stop an apple 
falling to the ground!) no science is ever complete.
Equally, it is hard to accept the hypothesis embedded in the above extract that some 
Church teaching could be contrary to scientific findings. Indeed, an incarnational 
approach sets a high premium on discerning the nature of God’s love through the 
evidence of what he has created and still is creating. Something which exists in nature 
has a strong claim to being part of that incarnational lens. 
3.1 The Use of Nature
Debates about sexuality, including the purpose of marriage, frequently resort to claims 
that certain behaviours are, or are not, natural. 
Almost all societies set a legal minimum age for sexual intercourse between men and 
women. In many contexts it seems likely that the strongest appeal in setting such a 
limit is to ‘what is natural’. In particular in our generation there is a widespread 
revulsion against paedophiles and a heightened sensitivity resulting from often intense 
media pressure.
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However, this minimum age has changed over time (Mechiorre, 2004; Fass, 2003) and 
is no longer linked to a physical event in either the life of a male or female person. 
Whilst in past generations a direct link with puberty was strong, there is now a sense 
of considering when a person becomes a mature adult. Below this age they are 
vulnerable, immature and in need of protection. But as soon as the threshold of age has 
been crossed then no legal barrier is established. When the age was set by a verifiable 
event, such as puberty, the barrier was clear, but in modern society there is no such 
clarity.
Of course, legal limits are, by their nature, crude and approximate, always set in as 
precise terms as it is possible. This becomes especially important when criminal 
prosecutions can result. But the notion that on one day, sexual activity is illegal, yet 
just a moment later, all suddenly changes, is clearly nonsense. People grow and 
mature gradually.
The debate is clouded by emotional reaction and prejudice as, for example, can be seen 
in the adverse popular reaction to a suggestion from a senior British police officer that 
there should be changes in the way in which heterosexual behaviour, where one or 
other partner is under age, should be prosecuted (Gillan, 2006). Under-age sexual 
offending of a consensual nature is often confused with paedophilia.
Those who appeal to nature for such principles have to come to terms with the fact 
that the human body, like much of the animal world, is ready for procreation at 
puberty. For many generations, but not for all of history, it has been considered that 
this event in itself is not sufficient to make procreation allowable and so marriage laws 
have been set which are not solely based on the so-called laws of nature.
It is also important to recognise that, at the time when scripture was recorded, most 
societies expected procreation to follow soon after puberty and it is necessary to 
reflect this in any use of proof texts to guide contemporary social mores.
It soon becomes clear that we have to be careful in the appeal to the natural world for 
positive evidence about what is morally right or wrong for humans, set in a specific 
social context, any more than we can to prove the existence of God.
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We have already noted the problems thrown up by post-modern critiques of 
modernist scientific arguments, not least because the use of scientific method in 
theological arguments involves a category error, and vice versa. However, recourse to 
‘what is natural’ still remains  a temptation that Evidential Theology must resist.
For example, the debate about sexuality, especially same-sex relationships, often 
appeals to the law of nature. In this context, 'same-sex behaviour is against the laws of 
nature' has some initial attraction – 'It is not natural'. However, it begins to be less 
comforting when we realise that any generalisation can only be claimed as a law of 
nature if it is fully inclusive – it accommodates all the observations in nature. Hence, 
for a scientist, anything that actually occurs has to be described by a law of nature and, 
in that sense at least, can only be described as natural. 
Yet even this is not enough as nature is subject to change – evolution. Fagan says, 
“The practical conclusion from all this is that human nature does indeed change, and our  
perception of what counts as ‘natural’ likewise changes” (2003, p91).
When we come to apply this to marriage, we should also remember, “This means that it  
is not possible to make any single historical or cultural form of marriage absolute as the norm for  
all” (Fagan, 2003, p91).
The confusion between nature (ontology) and purpose (teleology) has been a feature 
that has arisen in debates about marriage for some considerable time. Indeed, the use 
of marriage as a paradigm serves only to compound the difficulties and we will return 
to this in a later chapter.
3.2 Tradition and Reason
As we all grow up we consolidate our experience into simplified expressions, many of 
which we learn from previous generations. Such received wisdom helps us 'stand on 
the shoulders of those who have gone before us' and means that we do not have to re-
invent that which is already well-known. As we become more analytical in our 
approach to the world around us we learn about physical laws which describe the way it 
seems that the world works. Sometimes these ‘laws’ are found to be faulty and have to 
be revised.
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In the world of physics, progress is usually in a forward direction, with new 
discoveries refining those that were previously the last word. Sometimes even with the 
refinements the older, simpler, descriptions will suffice for practical purposes. Most of 
us do not need to know that Newtonian Mechanics are not exact and that, if we were 
to operate at the sub atomic level then we would see things very differently. However, 
it does not take a child very long to discover that a breakable cup always falls to the 
floor when let go. Adults call that gravity – toddlers just find it fascinating!
Indeed, if we were required to work with the latest refinements all the time, two 
things would result: Firstly, it would take so long to learn them that there would be 
little time left in life to do much else. Approximations save time. Secondly, the degree 
of brain power needed to survive would mean that most of us would have to exist in a 
bemused torpor for our whole lifetime! Again, approximations help those who do not 
need to use the more complex rules. The danger in the post-modern critique is that 
individuals feel compelled, rather than permitted, to devise their own principles to the 
extent that, in the end, the task collapses and people retreat too far into the traditions 
which they inherited, or alternatively, into self-interested prejudice. Principles need 
only be sufficiently accurate for the immediate purpose.
Tradition is one form in which we learn from our forebears. Ways of doing things – 
whether social behaviour, medical practice or religious ritual – become codified and 
passed from one generation to the next as what we call tradition. In this sense, 
tradition is part of the tapestry of things which we learn early in life that help us make 
sense of the world around us and to operate within it in a time-efficient manner.
On the other hand, so much of what we learn from the past is modified and evolved in 
the light of further experience. Scientific laws stay in one place for ever shorter periods 
of time. The result of this immense amount of activity is that we are always learning 
something new. Of course, the down side is that we sometimes learn that what we 
thought was true we now know to be false, or at least defective. New theories bring 
with them better understanding and the ability to do things that we could not do 
before. However, what is important is that technology – what we can do – is 
overwhelmingly driven by science – what we know. The more we know the more we 
can do. 
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On the other hand, there are plenty of examples of discoveries that were driven by 
belief rather than reason. Many of the world explorers of previous centuries believed 
that there were places to be found even if their contemporaries thought that their 
knowledge indicated otherwise. Equally, there are many medical treatments that were 
found by accident – the discovery of penicillin is said to be one of the greatest 
accidents of the 20C.
However, what reason does is to provide the means to recognise when there is a 
dissonance between tradition and experience. This is the process of discovery. 
In the world of moral laws similar progress is made. Few today would wish, with 
Hammurabi, that “if any one bring an accusation of any crime before the elders, and does not  
prove what he has charged, he shall, if it be a capital offence charged, be put to death” (King, 
1910, p29). Old Testament times adopted Codes of Behaviour parts of which, such as 
child sacrifice and polygamy, would be quite unacceptable today.
Most world religions are founded on a base of tradition, often in the form of written 
documents dating back many centuries. Whilst they vary in the way in which such 
traditions are viewed, it is clear that they can be a substantial force, controlling 
contemporary social behaviour.
Christians are divided on the role of tradition, including the greatest part of that 
tradition, the Bible itself. On the one hand there are those who see the bible as literal 
truth. Whilst this is an extreme position there are many who adhere to it. Perhaps 
more frequently there is a minimal damage position which would like to think that the 
literal and whole truth have been revealed in the bible but are forced by circumstance 
and experience to diverge from that position. Instead, they seek to accept as few 
amendments as possible – preferring to hold to biblical statements which, to others, 
seem at variance from their experience.
Alternatively we can take the view that principles set out either in the bible at varying 
historical times, or by the church in subsequent generations, were perhaps the best 
approximations known at the time to what is best for humankind and what it is that 
God wants us to do. In other words, “Because it is literally the word of God does not mean  
that I have to read it literally”.
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Humankind can never know wholly and without error, the mind of God. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that our collective view of what God expects from us develops 
over time and in the light of contemporary culture and scientific knowledge. There is 
nothing either new or wrong with this: it has been happening for at least as long as we 
have recorded history. In the context of Evidential Theology, this  can be seen as 
another manifestation of the on-going process of incarnation.
However, it will become important later in our examination of marriage theology to 
make careful distinction between purpose and nature. The two questions: “What is 
marriage?” and “What is marriage for?” are easily compounded and the fundamental 
difference overlooked resulting in a dissonance between what we inherit as a theology 
of the purpose of marriage and what we can measure in terms of what marriage 
actually is and how it is practised in society.
3.3 Science Related Theologies
Earlier, we set out in some detail how Evidential Theology avoids some of the 
problems which have been seen in Natural Theology. In particular, it has been 
important to emphasise how the evidence is used as a corrective to tradition rather 
than a means of demonstrating specific conclusions about the nature and intentions of 
God. Theology and Science currently interact in two distinct ways:
• theological analysis of what science is saying
• using scientific developments as inspiration for theological understanding
The first of these encompasses those who, stimulated by atheistic analyses such as by 
Dawkins, examine whether or not the discoveries of science impact on how we 
understand God and God's interaction with our universe. The biological perspective 
has, since Darwin, challenged literal readings of scripture and led some to develop 
Intelligent Design as a means of spanning both the principle of creation (God as the 
initiator and designer of the universe) and that of evolution. Rather than, as the most 
literal readers, insisting that God created everything as it is, Intelligent Design9 asserts 
that God created the universe with a set of rules that made the emergence of humanity 
a necessary consequence. Irreducible Complexity is adduced as evidence that biological 
structures are too complex to have evolved naturally and must therefore have been 
designed. 
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Cosmology inevitably presents a challenge: firstly because it seeks to understand the 
processes by which the universe began and subsequently evolved into that which we 
experience today and secondly because it is, inevitably, largely theoretical, even 
speculative. This provides grounds for those who are uncomfortable about the 
theological consequences to seek refuge in a 'It's only another unprovable theory' to avoid 
having to confront the evidence. As yet, the Large Hadron Collider experiment has not 
provided evidence one way or the other for such as the Higgs Boson or even 
dimensions other than those of three dimensional space and time (LHC, 2010). 
Recently, Hawking has suggested the existence of universes inaccessible from our own 
(Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010). Keller (2008) seeks to address the question Why? 
Rather than How? - properly avoiding a category error that confuses the separate roles 
of science and theology, especially in such a confrontational matter. In challenging the 
orthodoxy of creatio ex nihilo, she says, “A chaosmic Christ would represent the flow of a  
word that was always materialised, more and less and endlessly, a flow that unblocks the hope of  
an incarnation, in which all flesh takes part. . . . It takes place within the shared, spatiotemporal  
body of all creatures” (2008, p19).
Several theologies have emerged which  take their inspiration from the development of 
ideas in the scientific domain and translate the concepts as analogies for theological 
discourse.
Process Theology, developed from original ideas by Whitehead and Hartshorne, places 
our individual and collective experiences centre stage and emphasises that God 
contains and interacts with the world, whilst not being limited by our universe. 
“Original thinking in science and philosophy, original art in all its forms, original styles of life  
and social organisations, all witness to the peculiarly effective presence of Christ” (Cobb & 
Griffin, 1976, p101). And then: “But the history of (these) is the history of repeated created  
transformations” so that: “Christ is in no wise limited to the sphere of the 'religious'”. God 
contains the universe but is not limited to or by it: the term panentheism was coined to 
distinguish this position from pantheism in which God is only to be found in the world 
about us.
Evidential Theology shares with Process Theology an incarnational base and that we 
must use the totality of the evidence that we gather from the world about us as 
evidence of God interacting with humanity. However, the limited ambition of 
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Evidential Theology allows us to use that evidence more objectively and less 
experientially since it is primarily concerned with acting as a corrective to ideas 
generated from outside itself. Mesle points out that, “any vision of divinity or even of  
nature that humans create must be understood as a model or a myth” (1993, p5). This process 
is shared with scientific method which generally establishes a model based on 
evidence which it then seeks to prove by further observations. “God is omnipresent.  
Every person in every moment is experiencing God as the ground of both order and freedom . . .  
God works in the world by continual and universal self-revelation” (1993, p9). “When process  
theologians are asked how God acts in the world they have an answer that does not escape into  
the supernatural world of magic and wishful thinking, but embraces the scientific quest for  
knowledge and all that it teaches us” (1993, p44).
Barbour suggests that, “God acts by being experienced by the world, affecting the development  
of successive moments. But God never determines the outcome of events” (1997, p287). Here 
we see a divergence from the interests of Evidential Theology: we have already 
indicated that this is based on the principle that God is continuously incarnate in and 
through the world as a means of establishing a relationship with humanity. That 
relationship is one of Love, quite distinct from the autocratic role which Process 
Theology sets up in order to knock it down.
O'Murchu (2004) is inspired by the ideas of physics that emerged in the early 20C, in 
particular the way in which Quantum theories challenged Classical models of how the 
universe operates. He is less concerned with the fact that quantum physics presents a 
very different view of behaviour from that on which scripture was written, but more 
inspired by possibilities which result from being freed by the constraints of a 
mechanistic metaphor whose principal features he identifies (2004, p25) as:





In their place, as O'Murchu reports, we have to face the conclusion that everything 
interacts with everything else in ways which have surprising outcomes. Firstly, it 
means that nothing is isolated and that we have a moral responsibility for the 
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consequences of our actions and the long term survival of our environment. Secondly, 
that matter can manifest itself in different ways, notable the wave-particle dualism. 
Thirdly, “It is at a perceptual level that the new theory evokes a new way of viewing and  
understanding our world. . . . interacting with it experientially rather than trying to  
conceptualize it at an 'objective' distance” (2004, p29). “In the quantum worldview, nothing  
makes sense in isolation; basically, there are no boundaries, and influences can emerge from  
several sources” (2004, p33). Swinburne (2006) examines how this understanding of 
mutual influence has replaced the need to assign the effect to God in the shape of 
Divine Laws.
Evidential Theology shares this understanding that we cannot establish theological 
and ethical statements in the abstract, independent from the evidence of a God, in a 
loving relationship,  interacting with the totality of humanity.
O'Murchu also looks at the implications of Uncertainty but makes rather less of it than 
we shall when we return to our methodology in a later chapter and posit Uncertain 
Theology in which it is possible that specific statements about God and how he 
expects humanity to behave can be, in the sense of particle physics, infinitely 
uncertain.
The use of evidence from the surrounding world in three case studies will throw up 
problems with received marriage theology which will need to be resolved. Situational 
Ethics is one attempt to provide a basis for just such contexts. Pioneered by Fletcher 
(1966), it seeks to respond to the experience that deterministic principles appear to 
break down in specific cases, often at the point when they are most needed. In some 
cases, two or more legalistic rules lead to different conclusions of the right action in a 
particular context. In their place, he proposed that decisions should be made in each 
context and the circumstances surrounding it.
In the case of Marriage Theology, this might mean that when we encounter difficulties 
in reconciling the evidence of, for instance the ability of people with a learning 
disability to form enduring relationships, we should resolve the problem by allowing 
different action – action which may be counter to some established principles – if the 
context demands it. “there are times when a man has to push his principles aside and do the  
right thing” (Fletcher, 1966, p13). Situational Ethics prefers this over expecting general 
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principles to be discovered which encompass both the majority as well as the marginal 
cases.
In many ways, this approach is reminiscent of early attempts in physics to 
accommodate new experiments that could not be explained by Newtonian mechanics 
by adopting models which were essentially 'traditional' but with special cases. Better 
progress was made, such as with Quantum Mechanics, when it was recognised that 
fundamentally new principles were needed.
3.4 Methodology In Action
The impact of the Evidential Theology methodology is that we shall begin by looking 
at what marriage is, or has become, as seen in contemporary society, largely in a north 
European context, but with some reference to north America.
Potentially, one of the methodological problems we face is in determining what 
situations are ‘marriage’ and which are not, especially if we seek to draw 
generalisations from our observations. For example, if we accepted the assertion – 
made historically quite widely – that marriage cannot be ended and that divorce is not 
to be allowed, a relationship which follows a secular declaration of divorce may not be 
considered (at least ecclesiologically) as a marriage. In which case, any observations 
which included such situations would potentially be flawed, especially if there were 
considerable sub-group variations between those in a first marriage and those who 
had formed their relationship after a divorce. We would for example, have a conflict if 
we found that second marriages lasted longer than first marriages.
For the present at least, we shall set aside this concern and generally examine 
situations which have a broad social acceptance as being marriages.10 Indeed, it may 
well be that in the process we shall see a need to allow a broader definition of what is 
a marriage or, especially, what a marriage constitutes.
This problem arises even within the stage of examining the nature (ontology) of 
marriage and before we allow a sense of purpose (teleology) to invade what we are 
prepared to define as marriage.
47
Conclusion
In this thesis three situations are considered which are, broadly 
speaking, new to the essence of Christian theology of marriage, 
namely:
• marriage where one or both partners has a learning 
disability
• post-menopausal marriage (as a focus for deliberately 
childless marriage)
• changes in the parenting role
In each case we will examine what is happening in practice and how 
this evidence shows defects in past theologies of marriage. In this 
way we shall seek to reach a more encompassing definition of the 
nature (ontology) of marriage.
In the manner set out above, this evidence will be found to indicate 
areas in which we can clearly state that the purpose, or theology, of 
marriage does not lie. Having thus used the evidence to reject some 
traditional beliefs, especially where marriage is used as a paradigm 
for other theological constructs, we shall need to reconstruct a better 
basis for the church to teach about the purpose (teleology) of 
marriage in our contemporary society.
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1 Although the words 'Doing God' have been widely used, Spencer (2006) gives a particular 
contemporary focus.
2 In general in this thesis, God is referred to in the third person as ‘he’ but it is not intended 
that this should indicate gender but rather as a distinction from ‘it’. That is, the 
assumption is that God has a personality, however unclearly defined that concept might 
be.
3 It is important to recognise that the bible is generally quite silent on the matter of rights.
4 Polkinghorne (2000) says: “The impersonal is not to be given precedence over the personal” (p13)
5 And that it operates everywhere the same.
6 Nelson's use of the term 'complementarity' is different from Pope John Paul II's.
7 Barbour (1997) uses the criterion which he calls agreement with data and extends the notion 
of data: “the stories and rituals of tradition are part of the data that mjust be interpreted.”
8 Not to be confused with 'Laws of Nature'.
9 A large compendium of resources supporting Intelligent Design is available at Intelligent 
Design (2010)
10 The enduring popular reference to 'common law marriage' exemplifies this.
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4. Learning Disability
One of the case studies I will consider later is that of marriage where 
one or both of the partners has a learning disability. We have already 
identified in the Literature Review that the general theological 
understanding of this aspect of human nature is inadequate for the 
specific purpose of marriage theology and so I shall first look 
particularly closely at this area. To do so, however, we need to gather 
the evidence about the phenomenon called learning disability in 
order to gain a clearer understanding of the condition and ways in 
which it may be relevant to a wider consideration of marriage 
theology. In particular it will be seen that there are important 
differences between physical and learning disability, both from a 
general theological point of view as well as in respect of our specific 
concern with marriage.
Understanding learning disability1 is a useful tool in this context because there was 
very little recognition of the condition in biblical sources and there are therefore no 
obstacles arising from narrow perspectives on single ‘proof’ texts. Any use of 
scripture, rather than reason and tradition, has to cite more general material than 
anything which mentions learning disability per se. There are not the same problems as 
when attempting to decide whether a word which is translated, let us say, as adultery, 
means the same now as it did in its original context or, indeed, at any intervening time 
when tradition was being moulded. Not only is the bible silent on the matter, it is 
quite probable that the condition – at least as it is understood today2 – was 
unrecognised. Many of the individuals who now survive into adulthood with a 
learning disability would have not done so in biblical times, through the lack of 
relevant medical care. Of those simply with a low intellectual capacity, the nature of 
the economy at the time would have been less disadvantageous.
This thesis is not primarily about learning disability3 but we shall have to develop a 
theology of learning disability in order to develop our understanding of marriage, 
because there has been so little work on the subject. We will set out these 
considerations at some length, partly because we shall discover some important 
theological aspects about learning disability in itself, but more especially because it 
reveals some important conclusions about human nature and how it affects our 
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approach to sexuality and marriage. In this context, Stuart writes, “The resurrected  
Christ fulfils the promise of the incarnation that God is with us, embodying the full contingency  
of human life” (Isherwood & Stuart, 1998, p93) and in this context that spectrum of 
humanity includes all forms that are labelled disability. Earlier she said, in reference to 
Eiesland's work, “[physical] disability has been linked either with sin or with special  
righteousness which is tested through an embodied trial” (1998, p2). I will contend that, in 
relation to learning disability, both of these are erroneous. However, it is much harder 
in this case to resort to the solution that she highlights that, “the Church makes  
statements like 'all Christians are disabled in some way'” (1998, p92). To extend this to 
learning disability requires a lot of careful consideration – especially as such people are 
even more marginalised than those with a physical disability.
Several questions arise: Does learning disability define a group? Are there inherent 
characteristics to justify a distinction or are we talking about a property of all humans 
which may emerge in different ways? How far are those labelled learning disability 
aware of their designation? How much does it matter? Does traditional traditional 
teaching on marriage – and sexuality within marriage – depends on a narrower view of 
humanity that excludes people with a learning disability?
Let us compare this question with gender as an issue: as many writers have indicated 
(mostly since late twentieth century), gender issues are primarily cultural. Butler 
(1993) argues that not only are masculine and feminine matters of performance but 
that they are also culturally formed. What we do is, in part, affected by what society 
thinks we are.
Moore (1992) argues against a clear binary segregation (which is needed by those 
arguing for the traditional Christian view of sexuality) and rejects the idea that sex 
other than between a man and a woman – probably married – is not natural. He says 
that, although it may ultimately be the case that same-sex actions are to be rejected, 
one cannot do so by ‘reading off’ this conclusion from observation of either the human 
or the animal world.4
However, most writers seem to conclude that gender, if not sexual orientation, is - in 
the great majority of cases – clearly understood by the person themselves. It is not 
possible to determine objectively whether animals are aware in this way but it seems 
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likely that such self-awareness is a particular human attribute. Coontz asserts that 
“marriage is a social invention, unique to humans” (2006d, p34). As a consequence it is 
hard to justify drawing conclusions about sexuality from the animal world (where 
there is gender but probably not sexuality) especially when attempting to determine 
what is or is not ‘natural’. We cannot even tell whether any animal is able to make the 
link between sexual intercourse and procreation, or even when humans first became 
so aware. We do, however, know that in biblical times (and therefore in the minds of 
those who wrote scripture) there was a quite erroneous understanding of how 
conception works (Coleman, 2004).
Of course, no conclusion about gender identity can make absolute claims since there is 
a small number of cases where there is clear gender and sexuality confusion, whether 
by experience or wholly from genetics. Certainly, a very small number of humans have 
an ambiguous biological gender whether this is perceived through having confused 
sexual organs or through XXY chromosome abnormality.5
Any theological conclusion – or even moral conclusion based entirely on secular 
principles – has to be capable of including the small minority of difficult cases and the 
recipes for appropriate or approved behaviour must work for these people.
But what does this indicate for the case of learning disability?6 Here again we have a 
similar situation with a range of characteristics of varying origin, both genetic, social 
or acquired (such as through injury).
There has been a tendency to treat the subject as a binary condition – people either 
have a learning disability or they do not.7 Indeed, there are social circumstances where 
having or not having the label is important, such as access to special educational 
resources or social benefits. In a slightly different context, it is interesting to reflect on 
the world reactions to allegations that one nation’s team at the 2000 Paralympic 
Games were cheating by faking their disability (IOC, 2003).
There are two important issues about identity when formulating theological or ethical 
statements regarding learning disability. Firstly, can we unambiguously8 and 
objectively attach a label to particular people which is equally clearly not attached to 
others? 9
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Secondly, how far is that label part of the individual’s own self-identity? Are they 
aware of being different? Are they prepared to accept different treatment as a result? 
(In the case of gender, the issue is sometimes of not wanting discrimination, in the 
context of sexual equality, yet in others of wanting it, in the case of transsexuals) 
Positive discrimination has become as problematic as it has been helpful.
Without clear answers to both of these questions we will need to be very careful about 
enunciating any absolute conclusions about what people with such a label may or may 
not do in their lives. If, for example, we were to conclude that people with a learning 
disability could not be allowed to marry, then we have to be very certain that the label 
is correct. Otherwise we may have a situation in which individuals are denied the right 
by one ‘expert’ and granted it by another. Even more complex is the situation in which 
a label might be clearly applied by a wide range of ‘experts’ but not by the generality of 
the population.10
Basic human rights must be accepted and understood by society as a whole, although 
their application and interpretation may involve recourse to courts and other places of 
judgement. However, it is probably necessary that allowing or denying rights to an 
individual should command widespread support and understanding (although in the 
case of institutional punishment and tabloid media this is not always true!)11
At the same time, however, society has (in some countries at least) abrogated to itself 
the right to make identity decisions on behalf of the individual. At present in the UK it 
is not possible for an individual to petition for their official gender to be altered once it 
has been entered onto their birth certificate.12 When we look at the lifetime 
consequences for those where mistakes were made or where genuine uncertainty 
exists, it is surprising how such initial decisions are made with little thought or 
consideration!
Whilst it is not absolute, the learning disability label is hard to change once given or 
denied. Indeed, some parents can spend much time and energy pursuing doctors, 
geneticists, social workers, teachers and the like, to obtain a formal label for their 
child – or to have it removed. The underlying motives may be very complex and be as 
much to do with the need to assuage the guilt feelings in the parents for having a 
disabled child as to do with gaining identity or benefit for the child itself.
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In some ways, this is not just a modern issue. In earlier centuries the practice of 
castrati in cathedral choirs meant that, in early infancy, parents would seek to alter the 
sexuality and gender of their child for the sake of economic benefit, either for them or 
for their child. Even today, the hijras are an identifiable, economic class in India 
(Anon, 2008).
Identity, for minorities, may be important – as Moore (1992) points out in the case of 
homosexuals – as a defence mechanism. There is no need for a group identity for 
heterosexuals as they form the greater part of society and are not under threat from 
authority or fellow humans. However, homosexuality is under threat and so there is an 
evolution of a group identity which goes beyond individual sexual orientation and 
which ultimately can become a restriction. Homosexuals may be expected to conform 
to the paradigm (both from within and from without the group itself) and to accept 
normative behaviours for their group. This can lead to there being (allegedly) ‘gay’ 
ways of doing certain things, or appreciating certain things, in a context in which there 
is no corresponding ‘straight’ way of appreciating the same matters.
The same problem arises with learning disability: both at an individual and at a group 
level, there is an expectation by society of how such people will and should behave, 
how they will perform and what they might achieve.13 Such expectations are generally 
limitations in the same way as gay identity, black culture and women’s issues can 
become. Rarely, if at all, are the norms of such minorities seen as positive 
characteristics which are not open to the rest of society. Imagine a white person 
saying, “Oh, I wish I was black because then I could do . . . ”– quite different from the 
other way around, which is definitely more imaginable. Far too many people with a 
learning disability fail to achieve simply because they are not expected to do so.
Even some apparently positive descriptions have negative or restrictive roots. It is 
often said of people with Downs Syndrome, “They are such loving people”. Not only is 
this popular expression more myth than reality (perhaps confusing a manipulative 
skill with ‘real’ loving) but is rooted in a desire to set such people apart from the rest 
of society: ‘us’. In any event, the syndrome is so easily identified and the myth so 
widespread that it is hard to distinguish between nature and nurture in observing how 
such individuals behave.
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There is, for the most part anyway, an important difference between the way in which 
minority identities for gay, black, women, poor groups emerge and that for learning 
disability. In the former cases, the identity is largely generated from within the group, 
from those who are gay, black, female or poor and who want to say something positive 
about themselves, often as a reaction against repression as a minority. The 
identification of learning disability, if such a group exists, is done to the group (or to 
members of the group) by those from the outside, much as in earlier times people 
might have been prepared to argue seriously (for example) that all black people are 
lazy, promiscuous or whatever.
In some cases, people with a learning disability must be aware of their label and be 
able to contribute to formulating a group identity. Self-advocacy groups, such as People 
First (2008), are beginning to be formed which attempt to create such an identity and 
to achieve the analogous positive outcomes that other minority groups have achieved 
for themselves. However, almost all of these groups are supported by people who are 
not labelled 'learning disability' and most are initiated by them in the belief that they 
are good or necessary for the client group. For the majority of people with a learning 
disability such self-identity barely exists and so the characteristics are inevitably 
established from without.
The Mental Capacity Act (Parliament, 2005) seeks to protect the position of those 
members of society who are unable to make certain decisions14, often important 
lifestyle decisions, for themselves or to handle their own financial and legal affairs. In 
so doing it asserts the right of society to define such a category of people and to 
restrict their basic human rights accordingly.
Whilst such intentions are not seriously in question, the future impact certainly is. 
The following quotation is taken from  evidence to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee which considered the Bill:
We are worried that if the Mental Capacity Bill becomes law disabled people  
will be stopped from making the ‘small’ day to day choices like eating the  
food we like and dressing in clothes we feel good in, right to what happens to  
our bodies together with the enjoyment of going out to work and having fun,  
moving home and having friends and relationships and in short having a life. 
(Parliament, 2004b)
The website goes on to identify various detailed concerns about the rights of those 
who may be brought within the coverage of the Act.15 Although current best-practice 
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in social care clearly indicates the need to support choice for individuals with a 
learning disability, it is still possible to observe the contrary in isolated practices.16 
Hauerwas, speaking in the admittedly comparatively early date of 1977 (but re-
published in 1986), talks about ‘the retarded’ as a group in ways which were clearly 
intended to see a justification for their existence, “let me suggest what I have observed the  
retarded have done for their parents” (1986a, p41). He also identifies problems with 
normalisation “the demand to be normal can be tyrannical”  (1986a, p40) even though he 
seems to overlook the fact that, for the profoundly disabled at least, it is others who 
are making the demand for normality supposedly on their behalf.
This is a point that O’Brien takes up in his response where he clearly has problems 
with identifying those with an intellectual disability as a group:
The asymmetry generated by dependence continually tempts those who offer  
assistance and those who receive it to freeze themselves into postures of power  
and dependency  … I think that the most frightening reality that people with  
intellectual disabilities raise is the difficulty of living gracefully with the  
continuing demands and temptations of practical dependency” (O'Brien, 
2004, p49).
Of course, without the existence of learning disability as a category or group, there is 
little prospect of being able to marshal interest and power to enable appropriate 
provision for their needs and aspirations to be established.
Yet O’Brien concludes his response by sharing with Hauerwas that it is dangerous to 
“attempt[ing] to make “the retarded” normal … and thus stripping them of differences  
important to their identity and history” (2004, p50). It is essential to this view that people 
with a learning disability are clearly a group that can be differentiated from those who 
are not in such a group. It necessarily argues that there is an inherent difference 
between those who are in such a group and those who are not.
Hauerwas also perpetuates the myth that adults with a learning disability are really 
still children – “eternal children” is the phrase he used (1986a, p186). He suggested, 
with echoes of Paul (“When I was a child I thought as a child” 1 Cor 13:11), that people 
with a learning disability can never enter the adult world. Furthermore, he seems to 
reinforce the assumption that care for them “can be justified only because they are eternal  
children”.
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Since that essay was written much more work has been done which  recognises that 
adults with a learning disability are exactly that – adults. Whilst some aspects of their 
performance are limited by their ‘condition’, others are not and it is often those parts 
of the human personality which are not primarily driven by an intellectual component 
– love, hate, responsibility, desire – which can develop just as effectively as for the rest 
of the population, but which are regularly denied fulfilment. That denial is more 
because society refuses to allow them the opportunity than because they lack the 
capacity for such feelings. It is exactly this side of human nature which is central to 
our understanding of revelation through incarnation and which demands a response in 
similar terms.
Recognition of this aspect of caring for people with a learning disability is especially 
important for a church response: theologically, the heart of the gospel message is an 
emotion: “God so loved the world that he gave” (John 3:16) but in practice the faith is 
transformed into an intellectual activity – and this is not an anti-theological jibe either. 
At a practical level we expect congregations to be able to read in order to participate 
fully; we have often erected hurdles such as learning by rote or confirmation classes, 
all of which are formulated in an intellectual way. The more emotional forms of 
churchmanship are frequently castigated by others for just that characteristic and that 
they lack ‘rigour’.
One of the least well solved aspects of inclusiveness (to date, in any case) is to avoid 
the temptation that the only way to comply is through a comprehensive kind of 
dumbing down, a reduction to the highest common factor, something in which 
everyone can participate equally. To the extent that this instinctively seems 
unworkable or undesirable it can lead to an adverse reaction and a ridiculing of 
genuine attempts to mitigate the consequences of disability, in whatever form. 
Certainly, avoidance of unnecessary barriers has become something to which we are 
all now much more sensitive and, in part, has been institutionalised in various 
standards and codes of practice covering a wide diversity of situations. (See, for 
example: BSI, 2008, 2009)
Yet an essential part of humanity is also diversity – sensitivity to gender, sexuality, 
race, ability has generated a call for increased identity for those who are ‘different’. 
This move is not unwelcome and is perhaps more in tune with Paul’s recognition of 
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the importance of species differentiation (1 Cor 12:12-27). This is much easier to 
support when we perceive individuals who have obvious gifts (1 Cor 12:28) – we can 
then encourage their diversity and, to take but one example, society has become richer 
by admitting feminine as well as masculine ways of approaching many issues. The 
problem is more challenging when we find it hard to identify a particular skill in an 
individual, especially one who has problems with achieving ‘ordinary’ things in life.
It is one thing to view our appendix as something seemingly without known function, 
to the extent that if it becomes a problem we can cheerfully cut it out and throw it 
away, forgetting that it was ever there in the first place, were it not for the surgical 
scar – and no doubt better keyhole techniques will even remove that reminder. It is 
another matter entirely to treat an individual human being as having no useful 
function, allowing us to ‘throw them away’ – even if this is exactly what earlier 
generations would have done. (Ironically, it now appears that the appendix may after 
all have a useful function (Anon, 2007d) making it an even more useful analogy!)
The consequence is that theologians seek to identify a ‘purpose’ for those with a 
disability, especially those with profound disabilities, a purpose that arises specifically 
from their disability rather than their membership of humanity as a whole. Sometimes 
this is expressed in terms of what emotions and practical actions it allows others to 
experience – their existence ‘allows’ us to care for them, even if in the process it 
reinforces our feeling of superiority. “Thank God that I am not as one of these” (Luke 
18:11) may well be an underlying motivation. Even Hauerwas, after reacting 
favourably to calls by Catholic Bishops to “the notion of interdependence is critical and that  
openness to discovery in diversity or difference is vital” (1986a, p187) still concludes an 
essay with the phrase “retarded people can be appreciated as inherently valuable” (1986a, 
p188) which repeats the view that ‘value’ (however we measure it) is a key to our 
theology.
Kelley records that:
the classificatory scheme 'disabled'/'nondisabled' did not exist for Greeks and  
Romans. In modern Western parlance it is common to speak of disabled  
individuals as belonging to a separate and identifiable group, but this was  
not the case in the ancient world (2007, p33).
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Yet it may well yet prove that this is a dead-end for theology – a line of development 
that takes us into unproductive backwaters. Instead, perhaps we need to rehabilitate 
the essence. If the ‘purpose’ of humanity (even supposing that we really need to find 
one) is to allow God an incarnation – the recipient of God’s love that enables that love 
to exist in the first place – then we need look no further. Whilst, in human and social 
terms it is inevitable that our utility is measured by what functions we can perform, 
and perform better than others, the factor that binds us all is simply that we are 
humans. It is this that differentiates the profoundly disabled from an appendix, 
something that cannot just be discarded just because we fail to identify an 
economically useful function.
Secular society has at least moved to the point at which learning disability is seen to 
be part of the spectrum of humanity and that such individuals are not to be set apart 
on the basis of fear.17 Nevertheless, in detail there is still much to be done to avoid the 
unintentional discrimination that arises simply because people lack either knowledge 
or understanding of what to do in specific situations as they meet them.
At least in Christian terms we need look no further and, indeed doing so may well 
cloud that essential message: the purpose of all of us is to be human, no more and no 
less: humans that have the potential to be the recipients of God’s love. It is important 
also to put it this way round, rather than to say that our purpose is to respond to 
God’s love, for several reasons which include, firstly, that we assert that God’s love is 
unconditional. It does not depend on our response for its existence. God’s love would, 
we claim, still exist even if all of humanity was so disabled that it could not recognise 
it. Secondly, to make God’s love in some way dependent on our response starts the 
process of setting achievement barriers in the way of salvation and redemption.
Conclusion
Most of this chapter has been about understanding what is meant by 
the expression 'learning disability' but in considering the question of 
whether such a characteristic defines a clear group of people, in the 
same way as gender and race have done, we have run into serious 
problems with ensuring that our theology is universal. We will 
therefore have to explore the notion of a theology of learning 
disability itself.
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1 The following terms have been used at some time or another, most of which have 
gradually fallen into either disuse or disfavour, often because of attempts to find new 
terms which avoid adverse connotations associated with earlier words: Imbecile, Mentally 
Defective, Mentally Deficient, Mentally Retarded, Ineducable, Mental Handicap, Special 
Needs, Perceptually Handicapped, Learning Disability, Learning Difficulty
2 The term 'learning disability' dates probably only from 1996 and initially was associated 
with reasonably clear and specific definitions. More recently, however, organisations 
specifically directed towards supporting people with a learning disability have adopted very 
much more unspecific descriptions, not always with helpful consequences.
3 A further complication is that, in the United States, the term learning difficulty is often used 
with a broader scope (distinct from learning disability), particularly to include those children 
with behavioural conditions such Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). This use 
has been politically controversial with some opinion (Fuchs et al, 2001) rejecting the 
symptoms as a 'condition' but rather as the result of poor parenting or the lack of 
appropriate learning opportunities. (See Audiblox 2009 for an example of this approach, 
with commercial overtones, which also used the term Teaching Disability). In this country, 
the educational field has more recently used Special Needs to include those who are 
assigned to a special school on the basis of behavioural issues. At some stages, conditions 
such as word blindness (dyslexia) have been considered to be part of the learning disability 
spectrum (Hinshelwood 1907) but this would not be considered helpful today. With 
suitable educational support, conditions such as dyslexia no longer need be an obstacle to 
considerable achievement. On the other hand, the present use of autistic spectrum can be 
unhelpful, certainly in our present context, as some people at one end of the spectrum are 
capable of functioning well within society, learning to live with their characteristics, whilst 
at the other end there are people who need full time care.
4 This warning about ‘reading off’ from nature is an important constraint on Evidential 
Theology and leads us to ensure that we use evidence primarily in a negative sense of 
indicating what is not a valid argument rather than the converse of telling us what must be 
the case.
5 A detailed consideration of what distinction can be drawn between biological and social 
gender lies outside the scope of this thesis other than to recognise that there is no simple 
conclusion that can be 'read off' from nature.
6 The wide variety of  definition leads to a corresponding divergence about its prevalence. 
An approach based purely on a statistical basis of IQ (Newcastle 2007) indicates 2.5% 
whilst US sources suggest a slightly lower figure of just under 2% (National Health 
Interview Survey, 1997) but figures as high as 25% - 30% are occasionally cited (St Louis 
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Learning Disabilities Association 2009), although these may reflect those which include 
social skills deficit within the scope of the estimate.
7 A learning disability is caused by the way the brain develops. There are many different 
types and most develop before a baby is born, during birth or because of a serious illness 
in early childhood. A learning disability is lifelong and usually has a significant impact on a 
person's life. Learning disability is not mental illness or dyslexia. People with a learning 
disability find it harder than others to learn, understand and communicate. People with 
profound and multiple learning disabilities (PMLD) need full-time help with every aspect 
of their lives - including eating, drinking, washing, dressing and toileting. (MENCAP 
2009)
8 Ie we need to look at both false positives as well as false negatives.
9 The World Health Organisation defines learning disabilities as “a state of arrested or 
incomplete development of mind”. Learning disability is a diagnosis, but it is not a disease, 
nor is it a physical or mental illness. Unlike the latter, so far as we know it is not treatable. 
Internationally three criteria are regarded as requiring to be met before learning disabilities 
can be identified: Intellectual impairment, Social or adaptive dysfunction, Early onset 
(BILD 2009)
10 The General Synod paper, Opening the Doors (GS 2009) begins with: “A person is said to 
have a learning disability if their capacity to understand new or complex information or to 
master new skills is significantly limited. A learning disability is not the same as a learning 
difficulty, such as dyslexia or dyscalculia.” 
11 This is no theoretical risk either, as the series of cases regarding the rights of mothers to 
keep their children, or to be convicted of murder, have highlighted. In some cases the 
concerns identified by experts proved justified yet in others the underlying theoretical or 
scientific evidence was plain wrong as later evidence demonstrated. (BBC 2005a, Shaik 
2007)
12 Recent judgements in the European Court of Human Rights may lead to changes
13 Functional limitation may either be the result of genetic factors or acquired as the result of 
a life event. Some cases arise from peri-natal circumstances (such as oxygen starvation 
during birth) and others through accidents. Although there are important differences 
between those who have the limitation from birth and those as a result of an accident later 
in life, there are also many commonalities and professional care frequently covers both 
(when adults). Many definitions tend to exclude those whose condition is acquired later in 
life whilst Opening the Doors (GS 2009) focusses on the functional deficit, whatever its 
origins. It is unclear whether the distinction is necessary in a theological context. 
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14 Many people with a learning disability suffer some form of abuse in their lives (GS 2009, 
p37) although much of that which occurs outside the immediate family context is more 
from ignorance than deliberate intent.
15 A BBC programme File on Four, broadcast on 27 July 2010, indicated that these fears were 
with good cause
16 see File on Four cited above
17 Opening the Doors (GS 2009) clearly makes the assumption that the people with which it is 
concerned are housed in the community, in small group homes at the most, with many 
either living with some degree of independence or within a family context. On the other 
hand, there are some providers such as l'Arche which – perhaps because they are focused 
more on those with greater degrees of impairment – have a larger group community as 
their model of operation.
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5. Learning Disability Theology
It was established in the previous chapter that there is no inherent 
distinction between people with a learning disability and the rest of 
the population. Indeed, the criteria for determining whether a 
particular person is  to be considered to have a learning disability is 
not only blurred but culturally and time dependent. Nevertheless, 
conditions that may usefully be called a learning disability do exist 
and the next step is to find a theological understanding of them. 
Although there have been extensive developments in the theological 
of physical disability, the same cannot be said of learning disability. 
The care and support of people with particular needs has often been 
led by people of faith, but primarily out of compassion for their 
needs rather than with a specific understanding of a distinct group.
Theological approaches to disability have broadly been aimed at bringing those with 
varying physical disabilities into the mainstream of church life. Whilst writers such as 
Eiesland (1994) have contributed much to raising the self-respect of disabled people 
within a spiritual and secular world, that thinking has major defects, especially when 
considered for application to those with a learning disability. As a result, I shall devote 
this chapter to a detailed examination of the theology of learning disability, noting the 
observation in the Literature Review above that this subject has not received adequate 
attention for the purposes of our principal aim of considering the impact of learning 
disability on the theology of marriage.
The first defect is that Disability Theology has tended to lead to statements that apply 
to disabled people but not to the population as a whole. Such specialised thinking, as 
with some liberation and feminist theology, is limited in its long term effect. Indeed, if 
it succeeds in its declared aim – of removing unfair discrimination – then ultimately it 
ceases to be of relevance. 
More substantial reflection will help to recognise that general theology will benefit 
most when ideas arising from such marginal considerations (if one can describe 
feminist issues as marginal!) are re-imported. For example, our understanding of God 
is expanded, rather than replaced, by images and insights from a woman’s rather than 
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a patriarchal male perspective. Stuart hints at this process which she calls 
reconstruction, by antithesis to deconstruction (Isherwood, 2000, p168).
A much less eclectic view is expressed by Pailin (1992) who was driven by his 
experience of Alex, a seriously disabled young child which challenged his concept of 
God’s role in the creation of people with a disability. Ultimately he sought to re-define 
his understanding in a way that encompassed not only Alex but everyone else as well, 
disabled or not.
The extent of the difficulty for Disability Theology can be seen in, “The body exists to  
perceive and manifest the glory of God. It is in the body that God comes to meet and save and  
elevate human beings” (Rogers , 2002, p xix).
This teleological argument is stated as a simple fact and the editor (in his 
introduction) immediately proceeds to build upon it. However, whilst it might seem a 
compelling position, when it comes to looking at disability we have an issue, if not a 
problem: if the body is to “manifest the glory of God” then what aspect of God is 
being manifest by the disability?
Harvey, in the same anthology, says, “Therein lies the purpose of the body: it provides the  
context for how and what we can and will know of God, now and in the life to come” (Harvey, 
2002, p4). In saying “God created the body to be a means of knowing God”, does Harvey 
mean ‘body’ as a generalised concept, or does she mean each specific body? 
In the former case we then have to answer the question about why the variety extends 
to significant disability – variety that goes beyond an evolutionary need – whilst if God 
created each individual body then we have the older and more specific question, which 
Pailin relates to debates such as “Why does God create Evil?” 
Even posing such a question accepts the long established view that disability is ‘bad’ 
and that its existence must, in some way, be related to or caused by evil – or sin. 
Perhaps the ultimate link is in Rom 5:12 where Paul argues that death is the result of 
sin. No matter that the whole of nature goes through birth and death cycles, Paul 
ignores the fact that the best we can hope to do with the latest science and medicine is 
to delay the inevitable and no amount of sin or repentance can be evidentially linked 
64
to changes in life expectancy. Eiesland’s main aim (1994) is to challenge the ‘Evil’ 
hypothesis and to establish that, despite whatever non-normative characteristics an 
individual may exhibit, they still have an essential worth.
But what Pailin tries to face is the fact that disability – in his case the concern is with 
severe mental incapacity – is related to major performance disadvantage in comparison 
with the rest of the population and why it is that God, if he is concerned with the 
welfare of humanity, has created a world in which such severe disadvantage exists. 
But ‘evil’ is not a scientific or objective concept – it relates to ethical or theological 
considerations of behaviour and, furthermore, behaviour that is under our control.
In De Profundis (Wilde, 1905), Oscar Wilde reflects in prison. Whilst he admits 
“Religion does not help me” he also concludes that “Reason does not help me”. However, 
from the depths of his despair he begins to find some meaning to his circumstance:
On the occasion of which I am thinking I recall distinctly how I said to her  
that there was enough suffering in one narrow London lane to show that God  
did not love man, and that wherever there was any sorrow, though but that  
of a child, in some little garden weeping over a fault that it had or had not  
committed, the whole face of creation was completely marred. I was entirely  
wrong. She told me so, but I could not believe her. I was not in the sphere in  
which such belief was to be attained to. Now it seems to me that love of some  
kind is the only possible explanation of the extraordinary amount of suffering  
that there is in the world. I cannot conceive of any other explanation. I am  
convinced that there is no other. (1905, p59)
Although thinking more about the work of artists, his comment “Every single human 
being should be the fulfilment of a prophecy: for every human being should be the realisation of  
some ideal, either in the mind of God or in the mind of man” (p79) could equally well be said 
about disability. (In some ways, this anticipates Hauerwas) And later: 
If any love is shown us we should recognise that we are quite unworthy of it.  
Nobody is worthy to be loved. The fact that God loves man shows us that in  
the divine order of ideal things it is written that eternal love is to be given to  
what is eternally unworthy. (1905, p85)
There are parallels with attempts to unravel a theological understanding of suffering 
and here we do have some more direct scriptural help since there are clear indications 
that the earliest Christians recognised and understood the effect that their faith had 
on the likelihood that they would suffer for it. In 1 Peter 3:17  “it is better to suffer for  
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doing right, if that be God’s will, than for doing wrong”. There is an obvious expectation 
that doing right will almost inevitably result in some form of suffering.
But is this the same kind of suffering for which Hauerwas (1986a) seeks to find ‘a 
point’? In this case he is thinking especially about medical conditions and the pain – 
suffering – to which they can lead. Apart from a few pathological cases, broadly such 
suffering is not the consequence of an action over which we have any control. We do 
not choose to have a heart defect or breast cancer.
The problem with some of Hauerwas’s conclusions lies in his assumption that the 
question “What is the point of suffering?” is well-formed. In fact, suffering, in the 
sense that he is considering, is a description of the consequences or, even, the 
characteristics of, a specific medical condition. A broken leg is painful (and medical 
knowledge can explain some of the mechanisms by which we perceive such pain) and 
it is the objective of a physician both to mend the leg (so that it can perform its 
desired function once again) and to relieve pain whilst the leg is mending or, if it 
cannot be mended, in the ensuing consequences. It is no more useful to consider 
whether such suffering has a point than to ask the question “What is the point of a 
broken leg?” If we have a broken leg then we have pain and suffering.
This relates back to the wider debate on the existence of evil: is there a point to evil? 
Humans seek a specific answer to that question  because they want to ascribe its 
existence to a particular agent: “Why does God allow evil?” or even, “Why does God 
create evil?” In practice it is easier and more useful to reject the question itself as not 
being well-formed and to view evil as an existential characteristic: evil exists only 
because we can perceive adverse consequences of specific actions and can attribute 
undesired motives to the agents of evil. 
Of course, this raises the difficult question for a Christian ethicist: is a particular 
action wrong/evil because it is proscribed either by scripture or by the tradition of the 
church, or is it because of the consequences of that action? This is nowhere more 
relevant than in the debate about sexuality. 
All too often we seek to identify an agent for evil or suffering not so much because we 
really want to find the answer (and in any case what good will it do us if we do find 
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it?) but as a means of avoiding the need to confront the existence and to deal with 
that issue. Suffering exists and it matters little who caused it, and why, when we face 
the challenge of how we respond to it. The Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) is 
exceptional in his cultural context because he did not seek such answers before he 
responded effectively to address the condition in which he found his fellow traveller. 
He did not need to know whether the victim had courted his attack either ‘by doing 
right’ or even by being reckless. Neither the Samaritan nor we need to know whether 
the victim had been warned that the route he was taking was a known hazard and 
that, perhaps, he had gone that way to cut costs or to challenge his assailants and their 
evil way of life.
Equally, we have to overcome natural difficulties in deciding the culpability of 
individuals seeking medical treatment. Does a person with liver failure caused by years 
of unrestrained drinking have less of a claim to treatment than someone whose 
circumstances are identical but which arose from genetic factors? Of course, physical 
and mental capability deficits are not the only birth disadvantages – wealth and 
environmental deficits are often at least as disabling (DfES, 2005). 
What Eiesland challenges is the assumption that it is evil of God to create such 
disadvantages but rather that it is the responsibility of society to eradicate the social 
consequences of such capability deficits, in the same way that we might work to 
eradicate the fact that people live below a poverty line. 
A striking approach is taken by Albl who, in considering what he calls The Paradox of  
the Gospel at Corinth, looks at disability this way: 
In the ancient world, a crucified person was the ultimate example of  
“disability”. On the one hand, a crucified person was the ultimate symbol of  
“functional limitations” – a person stripped of all ability to do anything for  
him or herself. With regard to the second aspect of disability, a crucified  
person bore the ultimate in social stigmatization (2007, p 149).
In other words, with the centrality of the crucifixion in Christian theology, we not 
only have to break the link between suffering and evil, but must also have to recognise 
that too much stress on ability is to fail to understand the universality of disability. As 
well as recognising the shortcomings in each of us – both innate functionality as well 
as chosen courses of action – we have to be prepared to trust that accepting ultimate 
disability is the way in which Christ culminated his ministry on earth.
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But the process by which society engages in the eradication of social disability is still 
influenced in part by the ancient belief that illness is a sign of God’s displeasure, his 
impatience with the fallibility of humankind, a punishment for sin. Hauerwas cites 
Amundsen & Ferngren: 
According to one view, if God sends disease either to punish or to test a  
person, it is to God that one must turn for care and healing. … On another  
view, if God is the source of disease, or if God permits disease and is the  
ultimate healer, God’s will can be fulfilled through human agents (1986a, 
p67).
Here, Hauerwas is dealing with the relationship between religion and medicine, two 
activities which he asserts have always been linked together and, despite the 
rationalism of medicine in the twentieth century, a more recent recognition of holistic 
principles re-establishes that curing the body may, in part, involve healing the soul.
Of course, this line of thinking was largely responsible for the Medical Model which 
Eiesland and others have rejected as the basis of an approach to disability. But what 
she does not state clearly is why the Social Model is so incompatible with this 
historical attitude. The difficulty in countering the historical attitude lies in the 
essence of disability: too easily we can slip into believing that disability is an illness, at 
least somewhere in the same domain, sufficiently similar that we can apply the same 
principles. We may even seek to eradicate learning disability through genetic 
selection. 
Kelley takes the Social Model a stage further:
And it would be remiss to discuss the culturally contingent nature of  
deformity and disability without mentioning recent scholarship that employs  
the vocabulary of postmodernity to challenge the entire concept of disability  
as a normative discourse. … In other words, disability is not so much an  
objective reality as the product of discursive practices … that marginalize,  
exclude and limit those whose bodies have certain physical traits (2007, 
p34).
What Eiesland has done is to establish the right of people with a disability to be 
considered first and foremost as people, albeit people with particular needs but not in 
any way intrinsically different from any other part of humanity which, in every case is 
flawed and in need of help. But it takes a long time to persuade society as a whole not 
to see disability as an illness – its very definition focuses our attention on what a 
person cannot do rather than on what they can do. 
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A child born with a hole in the heart or one leg shorter than the other is surely 
entitled to medical intervention so that they may lead a more effective life. Certainly 
we can usefully distinguish between curing a disability and ameliorating it. Indeed, 
conditions such as a ‘hole in the heart’ highlight a problem: most people, including 
physicians, would probably instinctively categorise this as an illness, similar in status 
to, say, blocked arteries. Both prevent the heart from functioning effectively. However, 
the latter is an acquired condition, the result of lifestyle or ageing deterioration but 
the former exists at birth and, in principle, is no different from many other physical 
disabilities. Yet we react to them and treat them quite differently. The danger is in 
viewing the treatable as an illness and the untreatable as a disability. 
Taking Harvey’s view - that God created each individual - is the more difficult and 
does not accept Pailin’s view that God created the mechanism for each body to be 
formed but does not have a direct hand in each one. In this case, what are we to make 
of Harvey’s comments cited above?
Harvey also cites the early Syriac writer, Ephrem, as enunciating the view that the 
believer’s body is the battleground in the fight with Satan. “the believer must also defeat  
Satan by refusing Satan victory in these assaults” (hunger, thirst, weariness and death are 
given examples) “on the weaknesses of the body” (Harvey, 2002, p12). The danger here, 
surely, is in giving credence to the view that disability is somehow a mark of evil, the 
result of the sins of forefathers or one’s own fault. It is no longer acceptable, in an age 
that now understands more about genetic behaviour, natural selection and 
inheritance, to suggest that disability and its consequences are somehow the result of 
sin, nor are those who are so characterised to be considered less than fully human. 
Many of the current issues such as sexuality, gender, disability, suffer from an 
irreconcilable conflict between those writing from the outside and those from the 
inside. As Hebblethwaite (1999) puts it when talking about early liberation theology, 
“it was not just a theology about the poor, it was a theology for the poor” (p209). However, 
when considering the case of learning disability, for the greater part this is necessarily 
done from the outside. 
Eiesland, along with Stuart (Stuart, 1995, pp 207-209; Stuart & Thatcher, 1997, pp 
102-105), talks either literally or by implication of disability as being ‘pain’, something 
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that has to be endured, suffered and, at best, overcome. The Gospel narratives tend to 
compound the Healing Myth by recording stories about disabled people who are 
‘cured’ by Jesus or the apostles and, indeed, disabilities such as blindness are used as a 
metaphor for a sinful state (e.g. John 9:24-25).
The Healing Myth helped to give rise to the medical model that McCloughry and 
Morris (2002), as well as Eiesland and much of the ‘disability rights’ movement, so 
decry. Despite the emergence of better models for thinking about disability, the 
Healing Myth, or its denial, still has strong influences. 
The replacement of the Medical Model by the Social Model is consistent with 
comments made above about our response to evil and suffering. Insofar as the Social 
Model put an emphasis on society’s reaction to disability then the change is helpful. 
However, there is a real danger lurking below the surface, that it tends to normalise 
disability. That in one sense is good as it helps us to recognise that people with a 
disability, whether physical or learning, are all cast from the same mould of humanity, 
they are not a race apart. In that sense, disability should be normalised.
However, if we take the line too far we begin to normalise disability to the extent that 
we are content to do nothing about either the effects of the disability or, more 
especially, to put resources into finding ways of preventing or eliminating the 
disabling condition. Again, with the Good Samaritan, he was not content simply to 
address the immediate condition and put the victim back on the road but he went 
further and sought to improve life for him (Luke 10:33-35).
Walls identifies the way in which disability was considered in ancient Mesopotamia 
and he concludes that they had a keen sense in which everyone had to be fitted into 
roles that matched their particular characteristics. Rather than rejecting people with a 
disability they identified specific jobs which they were best suited to perform. Looking 
at the myth of Enki and Ninmah, he writes: 
In each of these six cases (of people with a disability)  Enki provides a  
social position and productive economic role for Ninmah’s purposefully  
malformed children. Indeed, some of these people are given advanced technical  
skills (silversmith) or powerful positions at court rather than menial tasks to  
earn their bread (2007, pp18-19).
the myth describes the deliberate creation of humans with abnormal functions  
or physical disabilities as part of the organisation of the world …  Although  
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the text leaves much room for interpretation, the myth appears to express a  
community model of disability, in which people’s diverse abilities are valued  
for what they contribute to society (2007, p30).
If we are not careful, a strict adherence to the Social Model reinforces our 
misconception that disability is an inherent characteristic and that those who ‘suffer’ 
from it are a distinct group, apart from the rest of society. Society is expected to do 
things for, if not to, people identified as having a disability. But in seeking to improve 
or ameliorate the lifestyle of people with a disability we must not so define ‘normal’ as 
something to which we aspire that we fall into the trap of saying, “I thank God that I am 
not as these people are” (Luke 18:11).
Not all physical disability is necessarily ‘painful’: the television drama Every Time You  
Look At Me (Mickery, 2004) poignantly highlighted the life of two young people, one 
with thalidomide damaged arms, the other of very short stature. Both are – apart from 
their ‘obvious’ deformities – beautiful people and very much in love. They are 
conscious of how people see them but have overcome their disabilities, he to become a 
deputy headmaster and she a qualified hairdresser.
In a sense both suffer ‘pain’ as a result of their sensitivity about their image, however 
successfully they had thought that they were in suppressing it, but it is difficult to say 
that this is pain which is intrinsically different because they are disabled. In nature it 
is similar to teenage angst or the poor self-image that many feel about how they look. 
It may be different in degree but not in nature.
People with a moderate learning disability are not necessarily in ‘pain’, although they 
may feel emotions which are different in degree as a result of their disability. Any 
theological treatment of learning disability has to take a much more positive view of 
people, especially those who have no identifiable ‘condition’.
Just as with the existence of evil, there are genuine questions about how and why 
learning disability exists. There are those individuals with a clear condition that limits 
their ability to exercise a full range of mental activities whilst with others their 
designation is based on falling one side of a man-made division based on particular 
measures of intellectual ability. In this respect there are clear parallels with the 
definition of poverty. 
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Pailin (1992) confronts the issues which are raised when questions such as “Why does 
God create people with a disability?”, but inevitably does so on the basis that people 
with a disability feel themselves to be disproportionately deprived in comparison with 
the rest of humanity.
Opening the Doors (General Synod, 2009) places the Social Model at the forefront of 
both theology and policy. It highlights the distinction between impairment (what 
someone has) and disability (what someone experiences) and places the onus on 
society to eliminate the effects of impairment on an individual's ability to participate 
fully in society. Its theological underpinning is firmly rooted in the assertion that 
“people should not be defined by their intellect” (General Synod, 2009, p7) whilst not facing 
up to the fact that much of our expression of faith is cerebral in nature.
A parallel exists here with that of poverty: whilst an individual's earning capacity may 
result in income levels below an agreed level (poverty) it is a social issue to put in 
place policies and practices to eliminate or diminish the impact. In both cases, 
definitions are inherently relative and society-defined. Hence, it seems hardly fair to 
'blame' God for their existence. God creates a variety – and society (collectively and 
individually) will be judged on how it responds to that variety.
5.1 Social Care and Social Integration
Just as a Christian response to any area of deprivation is to seek to improve conditions 
through a secular agenda, derived from a religious concern, so too we should look at 
how people with a learning disability are supported in the wider community as well as 
in the particular of church life.
However, we must face the paradox which many have voiced, including Hauerwas: 
Retarded people cannot justly be treated ‘just like anyone else,’ as they often  
do require ‘special education’ which allows them to develop skills to interact  
in society in culturally normative ways. At the same time, to the extent they  
are singled our for ‘special’ treatment, we reinforce the unjust  
characterization of what it means to be retarded (1998, p185).
On the other hand, those who are primarily driven by the Social Model take a strong 
line, such as Carlson:
Modernistic and post modernistic supporters of special education squared off  
in a long lasting battle regarding the effectiveness of differing treatment  
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methods. Modernists believe that special education should use instruction to  
enhance the functioning, knowledge, skills and socialization of individuals  
with disabilities. Postmodernism views LD as a social construction that is  
based on incorrect and immoral assumptions about difference; that view  
focuses on changing social constructions that limit the success of individuals  
with disabilities (Carlson, 2005 citing Hallihan & Mercer, 2001, p15).
Opening the Doors strongly adopts the Social Model as theologically sound, but 
recognises that there are circumstances where there is benefit from a Medical Model 
(General Synod, 2009, p9). The report is also an important step in developing the 
church's role in supporting people with a learning disability and begins to address the 
possibility of active sexual behaviour and marriage.  Whatever else a person with a 
learning disability may be inhibited from achieving, forming relationships is not one of 
them. It is unsurprising, therefore, that it unambiguously concludes that people with a 
learning disability have as much right as anyone else to form sexual (and other) 
relationships and to marry, whether to another person with a learning disability or 
not. In particular, it begins from the statement that “The Church recognises marriage as a  
covenant between two people in the sight of God” (General Synod, 2009, p26). 
Nevertheless, it runs into difficulties by accepting too many of the traditional 
assumptions about the nature of marriage. In consequence it is forced to strike a 
warning note for those supporting such proposed marriages, especially in the light of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which requires particular procedures to be followed if 
there is doubt that a person has the mental capacity to enter into marriage contract. 
A particular approach is taken by the L'Arche organisation, founded by Vanier, which 
brings into a single community both carers and those cared for: 
Today, forty-four years later, there are 134 such communities in thirty-five  
different countries. In these communities men and women with disabilities  
can develop in a spirit of freedom. We live together – those with disabilities  
and those who have a deep and sometimes lasting relationship with them” 
(Vanier,1998, p2).
Nouwen, a spiritual writer, joined the organisation in 1983 and has written about his 
experience, especially in a community in Toronto. 
The notion of identifiable communities has been a challenge to the way in which state 
care for people with a learning disability has evolved over the past few decades. From 
the large hospital-based institutions, a major break was made in the 1980's when they 
were quickly replaced by Care in the Community. Whilst this transition was not without 
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its difficulties (Audit Commission, 1986), it remains true today that most care is 
based on the principle that it should be delivered as close to a person's 'normal' home 
as possible. Even where residential care is provided – most often for those with the 
greatest degree of dependency – the move has been to small groups styled as far as 
possible on a domestic scale. Professional philosophy towards such care puts a focus 
on individuals, based on their specific needs and choices with the care given by people 
whose own views are, as far as possible, removed from the operation. With a very 
limited boundary (mainly legal and some ethical considerations) the role of the 
professional carer is seen to be to enable the individual to achieve what they want to 
achieve.1
Both Vanier and Nouwen start from a victim base: Vanier writes that he “discovered the  
plight of men and women who had been put aside, looked down upon, sometimes laughed at or  
scorned” (1998, p1). This creates the danger that it encourages individuals to accept 
the victim mentality – both carer and cared for. In the process, undue dependency can 
be allowed to develop – seeking to develop the greatest degree of independence, taking 
into account individual levels of ability – requires the carer to draw back from 
encouraging unnecessary dependency on them.
They also put a clear emphasis on the benefit to the carer of working in care. Nouwen 
writes: 
Looking at the people I live with, the handicapped men and women as well as  
their assistants, I see the immense desire for a father in whom fatherhood and  
motherhood are one. They have all suffered from the experience of rejection or  
abandonment; they all have been wounded as they grew up, they all wonder  
whether they are worthy of the unconditional love of God, and they all search  
for the place where they can safely return and be touched by hands that bless  
them (1994, p139).
This, sadly, denies the lives of many people who are living comfortable and fulfilling 
lives with people who accept them for what they are more than for what they are not. 
Swinton (2003) highlights the l'Arche theology as one in which “people with 
developmental disabilities represent the poor”. However much this group of people may 
currently be inappropriately disadvantaged by society, this attitude risks reinforcing 
the marginalisation permanently. Rather, we should be seeking to change society so 
that no-one is a priori considered to be 'poor'. Philosophies of care have to resolve the 
inherent tension between short-term alleviation of problems with the long-term aim 
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of eliminating them. It may not always be readily possible pursue both 
simultaneously.
However, we do need to consider whether there are – or should be – special rights that 
accrue to adults with a learning disability. Marshall And Parvis (2004) examine in 
detail the basis on which Children’s Rights are founded, formulating rights for those 
who are disabled, where the main emphasis is on those with a physical disability, is a 
very different process for it must be assumed that the people to whom the rights relate 
are adult, have their own views about what is happening to them and are not specially 
different in their ability to articulate their opinions and claims.2 They may, however, 
lack power to assert their rights and, in that regard, need specific protection against 
those with greater powers.
The situation for adults with a learning disability has some elements of both of these 
but, equally, is also very different and any specific approach must avoid the mistake 
treating adults with a learning disability as if they were still children. 
One of the over-riding difficulties is that we must ensure a clear delineation of those 
who are entitled to such specific rights. What, in this instance, do we mean by having 
a learning disability? Are there boundary disputes which could become important if 
rights are granted which are different from those who do not have a learning 
disability?3
From Marshal and Parvis (2004, p227) we should consider the following possibilities:
• adults with a learning disability do not have some of the rights of other 
adults
• adults with a learning disability have exactly the same rights as other adults 
but may need assistance in accessing or enforcing them
• adults with a learning disability have different rights from other adults 
which may or may not be in addition to those of other adults.
Formulating rights always entails specifying which authority is responsible for 
guaranteeing those rights. Frequently, it is considered right and necessary for the state 
to make proxy decisions on behalf of those deemed incapable of making them for 
themselves. However, there is a strong presumption in favour of permitting and 
enabling the individual to make their own decisions and that they have a right to 
75
support in achieving this. But how does this tension between the state and the 
individual sit within contemporary Christian theology where a possible third 
dimension intervenes – the right of the church to make prescriptions about human 
behaviour?4 
Of course, this presents two possibilities:
• Church laws prohibit rights established by the state
• Church laws allow rights denied by the state
To what extent should the church allow its thinking and its legislation change in the 
light of the society around it? In his opening lecture in Truro Cathedral for the 2005 
Lent Lectures series “Faith in a Civil Society” Ind argued that a theocracy is as likely as 
a civil autocracy to act against the rights of the individual. Whilst he stopped short of 
suggesting that Christian thinking should be moulded by its cultural context, he failed 
to indicate where the boundary lay or how it could be determined. “Render to Caesar  
that which is Caesar’s and render to God that which is God’s” (Luke 20:25) may have been a 
neat escape from a cultural conundrum two millennia ago, but it does not absolve each 
generation from needing to wrestle with its application. 
Within the context of a Christian theology in which it is inherent that all individuals 
are equal before God, it is almost self-evident that the response to Marshal and Parvis' 
choice has to be that adults with a learning disability have no less rights than everyone 
else and that society has a duty to enable them to enjoy those rights, however 
uncomfortable that at times may become. This may result in establishing a 
formulation of rights specifically relating to the circumstances of people with a 
disability.5
5.2 Spirituality
We need to consider whether the existence of a learning disability in an individual 
necessarily affects they way in which they perceive spiritual matters. If we adopt 
Eiesland’s approach then the answer is likely to be yes, but it seems unlikely that such 
a conclusion will stand scrutiny. Therefore we may need to look again at how Eiesland 
derives her conclusions and devise alternatives.
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Human Disability and the Service of God (Eiesland & Saliers, 1998) collected a number of 
experiences in seeking to adapt religious experience in the light of Eiesland's view that 
people with a disability should be given equal opportunities within the full gamut of 
spiritual activity. Eiesland writes:
The disability movement has at its core contested the moral meaning of  
disability, declaring people with disabilities to be a minority group with a  
distinct culture. Whether or not they agree with this definition, religious  
leaders ignore the moral implications at their peril (1998, p224).
In some ways this agenda maps onto Gutierrez’s distinctions for the liberation agenda 
but it is not yet clear that a liberation theology is the best basis for tackling the 
learning disability situation. Early liberation theologies focus on removing a deficit in 
the human condition, such as the relief of poverty. Later, this became a search for a 
political as much as a theological agenda, seeing the relief of poverty in an analysis of 
the structure of society. 
In the case of learning disability we are not seeking ways of removing that condition 
but rather to change those aspects of society that limit the achievement of the 
potential which is within each human being. In some ways this is much harder than 
when dealing with situations of poverty. In that context the Christian can respond, 
however unrealistically, with a determination to eliminate those conditions. The task 
here is to find ways of accepting the conditions and to absorb the existence of people 
with a learning disability into the mainstream of spiritual life. In some ways, this task 
is closer to dealing with feminist or racial issues, where theology does not seek to 
ignore the colour of skin or biological gender differences.
There are practical issues to do with spirituality, the way and the extent to which a 
conceptual expression of God and his effects can be understood by people with a 
learning disability. For example, we may need to decide whether such a person must 
understand the finer details of what happens in the Eucharist before they are admitted 
to communion. If  it is accepted that there is a sacramental benefit from allowing 
people with a learning disability to partake in communion then we emphasise the role 
of God acting through the sacrament. At the same time, we have to address a concern 
that is manifest in the discomfort that some find in very young children being allowed 
to receive communion. “How can they fully understand what they are doing/what is 
happening?” is a question that may equally be raised in relation to people with a 
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learning disability. Yet, do any of us fully understand? It may not be easy to set 
minimum requirements of understanding.
But this highlights the tension between mind and body which is often at the heart of 
how to define spirituality. Whilst we sometimes use expressions that suggest we can 
worship God with, through and in our bodies, the practical reality of training both as a 
catechumen and as an ordinand, is unashamedly cerebral. It is as if we can only be a 
believer if we can understand - raw emotion is not enough.
Past attitudes which have ignored the need to include people with a learning disability 
can no longer suffice and we must look to an evolution of the general case, just as 
much as an understanding of the specific.
5.3 Evolution and Creationism
I stated earlier that modern understanding of evolution means that it is no longer 
acceptable to see disability as the result of sin. However, it is perhaps necessary to 
look more closely at this assertion in the light of current debates about Evolution, 
Creationism and Intelligent Design.
As long as humankind has thought and written about the origins of the world, the 
Creation Story has been the backbone of belief and, until Darwin, understanding. In 
the absence of any proof to the contrary, most people, including natural philosophers, 
were content to accept the notion of a ‘beginning’ that was a finite time in the past 
and which was the consequence of intervention from some other being. The Bible is 
not alone in recording Creation stories – indeed it includes two distinct versions.
Darwin and others who developed the Theory of Evolution were largely satisfied by a 
process that traced evolution back for an indefinite time. The theory does not depend 
on a need for a beginning as it addresses only what happened thereafter, even though 
Darwin’s main publication was entitled The Origin of the Species. The mechanism which 
he catalogued is effective whether or not there was a single ancestor, although Darwin 
believed this to be so. 
it does not seem incredible that, from some such low and intermediate form,  
both animals and plants may have been developed; and, if we admit this, we  
must likewise admit that all the organic beings which have ever lived on this  
earth may be descended from some one primordial form. But this inference is  
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chiefly grounded on analogy, and it is immaterial whether or not it be  
accepted (1872, p425).
Later DNA studies suggest that a single ancestor, Mitochondrial Eve is possible, 
certainly a very small number (Cann, Stoneking & Wilson, 1987).
In later editions of his work, Darwin introduced the phrase Survival of the Fittest, 
characterising a mechanism that selected the best of random variations which later 
work showed to be the result of genetic modification, the more successful leading to 
evolution.
A literal scriptural adherence, notably from United States, has led to the promotion of 
the concept of Intelligent Design, which accepts that the world has been evolving for 
longer than a strict Creationist would argue (from a surface reading of scripture), but 
that the process is neither entirely random nor without external intervention. 
However, there are many who fail to understand the true significance of stochastic 
processes. Something which at an individual level may have randomness, can also 
belong to a population where the characteristics are quite deterministic. This approach 
underpins much of 20C physics, highlighted by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Whilst in many contexts, Evolution and Intelligent Design can live alongside each 
other – so long as Intelligent Design does not purport to be a scientific theory – there 
are significant problems for Disability Theology, especially so in the case of learning 
disability.
Most, but by no means all, instances of learning disability have their origins in genetic 
variation. Certain specific syndromes, such as Downs Syndrome, have already been 
traced to genetic ‘faults’ whilst there continue numerous research investigations to 
find similar explanations for other readily identifiable syndromes.
Even the non-specific category of learning disability (those who fall below a given level 
of intellectual capability) can reasonably be included within such an explanation – 
namely that intellectual capability is, in part, the result of randomly inherited 
(genetic) characteristics.
In the context of evolution, such variations can be seen as a fact which has enabled 
species to evolve and to withstand changes in circumstance. It is not necessary to 
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attribute blame for what is seen to be a negative characteristic. However, the resulting 
tendency is to treat humanity as a single entity and that genetic variation is to the 
benefit of that entity. Clearly, in the case of individuals, such variation is either 
disproportionately to their benefit or dis-benefit. 
The existence of such an evolutionary mechanism is, on the other hand, a greater 
challenge for Intelligent Design as it quickly returns us to the point at which it seems 
that the Intelligent Designer has acted malevolently towards those individuals who are 
disabled, unless one restricts the design process to a one-off activity at some remote 
point in time. Consideration then reduces to the general issue of the existence of evil 
or calamity, which is well outside the scope of this thesis.
A positive theological approach to learning disability, even more than physical 
disability, requires something better than it merely being collateral damage in the 
progress of humanity.
5.4 Disability as a Divine Opportunity 
John 9 provides an insight into the attitudes towards disability at the time of Christ, 
although the details present some difficulties in the context of Disability Theology as 
it has evolved. The story comes at a time when Jesus is more openly confronting the 
authorities in Jerusalem – the reference to the Pool at Siloam identifies the locus of 
action. The unnamed man was blind from birth. Not just blind, but from birth. In 
giving sight to the man, Jesus seeks to challenge the authority of scripture. Not only 
does he knead clay – work on the Sabbath – but also confronts the assumption that 
the man will never see and that he cannot speak for himself.
But we are not directly concerned with this aspect of the story so much as what John 
records Jesus as saying about the reason for the man’s condition. It is well known that, 
at the time, deformity was assumed to be the result of sin – a view that still prevails in 
some quarters even today (BibleGateway, 2007). Key to the particular case was the 
fact that the man had been blind from birth. It was not an acquired defect and it was 
difficult for the experts to suggest that it was his own sin that was the cause.
As an aside, if life begins at conception, as is now the view taken by some, then is it so 
obvious that sin cannot occur before birth? If we say that a baby at birth is without 
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sin, then its existence up to that point must have been intrinsically different from the 
human life which is to follow. Of course, the degree of sin and its exact detail are 
unlikely to be great, but the issue of a watershed at birth must be important to a 
number of debates. It certainly was in the case of the man born blind.
Not only were those born with a deformity barred from priestly functions (Lev 21:16-
23) but (Dorman, 2007) there was wider discrimination and exclusion of people with 
physical disabilities from the community at large (Schipper, 2006). Other 
contemporaneous material contained similar proscriptions - see Dorman (2007) for 
evidence from the Qumran Scrolls. It is also interesting to note her comments about 
what happens to society when disability is widespread: 
Modern studies of negligence of disability in ancient literature and modern  
studies is remarkable, because disability may have been more widespread in  
the period under consideration than it is today. A large part of the population  
must have had some kind of what, nowadays, would be regarded as a  
disability. Apart from congenital disabilities, chances were high that people  
would become disabled due to, for example, improperly healed bone fractures,  
warfare, childbirth complications, diseases, malnutrition, or ageing. Of  
course, there were no glasses, hearing aids, operations or other aids to solve  
some of the most prevalent physical limitations that are not considered a  
disability today. Only the rich could afford a doctor and for that reason even  
a small accident, such as a broken arm or leg, or a dislocated shoulder, could  
result in a permanent disability or physical deformity. It is intriguing to  
notice that there is so little information about such a common aspect of  
human life. (2007, p4)
Several biblical stories indicate how disability led to destitution and abandonment by 
society. Indeed, in the case of the blind man, the onlookers asked, “Is this the man who  
used to sit an beg?” (v8). However, it is the words that this “happened so that the work of  
God might be displayed in his life” (v3) which are of particular relevance here. Jesus 
clearly rejects the thesis that the cause was the sins of the forefathers but there is a 
clear suggestion that God is the cause. The reason for the act of God is so that God 
can then use that person as a means of demonstrating his love for the world.
The text becomes even more difficult when we realise that the apparent purpose of 
God in making this specific man blind was so that he himself could ‘cure’ him of his 
blindness. A perhaps unintended side effect is to reinforce the view that those who are 
disabled are sufferers of their disability and that there is an eternal expectation of being 
cured. 
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It is important to recognise that this line of thought seems to imply that the essence of 
a human lies beyond the physical frame and that removing a disability does not create 
a different person. Of course, doing so may liberate them to be able to do things 
previously not possible. The blind man may now be able to work and support himself 
rather than have to sit at the gate and beg. Nevertheless, this is a matter of degree not 
essence.
Turning now to the matter of learning disability, we begin to see that such an 
approach has real problems. Removing the learning disability strikes at the heart of 
what is distinctively human and any substantive change to that aspect of a particular 
human is to change their whole nature. Even more than with physical disabilities we 
have to recognise that most individuals do not have a specific cause such as a 
chromosome abnormality, but rather are simply at one end of a (multi-variate) 
spectrum of capability. Their intellectual capabilities are not essentially different but 
are diminished in respect of their effectiveness.
It is even unclear what might be meant in this case by a ‘cure’. Would we expect that 
God could modify all those who fell below a certain percentage of the average to bring 
them above that minimum level? What then does that do to the average? The only 
outcome here is that ultimately everyone is undifferentiated with no-one either above 
or below the norm. Not only does this intuitively seem unlikely but it strikes at the 
heart of basic Christian thinking as it would leave little room for individual choice and 
response to the Gospel message.
If this were not complicated enough, it becomes more so when we take into account 
the fact that mental capacity is not a uni-dimensional characteristic, despite manifold 
attempts to produce a single measure for it – so-called intelligence tests. A particular 
case is that of Asperger’s Syndrome in which individuals may, in one attribute, be so 
deficient that they are impaired in their ability to lead a full social life unaided but that 
in other respects they may well have above-average capabilities in reasoning powers.
Equally, in cases of those classified as learning disabled by virtue of their overall 
intellectual ability and not through specific genetic factors, they may well have 
attributes which are above-average for the population as a whole. Here we can look at 
the ability to form relationships, to be loving, to be sympathetic, to be loyal, to be 
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trustworthy and honest, to be diligent. None of these need to be related directly to 
intellectual capability and there are many instances of individuals who could act as 
role-models to others if only we could set aside our prejudices about people with 
learning disabilities as being wholly dependent people.
Returning to John 9 we do however find an important contribution to the attitude 
towards learning disability, namely the lack of blame for the cause of the condition. 
All too often, even today, there is a deep seated guilt felt by the parents whose child is 
designated as having a learning disability, a guilt which continues to affect their 
relationship throughout life. Jesus makes it quite clear that we are who we are, not 
through the fault of individuals or even ourselves and that we are all the product of 
God’s creation. Equally it is unhelpful to conclude that it is God’s ‘fault’ – in the sense 
of having fallen short of some higher standard of behaviour as this would assume that, 
in better circumstances, God could have avoided creating disability.
Since we cannot seriously look for a universal ‘cure’ for learning disability, even if we 
could screen 100% successfully to avoid genetic defects, it is vital that our theology 
should seek a positive response to the existence of variety – what in the margins we 
call disability. Clearly there is no particular blame attached to such conditions which 
are merely the product of defining a spectrum and we should therefore seek to 
approach people with a learning disability in exactly the same way as those who 
happen to be at the other end of the spectrum. All too often we revere those with a 
particular skill which exceeds most of the rest of the population, failing to recognise 
that they have no more merit in being born there than those at the other have a blame 
attached to them. What we can properly do, however, is to look at how each of us 
responds to the condition in which we are born, how we use that ability and what 
sense of custodian responsibility we adopt.
In this way we can begin to make John 9 have a direct relevance for us all – not just for 
a small minority. It is the variety in the human condition which is God’s expression of 
love, not as an opportunity for divine intervention. It is the variety rather than the 
robotic that gives us the opportunity to respond to God’s love in a way that the rest of 
creation cannot.
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5.5 Eliminating Learning Disability
We have already looked at how we – the church, society, individuals – should respond 
to those who already exist and who have a learning disability, but Hauerwas raises the 
question about whether it is right to seek to eliminate learning disability for future 
human beings, (Swinton, 2004) expressing scepticism of some of the aims of modern 
medicine, aligning them with those of Utilitarianism, which he rejects (Coffey, 2009, 
p12).
This article is full of confusions and inconsistencies, but we must be at least a little 
tolerant since it was written in 1986, before the Healing Myth was exposed by writers 
such as Eiesland (1994). Despite a few disclaimers that it is not his intention, he fails 
to escape from the assumption that ‘the retarded’ are suffering from their condition. 
Indeed, he examines at some length the theology of suffering, asserting that it is in the 
essence of humanity that we suffer.
Yet he draws the bounds of what he means by suffering so wide that one is left 
wondering where it is limited. In particular, he includes ‘need’, a lack of assets or 
resources, as being part of suffering. But, since half of the population lack assets or 
resources, in comparison with the median, this is clearly an unhelpful direction to 
take. Unless we arrive at some utopian world in which we are undifferentiated in our 
possession of wealth, there will always be those who have less and those who have 
more.
Here, then, we arrive at one of the main inadequacies of Hauerwas’s analysis. He is so 
obsessed with a consideration of the profoundly disabled, that he loses sight of the 
fact that many of those we call learning disabled earn that label through no specific 
genetic condition or through having experienced an adverse incident, such as brain 
damage or oxygen starvation during birth.
To seek means to prevent the genetic or other conditions which can give rise to a 
learning disability cannot be other than desirable in principle, though we must always 
be vigilant that the means remain acceptable and are not used to justify them. Hence, 
we would not consider that the elimination of learning disability should be achieved 
by killing children at an early stage when they have been diagnosed.
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But if we followed too closely the line taken by Hauerwas we would also fail to 
develop birthing techniques that reduced the possibility of oxygen starvation, on the 
basis that somehow having people in the world with a learning disability was 
enriching for humanity. In reality it is not the existence of people with a learning 
disability that enriches us, but more the way in which the rest of the community react 
and interact with them, along with the rest of the community (Swinton, 2004, p104). 
Those who work with disabled people are not, by that reason alone, especially 
meritorious.
Hauerwas is driven to the conclusion “Still I think that something is wrong with the general  
policy that seeks to prevent retardation” (1986b, p89). In the absolute, this cannot be 
right. To deny action to diminish the extent of disability means – ultimately – to 
encourage its existence since a point will be reached where we have consciously to 
refuse to take an action which we know will reduce the scale of its existence. Inaction 
can be as wrong as action; refusing to prevent disability can be tantamount to creating 
it. Just because we value the humanity of everyone, regardless of their degree of 
disability, does not justify seeking to encourage its existence.
But perhaps the biggest defect in Hauerwas’s essay is fundamental and practical: is it 
possible to eliminate learning disability? We may be increasingly successful at 
preventing a widening range of genetic defects and in ensuring safer birthing 
techniques, but we are left with the inevitable fact that human intellectual capability is 
a variable. As we have already identified above, many of those labelled as having a 
learning disability do so because they are at one end of the ability range. Even ignoring 
the problem that ability is a multi-factorial issue which cannot readily be put onto a 
single spectrum, the boundary line is not only arbitrary but may change through 
reasons unrelated to those most directly affected by the change. Even if we eliminate 
all genetic causes, there will always remain those whose capabilities lie beyond a 
specific criterion. Unless we devise an entirely different concept of what we mean by 
disability, the possibility that they can be eliminated simply does not exist.
Hauerwas does, however, correctly conclude that the term suffering can only be used 
of people with a learning disability under very carefully constrained contexts. Firstly, 
as he recognises, many people with a learning disability will not consider themselves 
to be suffering as a result of their condition, any more than the rest of us would accept 
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that our individual variations amount to suffering. I may not be able to afford a huge 
mansion or a top-of-the-range motor car, but I cannot really consider that to be a 
matter of suffering whereas a liberation theologian rightly considers an enforced 
poverty that results in serious malnutrition to be a suffering that we should seek to 
remove. As a result, theological assertions regarding the existence of suffering, as 
Pailin (1992) recognises, are of scant use in developing a theological response to 
learning disability.
But we can use the term disadvantaged and thus tap into developments, such as 
liberation and rights, which have enabled theological thinking to underpin a desire to 
address the needs of particular people. Using the term disadvantage also helps us to 
understand learning disability as a relative matter, not one of essential difference. It is 
then no longer acceptable to establish rights or constraints with respect to disability 
which are hard and fast, a reflection of a difference in essence.
In this way we cannot but reject Hauerwas, “That such fellow-feeling is possible does not  
mean that they are 'really just like us'. They are not” (1986b, p103). There can be no ‘them’ 
and ‘us’, we are all part of ‘us’. In her response, Morgan also demurs, “The aspects of the  
essay with which I am least comfortable are those which stereotype people with learning  
disabilities and their families” (Morgan, 2004, p111). Yet Morgan agrees with Hauerwas 
in being disturbed with developments aimed at screening for certain defects at an early 
stage after conception.6 What is not clear is how they would react if a drug were 
discovered that, taken by a mother during pregnancy, would guarantee that their child 
would be a genius. Would it be immoral to take such a drug on the basis that it is 
interfering with God's will to create some of us more able? Would, on the other hand, 
it be immoral to fail to take the drug and could the child subsequently sue its mother 
for negligence?7
Morgan tends to support the association of suffering with learning disability but the 
inadequacy of her and Hauerwas's position is highlighted by looking at the example 
Morgan cites: “I take Peter (her disabled son) as an example. … I imagine he was hurt when  
parents moved their children away from him as he paddles at the edge of the sea” (2004, p109). 
Of course, it is not possible to deny the existence of such actions, they are all too 
familiar to those who work alongside those with a learning disability. But to seek to 
state this as something peculiar to learning disability is wrong and we only have to re-
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examine the quotation above in the context of a child who is ill-dressed or who has 
poor personal hygiene. Prejudice exists throughout society and, because it is prejudice 
it is wrong, but we can only conclude from that evidence that children with a learning 
disability are perceived as a minority in a way that has also affected those with a 
different skin colour, whose parents are from a different socio-economic group or who 
have a different religion. 
Importantly, if we succeed in educating society not to treat people with a learning 
disability in a discriminatory manner, as described above, then we do not alter the 
essence of the condition, only some of the effects of it.
5.6 Is God Mad?
Eiesland (1994) wrote from the perspective of a person with a disability, seeking to 
establish the notion of The Disabled God. Much of her thesis is political – seeking to 
create an improved position in society for people with a disability – and there is also a 
strong liberation theme.
She describes her vision of God in a sip-puff wheelchair. “Not an omnipotent, self-
sufficient God, but neither as a pitiable, suffering servant” (1994, p89). She goes on to 
establish the concept of “the image of Jesus Christ, the disabled God” This notion has been 
taken up by others as a means of helping people with a disability to identify with God, 
especially in the form of Christ.
Isherwood raises the possibility of extending this approach to other human categories, 
in particular to those with a mental illness. (2003) This gives us the possibility of The 
Mad God as a catch phrase.
If we also then consider the case of people with a learning disability we presumably 
must also admit the possibility of a vision of God as learning disabled. Swinton (2003) 
raises the possibility that Jesus might have Down's Syndrome.
There are problems, however – if God is learning disabled, how disabled? If we go to 
the extremes comparable with a sip-puff wheelchair we are left with a God who has 
little or no ability to act rationally, to communicate other than in the most basic of 
forms and who can establish very limited relationships. Is this a God that liberates? Is 
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this a God who can create adoration and respect? Is omnipotence inherent in being 
God? At the same time, the image challenges us to consider how far our faith practices 
have become cerebral rather than emotional and whether this is either necessary or 
appropriate.
Of course, if we accept that God truly became human in the form of Christ, then we 
must admit the possibility that he can also become human in the form of the most 
disabled of humans, just as much as in the highest achieving. However, this vision 
creates as many problems as it resolves.
Pailin begins with “Handicap is not necessarily a form of suffering” (1992, p ix). He goes on 
to identify that disability is more often a cause of suffering to others than to the 
person with the disability themselves.
Reacting to his personal experience with a particular young baby Alex, whose short 
life was dominated by very substantial disability, led Pailin to re-appraise his view of 
salvation, especially as humankind’s need for salvation is perceived through their 
relationship with God.
Pailin rejects the traditional models of salvation in terms of ransom, propitiation, 
vicarious sacrifice and satisfaction of honour as irrelevant to human self-
understanding today. Instead he talks of “the saving activity of God is the twofold activity  
of preserving what has been experienced and inspiring further expressions of aesthetic value ”  
(1992, p11).
Alex leads Pailin to say: 
This view of the divinely recognised worth of human beings may seem  
appropriate in the case of people who have the opportunity and the ability to  
act creatively. …  What is worrying about this way of understanding human  
salvation is that it is in danger of sanctifying the self-regarding attitude of  
the members of an artistic and intellectual elite who despise ‘ordinary people’  
because they do not share their supposed talents (1992, pp 11-12).
Whilst most of the content of Pailin's book seeks to look at what we can mean by the 
‘worth’ of humans whose capabilities are very restricted by their disabilities, it is 
important to pick up his recognition that judging God by the standards of humanity – 
both in terms of the nature of God and God’s saving power – is not valid.
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Contemporary society has within it a contradictory tension. On the one hand there has 
been in the last fifty years an explosion in the expression of the rights of every person 
in a society, whether to express their views, to expect benefit from society or to seek 
the right to partake in its control and governance. Crucially encapsulated in the 
Human Rights legislation, it is widely accepted that we all have basic rights regardless 
of who we are or what we have done.8 
On the other hand, society has increasingly become one in which people are judged 
and rated according to their achievements – especially those which can be measured in 
terms of wealth or column centimetres in newspapers and gossip magazines. In this 
context, people whose achievements are limited by their physical and mental 
disabilities are inevitably seen as a cause for pity rather than responsibility, rights 
rather than duties.
So, is God mad? Is God disabled? We need to consider whether such questions are 
well-formed. The key, perhaps, lies in recognising that these are all attempts to 
anthropomorphise God, trying to turn God into an image of humanity, rather than the 
other way around. We can only see God reflected, perhaps poorly and distorted, by 
looking at the human condition. What we most definitely cannot do is to extrapolate 
our condition to being that of God’s condition. God is neither disabled nor mad. 
Otherwise we treat God as human and, more specifically, to be limited to human 
capabilities.
Our perception of God has to transcend these limitations, recognising that, as a 
consequence, the concept of God is a will o’the wisp, forever just escaping our 
comprehension at the very moment when we think we have begun to nail it down in 
our collective consciousness. Uncertain Theology (see later) will help us capture the 
basis on which we can evaluate this apparent lack of precision.
Seeking to define God as ‘like us’, having only our characteristics, is an arrogance that 
must be set aside in favour of a willingness to say that we know little, maybe next to 
nothing, about God and yet still be able to put our trust in God, believing in God’s 
existence and accepting the salvation which is wrought through the death and 
resurrection of Christ. 
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As Pailin says in his conclusion, “The first step towards the liberation of any person is to  
give them dignity. This is what God gives to each of us, whatever our condition” (1992, p184). 
And then he turns Eiesland’s approach on its head by saying finally, “It is such 
experience of love (the person-to-person contact of shared love) that points us through and  
beyond our human encounters to God, and to God’s encounter with each of us” (1992, p184).
In this way we can then begin to recognise that far from needing a theology of 
disability, what we need is an acceptance that all of us are disabled, in the sense that 
by comparison with God we are all limited in what we can achieve and that our 
achievement is not the way to establish our relationship with God. Instead we must 
focus on the way in which God’s achievement affects us and leads us to a better 
understanding of how we should interact with others.
5.7 Incarnation and Learning Disability
‘God became Man9’ is an essential part of the incarnational creed. It is a perennial 
question whether God became human in all the defects of humanity. It may be said of 
Christ that he was “Man without sin” but, at least in the times when that was first 
stated – when disability was closely linked with sin as an explanation for its existence 
- it would mean not disabled! God clearly did not become human in every particular.
But the danger in some quarters is to move from God became Man to Man became God.  
This is particularly evident when we examine the extent to which marriage is a 
paradigm for our understanding of God. This is distinct from Augustine's “God became 
man so that man might become a god" perhaps meaning that the incarnation gives man 
access to God:
He enters by the door who enters by Christ, who imitates the suffering of  
Christ, who is acquainted with the humility of Christ so as to feel and know  
that, if God became man for us, men should not think themselves God, but  
men. He who, being man, wishes to appear God, does not imitate Him who,  
being God, became man. Thou art not bid to think less of thyself than thou  
art, but to know what thou art. (Augustine of Hippo, 424, para 4)
Isherwood & Stuart ask “If the body is given the space and power to speak what will be the  
consequences for both the body and theology?” (1998, p22). In any event, their 
interpretation of incarnation is not a once-for-all event, but a continuous here-and-
now activity. Something that cannot be escaped by shutting it inside an historical box.
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Saying that the body (in all its manifestations) is a window on God does not mean 
that we can discern all that there is about God by looking at humankind, even if all 
that we know about God is found by looking at the world around us. To assert that 
“God is in …“ is not the same as “God is …“ To say that God is in a person with a 
learning disability is a far cry from establishing that God is learning disabled.
Isherwood and Stuart repeat, “A human being is made in God’s image” (1998, p57) and, 
just previously, “If there is a huge ontological gap between human beings and God then human  
beings would of course have needs and behaviours which God did not”. In a reference back to 
Eiesland, they say, “On the other hand disabled theologians have reminded us that at the  
moment when Christians perceive who Jesus really is, that is, at his resurrection, he is revealed as  
the disabled God, bearing the marks of rejection and injustice”.
We must take care not to confuse ‘disabled’ in the sense of ‘unable to do’ with 
humans having certain characteristics – which all vary and are all finite.
But surely the resurrection, as distinct from crucifixion, shows the marks of 
acceptance and justice – that is, that whatever humans may do to each other, and how 
their treatment of each other is, at best, defective in some way, God both accepts and 
treats justly.
Is incarnation used in the sense of God becoming human, or God being revealed in the 
human? In relation to the way in which we will need to assess the paradigm role of 
marriage and its relationship to learning disability, how we resolve this ancient 
dilemma is significant. If the incarnation (accepting its on-going formulation) is 
revelatory rather than ontological then we will be better placed.
The Catholic Encyclopaedia (2007) states:
Catholics hold that, before the Resurrection, the Body of Christ was subject  
to all the bodily weaknesses to which human nature unassumed is universally  
subject; such are hunger, thirst, pain, death. Christ hungered, thirsted, was  
fatigued, suffered pain and death. … All these bodily weaknesses were not  
miraculously brought about by Jesus… The Fathers deny that Christ assumed  
sickness. There is no mention in Scripture of any sickness of Jesus. Sickness is  
not a weakness that is a necessary belonging of human nature. It is true that  
pretty much all mankind suffers sickness. … Athanasius gives the reason that  
it were unbecoming that He should heal others who was Himself not healed.  
… The reasonableness of these bodily imperfections in Christ is clear from the  
fact that He assumed human nature so as to satisfy for that nature's sin. … 
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As Christ did not take sickness upon Himself, so other imperfections, such as  
deformities, which are not common to mankind, were not His. St. Clement of  
Alexandria, Tertullian, and a few others taught that Christ was deformed.  
They misinterpreted the words of Isaias (which) refer only to the suffering  
Christ. Theologians now are unanimous in the view that Christ was noble in  
bearing and beautiful in form, such as a perfect man should be; for Christ  
was, by virtue of His incarnation, a perfect man (Catholic Encyclopedia, 
Online)
This extract, which runs quite counter to Eiesland's approach, draws a distinction 
between weaknesses of humanity and defects, such as sickness. But sickness is a 
natural consequence of being human, disability a consequence of being human. 
Genetic processes and the mechanism of evolution inherently lead to disability. The 
re-introduction of the notion that there is a link between sin and sickness (and, by 
extrapolation, disability) now seems unacceptable.
5.8 Body Theology and Learning Disability
The origins of Body Theology lie in seeking to solve some of the problems raised by 
feminist thinking, but it also brings insights relevant to a theological perspective on 
learning disability.
Stuart & Thatcher recognised this: 
Body theology affirms the body in the midst of its decay and mortality. A  
body-affirming model of Christian care for the elderly and disabled would at  
least involve providing appropriate sex and body education for the young  
disabled, ensuring that disabled and elderly people have privacy to be intimate  
with spouses (1997, p104).
They also recognise that meeting the needs of disabled people, especially those with a 
learning disability, may involve affirming practices which mitigate the difficulties in 
realising a sexual experience in a conventional heterosexual married relationship. For 
example, they see the fact that people with a learning disability may need to be 
encouraged to view masturbation in a positive light as evidence that such activity is 
not to be universally condemned, “Masturbation need not be understood as an inferior type  
of sexual activity to be engaged in only when sex with another person is not possible … Like any  
other sexual ‘act’ masturbation takes on different meanings in different contexts” (1997, p102).
They also raise the issue that sexual activity involving a person with a learning 
disability is difficult, if not abhorrent, to many people. However, denying people with 
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a learning disability the opportunity to express their sexuality is tantamount to saying 
that sexuality is not an essential part of humanity. If we adhere to the view that 
sexuality is a God-given essential part of human nature then we must seek to resolve 
this dilemma for those with a learning disability and, at the very least, not deny them 
the means of expressing themselves in sexual behaviour, whether or not it is family-
forming or even within a formal heterosexual marriage and this is confirmed by 
Opening the Doors (General Synod, 2009).
Pope John Paul II used a series of 129 addresses to present a theological view of the 
body which is quite different from that above. He based much of the detail on the 
fundamental assumption that men and women are unambiguously differentiated and 
distinctive. By using the term 'complementarity' he sought to give such distinctions a 
positive gloss, not least in order to provide fresh support for traditional views. 
Nevertheless, he sees marriage as a relationship between equals. Yet, John Paul II 
builds many of his arguments on making sexuality an integral and necessary part of 
what defines humanity distinctive from other living forms, as well as an essential 
focus for a relationship with God. To corrupt the human relationship is to corrupt that 
with God. Consequently, he struggles with the Augustinian co-location of sin and 
sexuality. (Pope John Paul II, 1979)
The theology set out in this series has been analysed in depth, such as by Curran 
(2005) who highlights the difficulties which such an emphasis creates. He particularly 
criticises the pope for an 'seriously incomplete body theology', drawing attention to 
the absence of the role of self in a sexual relationship, the existence of lust, sexual 
activity for the purpose of pleasure (self) and gratification (other) rather than self-
consciously and exclusively for procreative ends. “I have further difficulties with the papal  
emphasis on and understanding of complementarity. Such an emphasis means that men and  
women who are not married are not complete and lack something about their humanity. But this  
obviously goes too far” (2005, p192). He also points out that the pope failed to 
acknowledge discontinuities from the past in his theology and so making greater 
claims for continuity than is justified by historical evidence. 
One of the consequences of treating the body – and a very specific view of sexuality – 
as an idealised vision of the relationship with God is that it restricts God to a narrow 
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spectrum of possibilities. Instead, if we celebrate and relish the infinite variety that is 
yet human, then we open ourselves to a richer relationship with God.
The introduction of the complementarity notion brings with it a justification that it is 
possible to treat individuals differently based on inherent characteristics (Curran, 
2005, 192). If it is acceptable to consider men and women differently (and this is 
necessary in order to justify a gender-specific priesthood) then it is but a short step to 
discrimination based on, for example, whether or not they are considered to have a 
learning disability. Whilst it is not possible to ignore sexual differences, the inclusive 
basis of the gospel message makes it imperative not to use such a distinction – and 
more especially gender differences - as justification for a wider discrimination.10 The 
same applies to factors such as disability. We cannot ignore the implications of a 
learning disability on parenting skills but our inclusive agenda leads us towards a 
responsibility to avoid using that fact further than is strictly necessary. In particular, it 
would be wrong to assert that anyone labelled as having a learning disability is to be 
denied Christian marriage whilst also asserting an unlimited right  - or even duty - to 
the rest of the population.
Our extensive consideration of the theological implications of learning disability as a 
precursor to the particular matter of marriage theology is an example of our Evidential 
Theological methodology. What we learn about learning disability sets constraints on 
any theology of the body.11 In particular, we have underpinned our a priori position 
about inclusivity and the need to make our theology of marriage of universal 
application, dealing with special cases in a coherent, rather than exceptional, manner. 
We focus on what is common in each human body, as a locus for discovering God's 
interaction with the created world, rather than measuring the differences.12
Conclusion
It has been a part of much Christian thinking for a very long time 
that, just as God chose human form for the locus of incarnation and 
revelation, so we can continue to explore our perception of God 
through an evolving understanding of what our body is and how it 
‘works’. 
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1 The Mental Capacity Act, 2005  requires that, for people who need some assistance, there 
is still a presumption of capability unless shown otherwise.
2 The Ashley case noted earlier highlights the debate about  how far it is permissible to 
restrict the development of a Learning Disability person into full adulthood, even if the 
person has substantial disabilities. In a full-page advertisement placed by Scope (a charity 
whose focus is people with cerebral palsy) they stated, “…everyone, regardless of their  
impairment or needs, has full and equal human rights. Central to these human rights is that disabled  
children should not be prevented from growing into adults through medical intervention.” (Guardian, 
2007c)
3 Suppose that a resource (such as a charitable foundation or a state benefit) is made 
available for those adults with a particular syndrome. Access to those assets is thus 
mediated by the assessment of whether the condition actually exists in an individual. The 
question of definition becomes very important to those concerned. For example, the 3H 
Fund for Disabled People says on their web site, “… 3H Fund has a grant programme to 
assist disabled people (whether physically or mentally disabled) their families and carers, 
on low income, to organise a modest holiday for themselves … Applicants are asked to 
complete an application form and submit it with evidence of disability and low income” 
(3H 2009)
4 Radical Orthodoxy has brought a new re-examination of the relationship between the 
authority of the church relative to that of the state.
5 The UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities establishes a right to help 
specifically to enable them to raise children.
6 Since the original article was written, the issue of embryo selection on the same basis has 
become important.
7 This parallels the case cited by Morgan regarding the consequences of medical non-
intervention.
8 Of course there are specific cases which continue to challenge this position when the 
results of its application are – to many, at least those who write the tabloid comment 
columns – counter-intuitive. Thus we have an outcry when people in prison seek to use 
the Human Rights Act to achieve particular benefits. (BBC, 2010)
9 Occasionally the gendered use of Man (with a capital M) is retained to reflect the historic 
linguistic practice which is clearly gender-inclusive.
10 In both cases, there are difficult boundary conditions to be considered and distinctions are 
not universally unambiguous in either situation.
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11 In this case, intellectual capability is an inherent part of what constitutes the body.
12 This, of course, is not intended to deny the essential individuality of each person.
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6. Marriage at the Margins : Three Case Studies
In this chapter we will examine the three specific contexts for 
marriage that we set out earlier. In general, each of these exposes 
weaknesses in existing marriage theology where the underlying 
characteristic does not bring historical baggage.
Having established that people with a learning disability have a right 
to marry, we now have to face problems which arise from the 
received understanding of marriage. Many concerns for a such a 
couple contemplating marriage relate to their ongoing needs for 
support. A corresponding concern for married couples generally 
might do something to reduce the rate of marriage and relationship 
breakdown.
The second area of consideration is post-menopausal marriage. The 
specific interest here is in the relationship between traditional 
theological views of marriage and childbearing. If we are to allow 
marriage where the woman is already of an age when she is 
physically unable to conceive, and it would seem impossible to argue 
against such marriages, then we have to face the fact that child-
bearing cannot be a pre-condition for a marriage to be Christian. 
Consideration is then given to other situations in which, either by 
choice or not, marriages are childless. 
Much of traditional teaching about marriage was developed in times 
when children became economically active at an early age. There was 
not only a clear understanding about what parents were committing 
themselves to but also an unambiguous expectation that events 
would  follow the sequence of marriage-sex-childbearing. In this 
chapter we look at the current social context as seen through 
statistics, primarily about the UK population. We shall find that not 
only is the above sequence rare but that many people entering into a 
formal marriage do so with pre-existing children. Consequently, 
there is a greater need to consider theologically and pastorally, at the 
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time of the marriage, not only marriage as a relationship between 
two people, but one which is already more complex.
6.1 Learning Disability Marriage
One of the important elements of a valid marriage is that of consent and the degree of 
understanding that is needed for consent. The Mental Capacity Act provides a basis on 
which people with impaired understanding can make legally binding decisions 
(Parliament, 2005). The Act defines its scope as people who lack the capacity to make 
a particular decision. However, we need to consider whether this is a sufficient basis 
for the church to declare a particular marriage invalid.
The problem is not unique to the Christian (or at least Catholic) interpretation of 
marriage. al-Hibri, reports that “according to Islamic tradition, either the woman or the man  
can make the offer (of marriage) … Finally, the consenting parties must have the legal capacity  
to do so or the marriage contract will not be properly formed” (2006, p204). This would 
appear potentially to preclude some adults with a learning disability from forming a 
marriage contract.
For the Catholic church especially, the growth of annulment in the absence of divorce 
meant that there was a special emphasis on ensuring that all conditions for the 
marriage to be completed are properly established. One of the possible arguments for 
annulment is that consent was not given at the time of marriage. It would be very 
unfortunate if it were concluded that no person with a learning disability could be 
married because their consent could not be established to the satisfaction of the 
church or secular authorities.
Further, in the Marriage Resolutions of the Convocation of York adopted in 1938, one of 
the valid reasons for declaring a marriage null and void was “that either party to the  
marriage was at the time of the marriage and unknown to the other … a mental defective …”. It 
is not clear, and probably untested, whether this was intended to mean that where one 
party knew the other to have a learning disability then the marriage could be declared 
null and void. However, if this were possible, then surely the church should not have 
permitted it by conducting a service in which it allowed two people to enter into what 
was, in effect, a sham arrangement.
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Subsequent resolutions of General Synod have modified the position taken in the 
separate York and Canterbury Resolutions primarily in respect of second marriage 
after divorce. Marriage : A Teaching Document appears to remain the current official 
position on various matters relating to the theology and practice of marriage 
arrangements within the Church of England. It states:
Sometimes a marriage never appears to have been 'real', perhaps because one  
or both of the partners was unfit for marriage psychologically or physically,  
or too immature to make the promises in full understanding. However, it is  
only in very restricted circumstances that the secular courts can annul such  
marriages, and in any event they do not account for more than a tiny fraction  
of marriages that break down today (HOB, 1999, p5).
It says nothing more on the matter, clearly assuming that it is no longer an issue of 
general significance. 
Of course, one of the concerns of parents and carers when considering the option of 
marriage for a couple with learning disabilities is that of children. Two factors lead to 
the same concern: Firstly, there are some situations where there may be an enhanced 
risk of genetic defects, although this may be smaller than is often thought to be the 
case. (It would be considered unacceptable for the state forcibly to sterilise adults 
solely on the basis that the children are at risk of inheriting a genetic condition) 
Secondly, just as support for the parents is needed then there may be the need for 
even further input to safeguard the needs of the children. Some people may be 
concerned that if the parents have a restricted intellectual capability then this may 
result in under-stimulation and development of their children. Whether this is just a 
concern for those children whose parents have a learning disability, or is more 
widespread, is perhaps a matter for investigation, not least in the light of several child 
abuse cases.
A high profile case of a person with physical disabilities is that of  Lapper (2005). Born 
with very abbreviated arms and legs, as a result of a congenital condition called 
phocomelia, she has challenged many of society’s prejudices concerning the sexuality 
of people with physical disabilities. In particular, she has had to face criticism for her 
choice to have a child of her own. In addition to her physical condition (which means 
that she needs continuous care support), she had the additional challenge as a single 
parent.
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In My Life in my Hands she recalls that soon after she became pregnant her partner put 
pressure on her to have an abortion; she rang her mother (with whom she had not had 
a good relationship) for support but received a negative response: 
when I gave her the news she was especially negative about the prospect of me  
having a child. ‘Why’d you get pregnant? How can you look after a child?  
You’ll never cope. You’ll never manage.’ Those were some of her more polite  
comments, and the rest of the family essentially agreed with her
(2005, p195).
Later she writes :
It’s only society and the able-bodied who have a negative view about  
disability and who think it should be banished from the earth. Luckily for me  
it was not a crime to give birth to a disabled child, but there are disturbing  
current trends which suggest that it might be a possibility in the future
(2005, p197).
She was all too aware that, in her case, modern technology could have identified her 
condition at an early enough stage for her mother to have terminated the pregnancy. 
In practice, she needed extensive assistance in looking after her own baby with very 
intrusive attention from Social Services.
In 2005, a statue of her by Quinn was placed on the Fourth Plinth in Trafalgar Square. 
At the time she modelled for Quinn she was eight months pregnant which added to 
the challenge to public opinions:
If it were political correctness gone mad, people wouldn't have minded when  
the statue of me was chosen for the fourth plinth. But they have minded  
because it's brought up people's prejudices: the fact that we're not comfortable  
with nudity, disability and pregnancy (Anon, 2004a). 
Whilst this is an individual case of a person with substantial physical disabilities 
rather than a learning disability, it does sound an important warning that support 
from society to enable people to be parents is not to be taken for granted and there 
may be times when essential human rights need to be asserted. Of course, the 
obstacles faced by people with a learning disability who wish to become parents are 
considerable, regardless of whether they also have a physical disability.1
It is, at this stage, worth noting again that there is no absolute definition which can be 
used to determine those who have a learning disability or not. This means that it is 
difficult to establish a basis for differentiating the human rights of people with a 
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learning disability from any other member of the population. Consequently, the right 
to form relationships of choice and to marry is something that it is, in principle, 
difficult to deny to couples where one or both have a learning disability. Yet, with 
appropriate support, such people have been able to achieve a lifestyle better than 
others who do not have a recognised condition. Nevertheless, counselling about the 
consequences of taking such steps ought to be available in an appropriate form, just as 
it should be for everyone. 
By the same time, married couples are assumed to have the right to have children 
(Right to found a family, United Nations, 1948). It may be necessary to do more work to 
identify from where this right arises if it begins to run into difficulties. With the rise 
in the availability of treatments for fertility problems, there has grown an extension of 
this assumed right from that to be allowed to have children to a right actually to have 
them. It is as if the traditional teaching about the responsibility for parents to have 
children (and thus to avoid contraception) had been turned on its head and used to 
bolster this new right.
This supposed right can emerge in various contexts, almost implicitly and without 
recognition. In the Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology  Fitzgerald (1999) alleges 
that one of the two factors which determines the extent of poverty in any developing 
country is the average level of income of that country. Of course, any average is the 
result of taking the ratio of two parameters, in this case the total income of the country 
as well as the population size. Fitzgerald ignores this latter parameter, implicitly 
assuming that it is either uncontrollable or that it ought not to be controlled. Arising 
as it does from a discussion on economics and liberation theology, steeped in the 
Catholic church teachings of the past four decades, it is unsurprising that 
responsibility for population size is ignored or down-played. The right to have children 
is assumed without justification, despite the one-child population policy of China. At 
this stage of this investigation, it is unclear whether such a right exists and how it 
should be balanced against other responsibilities, a problem to be returned to later.
Forced sterilisation of a national, ethical, racial or religious group would be considered a 
Crime Against Humanity by the International Criminal Court (UN, 1998). It is 
probable that enforced contraception or abortion is not allowed in UK law:  an attempt 
made by an MP in 1931 to introduce legislation for sterilisation of 'mental defectives' 
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(Hansard, 1931) was heavily rejected. In the case of people with a learning disability, 
abortion and sterilisation are liable to charges of criminal assault unless there is in 
place clear evidence of informed consent. The situation in the USA may be different as 
in the case of Ashley (Pilkington, 2007; Ashley, 2007). For prescribing contraceptive 
pills or devices, the case is probably slightly less clear, but needs careful statement so 
that those involved can be clear about what support they may give.
The consequence, unless further reasons are found, is that a couple with learning 
disabilities has the same duty to have children as any other couple, regardless of the 
outcome. There is thus an imperative to evolve a theology of marriage for people with 
learning disabilities that is not discriminatory but which meets their particular needs 
and circumstances.
It may be that in developing such solutions, the demand from certain churches to 
avoid contraception, stemming from an over-arching responsibility for married couples 
to have children, can be offset by an equally important responsibility in determining 
whether to have children in the first place. This seems to be eminently sensible in the 
case of adults with a learning disability, but we must then feed back that conclusion 
into the general case.
In this section so far it has been broadly assumed that both partners in the marriage 
have a learning disability. In the secular domain there are further complications if only 
one potential partner has a learning disability arising from the issue of consent and 
the avoidance of possible claims of abuse. Whilst this is an important issue, it seems 
unlikely that it raises matters of a particularly theological concern that have not 
already been aired above.
In 2005, the Department of Health commissioned a survey of adults with a learning 
disability (ONS, 2005i). Some 8% of the survey group (2898) either were or had been 
married. However, only 3% were recorded as living independently with their partner. 
7% of the sample had children, around half of whom were looking after them 
themselves. One third had help from someone other than their partner. In terms of 
the opportunity of finding a partner with which to establish a long term relationship, 
two thirds of the sample found their friends from amongst other people with a 
learning disability, but expressed a strong desire to find non-disabled friends. In 
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general, the group have less social contact than other members of the population. 
“People with learning disabilities are often socially marginalised and isolated. They may live in  
segregated settings with few, if any, social relationships with people living in the wider  
community” (ONS, 2005i, p16).
Somewhat in contrast, there is evidence that this right is being abused as reports of 
forced marriages indicates:
The motives behind families forcing their children with learning disabilities  
into marriage are often the same as for any other forced marriage - cultural  
attitudes which see marriage as the norm, responding to peer pressure, and to  
ensure marriage to someone of the same class and religion (Community 
Care, 2009).
But specific carer-related reasons may also exist, “But it can also have unique causes, says  
Mandy Sanghera, a trustee of Voice UK: Some families see marriage as a way of providing a  
carer for their child, so feel they have their child's best interests at heart". Further evidence is 
given in Forced marriage: not to be tolerated (NAWO, 2008) What is clear is that 
although there is a close proximity to the notion that married people are expected to 
care for each other and that it is likely that in previous generations an economic 
motive was predominant in many marriages,  the current position is that such 
arrangements do not constitute a valid civil marriage. It would seem unreasonable for 
the church to seek to establish otherwise, merely in order not to have to modify its 
views of whether and in what circumstances marriages can be dissolved or annulled.
It is clear, therefore that although adults with a learning disability have a full right, 
like anyone else, to be married, there are considerable obstacles to its fulfilment.
6.2. Post-menopausal Marriage
A greater part of teaching about marriage from a Christian perspective, together with 
the underpinning theological thinking, is directed at couples, young and positively 
contemplating raising a family, even if its size and timing are to be regulated to some 
degree.
In past generations, most couples devoted almost all of their post-wedding life to an 
active involvement in parenting. The need to have almost as many pregnancies as 
nature would allow in order that sufficient survived to adulthood meant that there was 
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little of life left afterwards. Indeed, for many women, death in childbirth was a very 
real risk and perhaps one of the highest causes of marriage termination, along with 
(for their husbands) death in war or at work.
Whilst second marriages have been common for a long time, these were almost all 
following the death of the other partner. Frequently, the new marriage continued the 
child-bearing process.
The arrival of smaller families and increased longevity means that many parents have 
almost half of their lives ahead of them when their children are no longer an 
immediate responsibility, even with the extended task documented below.
As a result, there are now many more cases of marriages which are, at the outset, 
either technically post-menopausal, or at least beyond the point at which the couple 
wish to continue child-bearing and will expect to achieve the same results as those 
who are post-menopause.
Life expectancy continues to increase and the Office of National Statistics reports that 
the fastest population growth in the period 1991-2004 was for those over 85(ONS, 
2005i, p11). It is expected that the proportion of the population over 65 and therefore 
unlikely to be economically active, will continue to rise.
Whilst this trend is most noted for its impact on economic factors, especially the 
viability of pension arrangements, it can be expected also to have an impact on 
attitudes towards marriage. It is unlikely that this group of the population will wish to 
lead single, celibate lives, yet will be less inhibited by conventions that relate to 
matters such as child rearing.
The average age for the menopause remains around 51 (WHO, 1996) and, although 
interest in sexual activity may diminish at this time, the need for companionship is 
unlikely to be similarly affected and the sexual drive for men is also not necessarily 
commensurately diminished.2 We are also beginning to see more widespread use of 
medication to offset deleterious effects of the menopause, such as osteoporosis, which 
can delay the effects, especially as they relate to sexual drive. The proportion of 
menopausal women in developed countries is around twice that in developing 
104
countries and overall the numbers are expected to double in the next twenty years 
WHO, 1996, p8).
It is also suggested that a woman’s emotional reaction to menopausal changes may 
well be influenced by cultural factors. At one time the most significant factor, other 
than purely physical effects resulting from hormonal changes, was a sense of 
bereavement at the loss of fertility. However, as more women see their persona and 
life motivation determined by factors other than child-rearing, then the effect alters. 
Indeed, in some cases the absence of concern about pregnancy may be seen with a 
sense of new freedom. As more of the women coming into this age group lived their 
early life in a time when there was greater sexual freedom, it is possible that the 
emphasis will be that of regaining this freedom without the counter effects of guilt or 
consequence. Hence there could be a growth of sexual activity and the formation of 
relationships (whether or not sexually expressed) in those who until relatively recent 
times would not have been considered as likely to be marrying or forming long-term 
relationships. They are probably less likely to be concerned about the traditional 
teachings of the church which focus almost exclusively on an assumption that 
marriage takes place towards the early part of adult life, ignoring the differences for 
those in later life.
All too often, theologies of marriage have found it hard to encompass post-
menopausal situations. Stackhouse reports “Even those who marry when they are beyond  
the child-bearing age, according to later accounts, replicate the structure of this divine design for  
the purposes of companionship, mutuality of regard, and relief from wanton temptation” (2005, 
p156). In other words, marriage in these conditions is intrinsically the same as for 
those of child-bearing age, but with something missing.
From one point of view this could be seen as a helpful view, in that it recognises 
several very important aspects of a relationship other than procreation and that 
marriage can exist in this form. On the other hand, by emphasising the huge gap 
supposedly left by the absence of procreation, it sets post-menopausal marriages off in 
a negative direction.
Furthermore, such a view fails to take into account that a post-menopausal marriage 
may well still have significant child-rearing and parenting components (for children of 
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a former relationship or even from the couple before marriage – let alone caring for 
grandchildren). Marriage liturgies largely ignore these possibilities. For couples 
beyond a child-bearing age, the language used, along with the underlying theology, is 
ill-fitting, often quite disrespectful. Exhorting two 78 year-olds with an injunction that 
they should look to further children as the justification and fulfilment of the marriage 
seems wrong. Surely this is a clear case for recognising that, in some cases at least, a 
marriage may be entirely for the good of the couple themselves.
The Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Los Angeles states, 
The church has traditionally offered the sacrament of Holy Matrimony to  
couples for whom the procreation of children was not even an option: for  
example, couples past child-bearing age, or couples in which one of the  
partners has a physical disability that precludes conceiving or bearing  
children. Moreover, couples may choose not to have children for a multitude  
of reasons (2008, p5).
Liturgically, their relevant phrase is, “the procreation of children and their nurture in the  
knowledge and love of the Lord when it is God’s will” This represents the compromise that 
many churches adopt. That is, without giving up procreation as a primary element of a 
Christian sacramental marriage, it is not quite an essential. Of course, the condition 
“when it is God’s will” raises many problems, especially of discernment as well as the 
relationship between God’s will and the actions of human beings. Given the context of 
the above citation, it is unlikely that the phrase is meant to indicate that any attempt 
to control procreation is prohibited. Nevertheless, it still leaves those who have no 
option of having children, or who chose not to, in an apparently deficient position.
Of course, if it becomes possible to view post-menopausal marriage in broader terms 
than principally, if not quite exclusively, those relating to child-bearing, there seems 
little in the way of translating the same understanding back into other marriages 
where the couple, for whatever reason, specifically decide to take steps to avoid 
pregnancy.
These marriages have presented problems for most churches insofar as the procreative 
imperative is clearly flaunted. The changes initiated at Vatican II, as described by 
Jeffrey, were forced to fall back on the authority of the church as the only way of 
defining which contraceptive practices are acceptable. (2006, p 60)
The change in general health and its impact on the extent of married life after child-
rearing is essentially complete, was noted in 1971 in Marriage Divorce and the Church, 
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the so-called Root Report. (see extract in Marriage and the Doctrine of the Church of  
England) “The prolongation of life together with earlier marriage means that couples can  
anticipate fifty years or more of wedlock” (Central Board of Finance, 1985, p19). Of 
course, several significant changes have occurred since then, including a substantial 
delay in the average age at first marriage, pre and non nuptial cohabitation and the rise 
in non-procreative marriages.
Nevertheless, the Root Report continues, “Such longevity with the availability of more  
effective means of contraception and the reduction in infant mortality means that a great deal of  
time and energy has been released for activities other than those traditionally associated with  
childbearing and caring for children” (Central Board of Finance, 1985, p19).
However, neither then nor subsequently does the Church seem to have dealt with the 
implications of such changes, nor the impact that post-menopausal marriage has on 
the whole concept of marriage.
Still, it was recognised by the Root Report that, “whereas in the past widowhood often  
occurred speedily after the departure of the last child from home, spouses have now the  
opportunity of a new phase of marriage of many years after their last child has left them” (p19).  
(Reibstein (2006) documents a number of examples)
D H Lawrence in Lady Chatterley’s Lover (Lawrence ,1928) sets up a situation which 
highlights a number of these issues. Connie (Lady Chatterley) marries a man who, as 
a result of a war-time injury, is not only confined to a wheelchair, but is also unable to 
participate in sexual intercourse. What interests Lawrence is the consequence of this 
situation – whether this inability of her husband invalidates the marriage. Clearly for 
him the possibility exists since he effectively encourages Connie to satisfy her sexual 
needs elsewhere. But it is also clear that the marriage, in a secular and legal sense, is 
expected to endure. Connie married as much for property as for love and, despite her 
husband’s injury, she is not inclined to forgo the wealth and position that came with 
the marriage.
We are thus forced to come to terms with the conflict between the contract and the 
covenant views of marriage (of which more in a later section). The contract view of 
marriage covers the matter of property and the duty of the husband to provide both 
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wealth and status for his wife whilst the fact that he cannot continue to satisfy her 
sexually allows them both to consider that the covenant form of marriage has been 
dissolved. He can no longer meet his obligations under this covenant and is able to 
consider allowing Connie to seek satisfaction elsewhere.
In Brazil in 1996, a Catholic Bishop refused to marry a paraplegic man, because he 
would not be able to have sex and father children (Mackay, 2001).
This section is initially focused on post-menopausal marriage because there are no 
over-loaded concerns about choice – the woman is unable to procreate simply as a fact 
of nature, time dictates the condition. (Although less discussed, similar issues relate 
to men with prostate problems) However, there are a number of lifestyle situations to 
examine these in more detail – both to find the commonalities but also to see where 
there are differences:
• childless by choice
• singleness
• live apart together relationships
6.2.1 Childless By Choice 
Later we shall look at the possibility that there might be a duty to have children. 
Increasingly, technology exists which enables, by conscious choice, couples who 
hitherto could not have children for natural causes, now to procreate.
However, in that context, it is tentatively concluded that the mere existence of the 
technology does not directly indicate a duty to use it, despite the fact that there are 
many counter examples. Ethically, the Christian message is clearly on the side of 
stating a positive duty to intervene on the side of good if such a possibility exists. In 
the parable of The Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) the Priest and the Levite are cast in 
a negative light for not acting even though they probably had the means so to do. It 
was not enough that they had other excuses – the needs of the injured man took 
precedence; doing good, in this sense, was a high priority and inaction could be just as 
unacceptable as action with negative consequences.
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It is tempting to draw a parallel in the case of choices about procreation: to apply 
arguments such as that above, demands that we see the action as being 
unambiguously a ‘good’. There has to be no doubt in our mind that, for example, the 
Samaritan was acting entirely for self-less motives and that there could be no adverse 
consequence, even unforeseen ones – although the Priest and Levite probably saw it 
differently with alternative priorities.
We have to face, in our contemporary culture, that actions in the context of medicine, 
social welfare and others, are rarely, if ever, without side effects. Whatever the life-
saving capabilities of a new wonder-drug, they come at a price and that price has to be 
weighed in the light of the primary benefits.
For there to be an absolute duty to seek to procreate it is necessary to demonstrate 
that there are no adverse consequences. Otherwise, it becomes a much more complex 
moral and theological question in which the competing demands of action and 
inaction are to be weighed, one against the other.3
Thatcher cites Barth as generally advocating child bearing as normative within 
marriage but concludes, “It is not entirely clear whether he (Barth) acknowledges that some  
individuals and some couples definitely decide to avoid having children” (2007, p219).
 But Thatcher goes further and asks:
Is the compensation for childlessness the Gospel allegedly offers available to  
all childless people (all of whom are supposed to want them), or only to that  
class of people who do want them but cannot have them because of a lack of a  
partner or because of a fertility problem? (2007, p219).
Thatcher concludes that Barth, and those of a similar position, fail to address the 
complexities that modern fertility treatments create. However, he still asserts that, 
“the gift of children (is) unambiguously joyful” (2007, p219) thereby failing to 
accommodate the consequence of fertility treatment that procreation is not simply to 
be seen as ‘a gift’. That is close to a fatalistic notion which is quite contrary to the pro-
active sense of responsibility which pervades the character of Jesus.
It is not difficult to realise that there are many situations in which a couple may 
identify that to seek to procreate (either at all or further than their existing family) has 
serious negative consequence. In some cases the issues may be medical - a 
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demonstrable genetic condition that makes it very likely that any child will be 
seriously malformed - or perhaps economic - the financial circumstances mean that 
the parents feel unable to provide sufficiently for such a future child. There could be 
may arguments that the mother is likely to be emotionally or psychologically unfit to 
nurture another child.4
In such circumstances, the couple, and possibly others, have to make a choice based 
on the positive and negative outcomes of the choice being made. For some, the option 
of successfully seeking to procreate is wholly good in terms of having the child. For 
them there is no question that having children is, in principle, a ‘good thing’.
However it is not immediately obvious where, from a Christian theological point of 
view, such a conclusion might derive. There are social and cultural pressures, differing 
in both time and country, which see childlessness as a wholly negative situation. 
Certainly, the Old Testament culture placed great importance on enabling the 
succession of the familial line. A failure to achieve this was a disaster. Augustine, 
however, developed his thinking to conclude that procreation was no longer the 
essential for marriage, based on his belief that God was making up the elect from 
those already baptised (Coleman, 2004, p144).
The fact that God is recorded as having intervened in childlessness (such as Abraham 
and Sarah, Gen 17; Zacharias and Elizabeth, Luke 1) can be interpreted as supporting 
the conclusion that procreation is a positive Christian duty. But it is also possible to 
see these cases differently: whilst the particular culture meant that the lack of a child 
resulted in great sadness, God intervened to demonstrate a sensitivity to the needs of 
humans, in whatever their context and condition. There is no place that is entirely 
without hope.
Change the time, place, culture and society, then the needs also change. No longer do 
those living in a Western society see childlessness in the same light (Townsend, 2002 
as an example) and there is a need to be particularly sensitive to those who do not 
have children, despite a wish to do so. But there are other needs and those who face a 
life without hope may well need something entirely different to be provided for them.
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It is perhaps therefore important that we look at the responsibility of procreation rather 
than the duty or necessity for whatever reason. Child-bearing should be related more 
clearly to child-rearing and, desirably, all conceptions should be undertaken with a 
positive intent to act responsibly, taking into account a wide range of known – and 
perhaps unknown – consequences. It is, therefore, entirely reasonable in this situation 
to expect, even accept, that a couple may decide, for a variety of reasons, not to have 
children ever and for this to be consistent with positive ethical considerations.
Whilst it is tempting to conclude that every couple have the right to choose whether 
to seek procreation, it would be equally wrong to conclude that they have an isolated 
right to choose without reference to the consequences and, indeed, the motivations, of 
such a choice. It is the very existence of such consequences that seems to create that 
right in the first place.
Thatcher concludes that there is, potentially at least, a tendency for consumer society 
attitudes to dominate such decision making, “At the very least the desire for children  
competes with endlessly stimulated desires for endless commodities” (2007, p224).
The evidence then is that it is likely to be as wrong for a couple to decide not to have 
children for selfish lifestyle reasons as it is to enforce a cultural expectation that 
denies the right to make such a choice.
6.2.2 Singleness 
Wilson (2005) examines the way in which singleness has been seen in past 
generations as well as charting its growth and development in recent times. He sets 
out to see how far the church has embraced the challenges that an increase in 
singleness presents and how it might do better in the future.
Although his aim is to look at singleness, he does so largely by looking at marriage 
and married people and inferring conclusions from that perspective. In many ways he 
approaches but never quite reaches a recognition of the asymmetry in the theological 
perspective of marriage and singleness. Compare the way in which we might react to a 
comment about a single person, “Oh, why are they still single?” with the 
corresponding one about a married person, “Oh, why are they still married?” The 
former, albeit with an in-built bias, is broadly acceptable to most people whilst the 
latter would not be. Such reactions indicate that, beneath the surface, marriage – or at 
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least a stable two-person relationship – is seen as the norm whilst singleness is 
aberrant. McCulley & Watters (2009) produced a three part radio series entitled 
Singleness: Living with a Hope Deferred. Again, the implication is that it is normal to seek 
(heterosexual) marriage and that singleness is either transient or a failure.
MacVarish (2006) also notes the rapid expansion in the number of single person 
households, doubling in the period 1971 to 2000 to 31% of all households in the UK. 
Although based on a relatively small sample, she notes, “For the women studied in this  
sample (aged 34-50), singleness is more problematic than the popular portrayals suggest,  
primarily because they would not want it to be permanent but they cannot be certain when, how  
or if it will end” (1.9) and concludes, “Issues of intimacy, care and transitional experiences  
seem to be evident amongst a group predicted to become more numerous in the future; single,  
childless women who do not feel that they have actively chosen to be either of these  
things”(1.34). 
Although in earlier generations and in other cultural contexts, enduring non-sexual 
friendships played an important part in social structures, the present sexualisation of 
all lifestyles seems to have marginalised friendship as something to be desired or 
sought. Cardman concluded that: 
Relatively little attention has been paid to friendship in Christian theology  
and spirituality, and why much of what has been written is not really very  
useful. Instead of abstract treatises on "spiritual friendship," what we need  
now is a theological understanding of the very human experience of  
friendship, a theology of "bodily friendship," so to speak (1983, p304-318).
Stuart (1995) wrote about whether friendship can be used to understand the 
relationship between God and humanity, especially from a same-sex perspective.
6.2.3 Live Apart Together
A relatively new phenomenon has been given the title Living Apart Together (LAT) and 
its growth has been charted by the National Statistics office. In December 2005 it was 
estimated that up to two million men and a similar number of women, aged under 60, 
have a regular partner who is in another household (ONS, 2005i). Such people 
generally consider themselves to be a couple, and will act accordingly in a social 
context, but they choose to live in separate households.
A growing element of this phenomenon includes younger people still living in the 
parental home. It appears likely that the high cost of setting up home together is the 
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determining factor – in the absence of this constraint, the relationship would 
otherwise have become a single household. As Reibstein (2006) charts, this may well 
be part of a process in which a couple explore the possibilities for a long-term 
relationship.
Haskey and Lewis (2006) report on a substantial survey of attitudes amongst LAT 
couples. They conclude that the phenomenon is not a new form of relationship but 
more a reaction to perceived difficulties in achieving a co-residential relationship.
6.3 Changes in Parenting Role
In England and Wales, the Office of National Statistics regularly publishes the results 
of various studies concerning the incidence and nature of marriage in relation to age, 
place of ceremony, birth of children and so on. The age of first marriage continues to 
rise and is now just over 30 (ONS, 2005a). However, for women there has been a 
growth in the distinction between those who marry young and those who delay much 
later than the average. Overall, the tendency to marry young, which flourished 
between 1960 and 1980 has once again diminished (ONS, 2005h). Whilst the period 
after the Second World War up to 1970 showed a growth in the number of women 
who were pregnant at the time of the marriage, this subsequently diminished, 
suggesting a decline in the social pressure to marry as soon as a pregnancy was 
confirmed (ONS, 2005b). The percentage of women who marry has steadily declined 
(ONS, 2005c) whilst the number of single parents has risen (ONS, 2005d).
ONS (2005e) also shows that whilst there was once a high proportion of couples 
having their first baby soon after marriage, indicating that many brides were already 
pregnant when the wedding took place, this is no longer a dominant factor. The mean 
age of childbearing fell sharply between 1930 and 1945, rising consistently thereafter 
(ONS, 2007c). Together with ONS (2005f), the evidence suggests that marriage is 
seen neither as a necessary nor a sufficient condition for procreation. (However, 
Dormor (2004) notes that in the hundred years following the Hardwicke Act, perhaps 
as many as 20% of couples cohabited outside marriage) There has also been a decline 
in the size of household, reflecting both the rise in single parent families and 
reductions in family size (ONS, 2005g). 
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However, the trend in family size is much less easy to measure – or even to define. 
Whilst in the past it would generally be taken to mean the average number of children 
born to a married couple, who then lived together until they were past child-rearing 
age, today many households contain children from various previous relationships, 
married or not. However, the number of children per woman continues to decline as 
shown in ONS (2007).
The number of women who do not have children has also changed but, although it 
might popularly be assumed to have been on a general increase, the following 
statement from the Office of National Statistics indicates otherwise:
Some women remain childless. Twenty-one per cent of women born in 1920  
were childless at the end of their childbearing years. This declined to a low of  
9 per cent for women born in 1945 and 1946. It increased subsequently, and  
will be just under 20 per cent for women that are soon to complete their  
childbearing years (ONS, 2007a, p4).
A recent development is the possibility that couples may openly become the legal 
parents and form families where both of the adults fulfilling a parental role are the 
same gender. The extent to which this occurs in UK is not necessarily easy to 
determine but studies in US suggest that between 6 and 14 million children have at 
least one gay or lesbian parent and 10,000 children are being raised by lesbian 
mothers who had become pregnant through alternative insemination.
Data for the US, presenting a not significantly different pattern, is summarised by 
Coontz (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d)
The overall picture is that whatever people might wish for, or the church and other 
moral ‘guardians’ preach, there is a continuing rise in the number whose practice is 
rather different from so-called traditional family structures (Drucker, 1998, p37).
Whilst these situations are too recent to establish the long term effects with any 
degree of certainty, there is confusing and contradictory evidence about the ability of 
children to thrive in various household circumstances (Juby, Marcil-Gratton & Le 
Bourdais, 2000). There are indications that the social prejudices surrounding single 
sex relationships may expose the children to particular pressures but these are not 
likely to be significantly different from those experienced by children of any minority 
group (e.g. black children in a largely white community).
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Willimon (1996, pp172-174) raises the influence of trends towards the individual, as 
having pre-eminence over society, as a significant factor on attitudes towards the role 
of parents. He points out that, however much we may think that we know our 
partners before marriage, the person they evolve to later in life may not be the person 
whom we chose. Equally, however much we may think that we take a conscious 
decision to have a child and take responsibility for its upbringing, there is much about 
that child which we do not choose. “What makes being a child or a parent so unusual is  
this: you didn’t choose your parents and they didn’t choose you” (1996, p173). Martinez 
makes a similar observation: “many people have lost the capacity to share intimacy because of  
a highly competitive individualism”(1996, p188). 
It is important to recognise that these trends are specifically those of the developed, 
western countries. Considerable differences exist elsewhere: Martey highlights the fact 
that many African societies, dependent on a very largely non-industrialised economy, 
still place child rearing as the primary reason for marriage, “Unlike in developed countries  
where the instruments of production are machines and where sophisticated tools are used, in  
traditional Africa goods are produced mainly by human beings. Because of this, much attention is  
placed on marriage and child-bearing” (1996, p204). He goes further: “Marriage is therefore  
looked upon as a sacred duty which every normal person must perform … marriage is only a  
means to an end and not an end in itself”.
Coontz reports that in the US, there has been a decline in Married Couple 
Households, “ [marriage] is what they do a considerable time after they have achieved those  
goods, 40% of homebuyers in America are single, the majority of them women” (2006b).
It is important to disentangle current economic circumstances from any attempt to 
define marriage in more fundamental terms. Any meaningful theology must be capable 
of being used as relevant teaching in such varied conditions.
6.3.1 Parenting Role
Central to any marriage theology is the responsibility to rear any children who are 
born to the couple. The need for a positive framework for the growth of children is a 
key factor in looking at recent trends in divorce, cohabitation and, increasingly, non-
partner conceptions and same-sex parenting.
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Those keen to argue for the traditional nuclear family, point to evidence that children 
brought up in other contexts, such as blended families, do less well whilst other 
researchers claim that there is no difference (Milena, 2009; Bumpass, Raley & Sweet, 
1995; Bumpass & Raley 1995; Larson 1992). It seems that, despite correlations 
between adverse outcomes and non-nuclear families, the selection process leading to 
such families is more of an influence than the nature of the family:
The question, however, is not whether recent family transformations are  
positive or negative — the family has always been a vehicle for social change,  
and continues to be so. The real issue is how best to manage these changes at  
the individual and social level, in order to ensure children’s well-being  
throughout childhood however simple or complex their family life  course  
(Juby, Marcil-Gratton & Le Bourdais, 2000, p201).
There is, unsurprisingly, less agreement about what measures are to be used in 
determining what is meant by a more successful or less successful outcome of 
parenting. Is the measure to be economic – the child has access to a wealthier 
standard of living? Is the objective to create  a sense of justice or an acceptance of 
traditional religious faith? Are we seeking new adults who have confidence in their 
sexuality? Is it important that the next generation is able to form stable and lasting 
relationships?
Of course, many people would subscribe to some or all of these and others. The 
problem then for anyone wanting to establish evidentially that the nuclear family is 
best is to cope with such a multi-dimensional scenario. It is highly unlikely that any 
sample group will show consistent rankings and the more objectives that are added to 
the list the more confused the analysis becomes.
Perhaps we could pick out just one objective to use for comparison. Leaving aside the 
probable improbability of reaching such agreement, we can never eliminate the effect 
of history – society is ever-changing and what works well in one generation may well 
be less successful in different times and we may not be able to select culturally-
independent factors.
In any case, we have to be particularly careful that we document the changing context 
so that we can identify whether or not it is the context or the reaction to the context 
that is the causal factor. Suppose we are able to measure a change in, let us say, the 
ability to form stable and lasting relationships as seen in divorce rates, and seek to 
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link that to changes in the divorce rates of the parental generation. What we cannot do 
is jump to the conclusion that one is the cause of the other. It may well be that both 
are reactions to economic changes which have happened contemporaneously.
Perhaps the most significant change in the child-rearing task is in the length of 
dependency or childhood (Haskey & Lewis, 2006, p40). In not much more than 150 
years, British society has moved from a situation in which children were starting work 
routinely between age 7 and 9, to the present day with school leaving age at 16 but 
with a practical age of 18 for the majority and a public policy of encouraging at least 
50% of children to attend university or some tertiary vocational education up to 21. 
Around nine out of ten students who get two or more A levels go on to further or 
higher education (DfES, 2006, p6).
In parallel, peri-natal and infant mortality have largely been eradicated from a past 
situation in which up to half of all live births failed to lead to an adult of 21. Family 
sizes have now dropped to below the replacement rate.
 Although the past decade has seen only a slight rise in the number of births outside 
marriage there is a continuing sharp drop in the numbers within marriage to a point at 
which they may soon be less than those outside marriage.
Whilst the number of dependent children per family has thus dropped, the economic 
and psychological burden has dramatically increased. Instead of parents only being 
fully responsible during the few years of physical dependency, their children now pass 
through puberty into being sexually active and possibly child-bearing and marriage 
before they have completed full time education and economic dependence.5
Any consideration of marriage today must recognise that procreation not only extends 
to the rearing of ‘children’ (in the young person sense) but also of being able to adapt 
and evolve the relationship to permit successful cohabitation with them as adults. 
There are entirely different dynamics involved as well as emotional pressures, not least 
because such off-spring probably lack the ultimate option of leaving home in the event 
that they wish to follow incompatible – but equally reasonable – life styles.
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Jones (2005) examines the implications for families following social changes including 
an expectation – both by the state and by children themselves – that parents will 
provide more economic support during the transition to adulthood and that this 
support is required for much longer6.
Beyond a certain age – which will no doubt vary from one family to another – this 
economic support is very much a function of the willingness of the parents to provide 
it. No longer is it seen as a duty, despite planning assumptions by the state.
As a result, many young people may find themselves in a poverty trap, attempting to 
be economically self-sufficient in a context where a declining youth labour market and 
rapidly increasing costs of housing make this ever harder to achieve. Jones also notes 
that, “because transitions to adulthood are more risky, returns to dependence may be needed” 
(Jones, 2005, p2). In other words, early attempts at leaving home, with cohabitation 
on the increase, may break down, leaving the young person with little alternative to 
return to the parental home. The joint income from two young people may be just 
sufficient to set up home together whilst a single income is not viable. Indeed, it may 
be that this fact alone has promoted much of the transitory cohabitation (ONS, 
2005i).
An important point, also made by Jones, is that adulthood is no longer a single 
dimensional achievement. Many young people may consider themselves to be adult in 
certain senses but still remain heavily dependent on their parents or wider family for 
much longer. This cannot be expected to be without inevitable tensions.
Additionally, whilst in part-time employment, young people may be expected to be 
responsible adults (often left in charge of non-trivial situations) whilst being treated 
very differently during education or training.
From the US context, Coontz writes:
Marriage no longer regulates social life the way it used to (or was once  
supposed to). It is no longer the main way people establish a separate  
residence on leaving home or school. It’s no longer the first step people take  
toward settling into a permanent job, buying a home, and embarking on an  
adult life and later, Having said all that, let me make one thing clear: This  
reduction in the social dominance of married couple households is not a threat  
to the existence or quality of marriage. Most men and women eventually  
marry. (Coontz, 2006b)
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Indeed, the combination of increased divorce (although this may be more myth than 
reality – see Coontz, 2006d), the pattern of repeated relationships including 
subsequent marriage and the extra length of economic dependence has led to a 
marked rise in the problems associated with step-children who become sexually 
available. A number of workers have identified and tackled cases where a step-child, 
aged 16–18, has been thrown out of the parental home, usually with an undertone 
that the new step-parent cannot cope with the sexuality tensions which arise. The 
young, often but not always, step-daughter offers a potentially more attractive option 
than the parent and none of the historical taboos of incest offer any protection. 
Equally complex are relationships between step or adopted siblings. It may also be the 
case that a recent trend to fewer divorces (at least in US) is more to do with the rapid 
increase in cohabitation rather than a growth in commitment to life-long marriage 
(Coontz, 2006d).
Simple statements about marriage and child rearing no longer suffice in the way that 
they might have done 150 years ago, “we cannot return to a world where almost all child  
rearing and care-giving take place in and through marriage” (Coontz, 2006d,  p271). It was 
perhaps once understood that marriage involved an implicit covenant with the 
children yet to be born or even conceived. It was not necessary to turn that 
relationship into anything explicit whilst the norm was an enduring marriage with 
comparatively short childhood, even though the covenant was perhaps more the 
converse in that it was understood that provision for old age depended on having 
sufficient surviving children to look after their parents once past the age of work.
Willimon (1996, pp 172-174) gives a reminder that much about marriage and 
parenting lies outside our a priori choice and that, to a degree and in the long term, we 
do not choose our children or they their parents. The increases in the length of 
childhood and of dependency only serve to make his observations more important 
than ever before. There is simply just more time in which to develop and change so 
that even less are our marriage partners the people whom we chose to marry or our 
children like those in our dreams at the moment of conception.
In a note of criticism on prevailing attitudes towards parenting, he reminds the reader 
that “You must receive a child. The Bible says that a child is a gift, not a possession or a  
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project”. He might also have added that neither is having a child a right or even, 
perhaps, a duty. 
There are echoes here of Hauerwas’s Law: You Always Marry the Wrong Person, 
where he notes, “the inadequacy of the current assumption that the success or failure of a  
marriage can be determined by marrying the right person”(1978, p414-422). In other 
words, marriage will succeed or fail as a result of what both partners do and become 
over a period of time. The same can also be said of the relationship between parent 
and child.
The advent of widespread divorce brought into the post-marriage situation legal and 
adversarial arrangements which have only proved to be successful in a proportion of 
cases. The tensions created by court judgements that are not fully accepted may even 
be greater than the pre-divorce tensions to the extent that studies on the long term 
outcome of divorce for the children are probably unable to distinguish the effects of an 
unsatisfactory marriage from those of an unsatisfactory divorce. Despite a legal 
emphasis on the needs of the children, most talk is of parental rights rather than 
parental responsibilities.
Jones makes the observation, “The relative obligations of various types of parents (biological,  
step, absent, lone) are unclear” (2005, pp5-6).  Campaigns by organisations such as 
Fathers 4 Justice, seeking to establish stronger legal protection for access by fathers to 
children living with a former partner, focus entirely on parental rights. Little work 
appears to have been done to assess the impact of weekly shuttling from one social 
context to another on the ability of children to form lasting relationships. The rights of 
children are often re-stated in terms of rights for the parents, cloaked in a ‘best 
interests of the child’ judgement. With children able to make a judgement, courts have 
taken to including their views within the decision making process when it comes to 
making a residence order. This practice was introduced in the 1989 Children Act 
which states that in any court decision, “the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount  
consideration” (Parliament, 1989, Part1, Section 1 (1) ) and “the ascertainable wishes and 
feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding)”  
(Parliament, 1989, (Part1, Section 1 (3) ) ).
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Too often the assumptions behind statements made by churches about parenting 
neglect to recognise that there is this spectrum, focussing entirely on the so-called 
traditional family in which both biological parents are present and enduring. One of 
the important challenges facing a theology of marriage (and the family) is to speak to 
this very much wider range of experience. In the context of Evidential Theology, that 
experience has to be taken seriously.
Clearly there are opportunities for the church to look again at its theology of marriage 
and the liturgical expression of it. In particular, marriage where there are children 
being brought into the new family from previous relationships (whether married or 
not) could usefully incorporate explicit recognition of the covenant between the new 
parents and the children. Whilst Jones recognises the economic and emotional 
challenges facing parents which were not present in prior generations, she fails to 
make a link between the experiences of parents with young adult children and the 
commitments made (or not, if not fully understood at the time) at marriage and which 
affect the relationship over the intervening period.
The Root Report recognises that even after divorce, “the couple will always remain people  
who have been married to one another” (Archbishop of Canterbury Commission on the 
Christian Doctrine of Marriage, 1971, p23. Nowhere is this more true than in the 
shared responsibility for children of that marriage. No subsequent marriage can ignore 
the fact that it is, in that respect at least, quite different from the conventional model 
of pre-children (and pre-sex) marriage. Failure to address this issue can only add to 
pressures on the new marriage,  increasing the risk of it too failing.7
If we then look to ways in which it is possible to bring marginal solutions back into 
the centre it may prove possible to develop further the covenant concept. It may be 
possible to view a covenant as something that has an open-ended and enduring 
potential – in parallel with covenants in a secular context – but which can by consent 
be set aside or, more especially, revised. Implicit covenants can be converted into 
explicit ones together with liturgical expression with the result that we are better able 
to re-examine the role that an enduring parental relationship has on child-rearing. Is it 
something that is needed for ever? Is there a point at which the input from the parents 
is no longer qua child rearer? At that point is the ‘need’ for the parental marriage 
something that can be established theologically or even in a secular sense?
121
Furthermore, it may be possible to develop the concept of what happens in a marriage 
ceremony as initiating a permanent relationship with children as much as between the 
partners. Marriage preparation should emphasise the life-long commitment not only 
to the partner but also to any children, whether or not they already exist (including 
those in the womb!) This commitment may well out-survive the marriage. Divorce 
clearly does not dissolve the commitment to children.
As we shall consider below, many people are either remaining married, or becoming 
married, long after they are actively involved in child-rearing. In these cases, many of 
the reasons advanced against divorce, or at least for seeing it as an undesirable end to 
a relationship, no longer have significant impact. What is the theological argument, 
aside from that of a vow in perpetuity, for a 60 year old couple whose children have long 
since ceased to be dependants, for not allowing divorce and then re-marriage? One 
certainly cannot appeal to the observed consequences of such an event on the children.
Indeed, should we be concerned that the central emphasis placed by some 
denominations on child bearing as not only the reason for marriage but also its 
enduring purpose leads to confusion about the post-child-rearing phase of married 
life? A marriage which is primarily held together in the purpose of child-rearing may 
cease to have those ties when the task is no longer significant. If the marriage had 
been founded on broader principles – such as mutual support and friendship – might it 
be more likely to survive the longer term requirements that modern social and medical 
changes demand?
As if such changes were not in themselves enough for modern society to cope with, 
there are now significant new opportunities for the parenting context. With the 
introduction of civil relationships, at least in Britain, it seems probable that there will 
be a growth in the numbers of such couples seeking to participate in the child-rearing 
process, even if they are unable to be child-bearing in the conventional sense. Not only 
is adoption now possible for those other than married heterosexual couples but there 
are alternatives of surrogacy and fertilisation without the immediate use of physical 
intercourse.
In a growing number of cases, women – more often than men – are positively choosing 
to be single parents. (ONS (2009) states that 23% of children live with a single parent, 
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compared with 8% in 1972.) With most existing data on the effects of single parenting 
being derived from relationship breakdown situations, it is unclear what might be 
expected from those which are created by deliberate intent. Indeed, a study of such 
cases may help to unravel some of the many factors which have led various 
investigators to conclude that children from single parent families do less well in life 
than those from two parent families.
This may be another opportunity for a positive celebration in liturgy of a covenant 
relationship between parent and child. The enduring popularity of infant baptism 
needs better explanation. Whilst it may be considered a folk mythology, it may well be 
that there is a subordinated desire for a liturgy that affirms the parental role. What 
better than to extract that desire and turn it explicitly into a pastoral opportunity for 
the church. For, unless we are talking about matters that might be considered 
sacramental, there seems little reason not to devise liturgies on a more transient basis, 
meeting the needs of the zeitgeist rather than seeking some form of spurious 
ecclesiological immortality.
6.3.2 Why Do We Have Children?
So far we have assumed that having children is merely a fact of life(!). It is certainly 
true that many parents do not together, or even apart, decide to have children for a 
specific purpose. They may even be unclear about the effects that having a child will 
bring about, especially those born ‘accidentally’.
Hauerwas makes it clear that this is certainly not a trivial question and he roots his 
own answer firmly in a Christian theology -  having children is part of a God-given 
imperative to perpetuate the Christian community: 
We do not have our children because we have some obligation to keep the  
species intact; or because we wish to furnish our country with a population:  
population large enough to secure worldly power, but because we are pledged  
to exist as a Christian community (1977b, p154)
This is largely an unsatisfactory answer: it is an over-romanticisation of what most 
people, even Christian people, contemplate when deciding, if they decide, to have a 
child. It seems likely to be the last thing on their mind as they engage in frenetic 
sexual intercourse. Indeed, it may even seem unrealistic in that context to expect a 
rational answer to the question.
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But more than this, Hauerwas asserts a pledge which all Christians make to exist as a 
community. He deduces from this that there is also a pledge to perpetuate the 
community. This is a long way from the early Christian church, where Paul’s advice 
was set in an eschatological framework, that the perpetuation of the community was 
not a necessity. After all, it was expected that the community would soon be 
completed as the Second Coming made further procreation unnecessary.
Let us therefore try to tabulate possible reasons which parents may have for 
procreation:
• desire for family perpetuation
• economic, support in older age
• creative instinct
• fulfilment of a right
• social conformance
• object of love
As we expose such reasons it is easier to understand why having a child with a 
disability (learning or otherwise) brings with it such anguish for the parents. The 
family perpetuation is not going to be maintained by this child – there is still a 
widespread(albeit not universal) sense of concern by parents about ‘the lack of 
grandchildren’, when their own children fail to procreate. Quite clearly, children with 
a disability, far from providing a guarantee of support into old age, make their own 
demands which become increasingly a worry for parents as they reach an age where 
they can no longer expect to care for their child themselves. The creative instinct and 
social conformance are understandably impacted with a sense that they have created 
something imperfect, a ‘failure’ in the same way that a broken pot is a failure for a 
potter. We will look later at the question of whether there exists a right to have a child 
but, insofar as this appears a self-evident expectation for many, the birth of a child 
with a disability is an infringement on that right.
Arguably, the one remaining objective – that of having something to love – lies at the 
heart of the way in which many theologians resolve the question of why do children 
with a disability exist. It is erroneous to assume that because a child with a learning 
disability is impaired in other ways then their purpose is focused in their remaining 
ability to love their parents, and others involved in their care.
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It is not necessarily the case that children with a learning disability have a 
disproportionate ability to love, at least not in an unselfish way that is characterised as 
Christian love. There seems  little objective evidence that having a learning disability 
disposes an individual to a loving nature any more or less than the rest of the 
population.
However, we ought also to examine whether creating a child as an object of love is 
itself desirable. Love, in the Christian sense, ought to be a response (like the Good 
Samaritan) not an intention to obtain benefit. Children ought not to be seen as assets, 
to be created for a selfish purpose. Creating something to be an object of love is as 
much a selfish act as it to create them as an economic asset.
6.3.3 Rights and Duties in the Family
There might seem little doubt that the emergence of Children’s Rights – especially as 
defined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 1989) – 
has marked a potential step change in the relationship between parent and child.8 In 
any event, there is growing evidence (e.g. Jones, 2005) of dramatic changes in the 
parenting role. 9
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is tempting to see the position prior to the 
twentieth century as being simple: parents (especially fathers) had a right to 
perpetuate their family line and had the right to obedience from their children – 
parents had a duty to care for their children insofar as it contributes to that objective.10 
The relationship between parent and child did not diminish with the passage of the 
child into adulthood (Luke 15:11-32), although the duty eventually turns from a 
dependency on the parents to one of provision for them in their ‘old age’.11 12
Today there is more emphasis on the failure of the parents to discharge their duties 
rather than on the failure of children to obey their parents. There is common 
agreement that children become ‘uncontrollable’ at an ever earlier age with exclusion 
from school having no effective lower age limit (DfEE, 2000). 
There is no consensus about the causes of the rise of serious childhood misbehaviour: 
blame may be laid at the feet of rights legislation although this is probably misplaced 
(Marshall & Parvis, 2004). More likely are the social changes which place a greater 
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emphasis on babies as assets, quickly turning to liabilities as their impact on the 
lifestyle of the parents becomes apparent. 
Increasingly, a child has to establish and maintain simultaneous relationships with 
more than one set of parents – and grandparents. Whilst previous generations may 
have had to cope with either a missing parent (killed at work, in war or in childbirth) 
or a step-parent, these were serial changes. It is only in recent times that children have 
had to cope with multiple concurrent family relationships.
There is an assumption that the balance in the parent-child relationship shifts from 
wholly direction at birth to wholly advice at the age of majority, with a gradual 
transition in between. The rate at which parents transition from direction to advice 
appears to be dependent on a cultural context. Some argue that the transition has 
been accelerated with not wholly advantageous consequences.
If we are to accept this model then we have to cope with a different definition of the 
parent-child relationship post-majority. The above presumes that the child has become 
independent by that stage and the enduring role is that of parents as advisers. 
However, that presumption as Jones highlights, is no longer possible and we have to 
accommodate a responsibility laid on parents by the state to continue to provide, at 
least in part, for their child.
Popular opinion might perhaps assume that a parent who still has some duty to 
provide for their child has a corresponding right to exercise a similar degree of 
direction with a duty to obey being laid on the child, at least to the degree that the 
parent is providing. But our earlier analysis of the UN Convention suggests no 
foundation for such an assumption. Clearly, however, many would see it as Natural 
Law in a vague application of the principle “Who pays the piper, calls the tune”. Little 
wonder, then, that distinct and significant tensions arise in this new scenario, 
problems which, on current trends, are set to increase.13
The evidence, therefore, is that the historic concept of the formal relationship between 
parent and child has changed significantly, an impact that has to be incorporated into 
a theology of marriage. In particular, the need to see marriage as an enduring 
relationship, not just an event at a point in time, will require us to recognise the 
126
relationships between parents and children as an integral part of what constitutes 
marriage and which cut across the more limited view that children are simply the 
product of a marriage.
6.3.4 Relationship Between Parents, State and Church in Parenting
Responsibility for the rearing of children has always been shared between the parents 
and the state. Gillard traces origins of schools in England back to the sixth century but 
makes the motivation clear: 
The earliest known schools in England date from the late sixth century. The  
conscious object of these early schools, attached to cathedrals and to  
monasteries, was to train intending priests and monks to conduct and  
understand the services of the Church, and to read the Bible and the writings  
of the Christian Fathers (2007, Chapter 1).
Education has increasingly become the responsibility of the state since 1833 when 
Parliament began building schools for poor children and the first Education Act in 
1870, culminating in the achievements of the 1944 Act which clearly set out the aims 
and objectives for secondary education, which subsequently evolved into the 
comprehensive system, pioneered in London14 and Leicestershire15.
Generally, developments in the provision of state education followed a social 
engineering agenda “the clumsy doctrinaire application of the principle by the Socialists” 
(Fenwick , 1976, p53). The London School Plan was clearly based on social 
engineering principles: 
From such an education it is hoped will flow in time a healthy mutual regard  
and understanding between persons of different ability with far reaching  
effects on the cultural, industrial and commercial life of the nation and on the  
social life of its people (1976, p9).
By the mid 1970’s it was becoming increasingly obvious that the social engineering 
dividend was not always being earned (Cosin & Hales, 1983, p235) and, as a result, 
there has been a continuing ebb and flow of public policy.16
However, by the start of the new millennium, the goal of encouraging, even expecting, 
at least 50% of children to go into university education was accepted. One result of 
this new trend was clearly to extend the period of economic dependency on parents 
with a blurring of the transition from emotional dependence.17 
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Similarly, there has grown up a difficult role for the state in terms of Child Protection. 
The tradition of state protection for children is a long one, mainly to provide a legal 
framework within which limits are set on what children may do and what may be done 
to children.
Although school leaving ages have increased, the current limit is barely relevant as the 
great majority continue well past this date and many young people are not expected to 
be in full-time employment until well after the age of 21. Perhaps for the first time in 
history, emotional independence precedes even partial economic dependence. Contrast 
this with the position barely a century earlier in which children as young as nine were 
making important economic contributions to the family budget, quickly becoming net 
contributors.
A long series of Factory Acts18 sought to regulate working conditions and have 
gradually raised the ages at which children may be employed. However, the intention 
may have been more a moral one and enforcement was much slower in being 
introduced.19
Child Protection is now an important feature of public policy and changes in the last 
couple of decades have shifted the agenda: whilst previously it was largely the task of 
the state to set a framework and then to police adherence to it, the exposure of child 
abuse, dating back many decades, which came to prominence in the later part of 
1980’s, has created a much more pro-active duty for the state and many people now 
look to the state to prevent abuse and cases such as Victoria Climbié generate more 
criticism of social workers, teachers and police for lapses in  their vigilance than of the 
perpetrators of the abuse (sometimes murder) itself.
Religion established its involvement early. In Old Testament times, most formal 
teaching was focused on the Scribes and, although some would be literate, much 
learning was passing on in an oral tradition. In this way, organised religion had a 
strong influence (and still does in some, largely non-Christian, societies).
Botticelli & Eckstein present evidence that: 
[The] religious and educational reform within Judaism received a big push  
after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE when the power in the  
Jewish community shifted from the Sadducees to the Pharisees. The new  
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religious leadership transformed Judaism from a religion based on sacrifices in  
the Temple in Jerusalem to a religion whose main rule required each male  
Jewish individual to read and to teach his sons the Torah in the synagogue  
(2005, p923).
The state and the Church have both considered that they have a role to play in 
defining the minimum age for marriage.20 
Pressure seems to derive from an implicit assumption that older is better without 
reference to any more objective analysis or to factors that might ultimately lead to a 
counter-pressure if such legal ages were raised too high. Already, ‘nature’ is being 
defined by setting the minimum age for marriage (and simultaneously sexual consent) 
well above that of puberty – the age at which it would have to be said that ‘nature 
intended humans to marry as a prelude to procreation’ – were one to believe that 
nature can be read that way. The age of puberty is on a downward trend.21
The age of consent and the minimum age of marriage have almost always been set at 
the same level - presumably based on the assumption that marriage inevitably leads to 
the imminent prospect of child-bearing. This link is entirely logical in a theological 
and pastoral context that maintains that not only should sexual intercourse take place 
within marriage but also that the over-riding purpose of marriage is procreation. With 
both of these principles challenged more in the breach than the observance,  marriage 
is neither linked to nor precedes child bearing in the majority of relationships. 
Certainly, the link between puberty and marriage/procreation no longer exists22.
Evidential Theology leads us to challenge the role that child-bearing has on the 
theology of marriage – at least in the general case.
Conclusion
In considering what a general right to marry implies for people with 
a learning disability, it is found that the view of marriage as a 
contractual relationship presents considerable problems and that 
marriage as a contract is incompatible with the universal right to 
marry. We therefore will need to find an over-arching theology of 
marriage which does not depend on a contractual basis.
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An increasing proportion of marriages are childless, either by choice 
or not. Unless we are to reject such relationships as not 'proper' 
Christian marriages, we will need to adapt traditional marriage 
theology to relate very differently to child bearing.
The varied and different contexts in which people enter into marriage 
in contemporary society has forced us to recognise that the 
assumptions of traditional marriage theology exempt most, if not 
quite all, current marriages from its scope. In the search for a 
universal marriage theology we will have to admit much wider 
assumptions about the relationship between marriage and parenting.
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1 Pregnancy, birth and early parenthood - a guide for physically disabled parents (DPPi, 2010) charts 
both good practice and the obstacles faced by parents with a disability wanting to have a 
baby.
2 Over the age of 50, benign or carcinogenic prostate problems and/or treatment frequently 
lead to erectile dysfunction.
3 A statement made by Pope Benedict XVI in November 2010 initially appears to admit the 
possibility that adverse consequences may be adduced to justify the use of condoms in 
particular circumstances but it may take a little time to determine more precisely how this 
is to be interpreted in the more general cases.
4 Babies have been taken into care soon after birth principally on the grounds that the 
parent(s) does not have the capacity to parent successfully, perhaps on intellectual or 
mental health grounds.
5 The average age of a first time buyer (without parental support) is around 38 and expected 
to rise to 43 for present 21 year olds. (Mortgage Solutions, 2010)
6 The following question which was posed in the Money Guardian encapsulates several of 
the changes: “My 19-year-old daughter earns about £200 a week. She is paying me £50 a week  
towards household costs, but she resents it – her friends pay nothing. I’m a single parent on a low  
income and receive nothing from her father. Am I being too tough on her?” (Anon, 2007c)
7 The church to date has done little to support, or even recognise, the effects of divorce. Yet 
it is often described in terms resembling bereavement for which there is a long history of 
theology and liturgical support. There are perhaps two distinct opportunities for the 
church: on the one hand there are hotly contested divorces where one partner, perhaps for 
religious reasons, unwillingly agrees to the separation. On the other hand there are many 
cases where the relationship has dwindled and the eventual divorce is more a matter of 
fact then a bitter fight. In the former case there is a need for the equivalent of bereavement 
closure in which the church is able to stand alongside the divorcee and help them to come 
to terms with the loss of the relationship. In the second case there should be the 
possibility for the church to bring the couple together as part of the resolution of the 
divorce and incorporate an explicit covenant with the children, making it clear both to the 
parents and to the children that, despite the ending of the marriage, they will continue to 
exercise their responsibilities towards each child. It may also be that the extended family 
and wider society will benefit from such a recognition.
8 Marshall and Parvis (2004) give a comprehensive review of the foundation upon which the 
Convention exists as well as its impact socially and theologically. They conclude that the 
Convention has followed social change rather than caused it.
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9 Of course the Convention did not cause these changes but it is a moot point whether it 
has catalysed or enabled change.
10 Lemmings (1996) includes some interesting records of views expressed in Parliament 
during the debate about the Hardwicke Act.
11 Marshal and Parvis (2004) point out that this picture, based on strict obedience - almost 
subservience – is not the only reading of some key biblical passages (page 282 ff). They 
distinguish between honour and obedience with the former being, for them, the chosen 
reading. Whilst honour may have a presumption of obedience built into it, it is not 
inalienable. As such, it is more of a liberty-right rather than a claim-right: the emphasis is 
more on what children should not do rather than something to which parents can lay an 
absolute claim.
12 Stackhouse (2005) identifies (p164) the association of slavery with Christianity as having 
enduring influences. He argues that the biblical authority which was used to justify not 
only the subjugation of slaves to their masters (including control over sexuality, breeding 
and what passed for marriage) spilt over into a broader understanding of marriage.
13 Of course, this is not an entirely new phenomenon but the case of financially-dependent 
children past the age of majority was largely confined to the wealthier section of society 
when there were either insufficient males to marry all of the daughters or insufficient 
estate assets to enable sons to raise families in the manner expected.
14 The London School Plan 1947 (London County Council, 1947) went further and stated 
(p8), “it was decided (in 1944) to establish a system of comprehensive high schools …This means  
that children of all kinds will attend the same school.” (p9)
15 The first comprehensive schools in Leicestershire were introduced for economic reasons in 
largely rural areas where it was difficult to establish sufficiently large catchment areas 
without excessive travelling times. (Fenwick 1976, p96)
16 The cost-cutting agenda of the 1980’s and first half of the 1990’s led to education 
expenditure coming under pressure. By 1997, Education, Education, Education (BBC 2005c) 
was used as a mantra for the incoming New Labour government. (Smithers 2007, p8)
17 The planning assumptions currently are that all young people will stay in school or similar 
full time education until 18 (effectively raising the school leaving age from the statutory 
base of 16) and that half will undertake further full time tertiary education (predominantly 
to degree level) and that most of the remainder will receive part time job-related training. 
As a result, few young people are expected to be in full-time employment until well after 
the age of 21.
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18 The 1802 Factory Act limited the hours a child of nine could work to eight hours a day and 
also banned employment under that age. This lower limit was raised to twelve in the 1901 
Factory Act.
19 The 1802 Act became known as the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act (Britannica 2009).
20 Marshall and Parvis note (p26) that the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child has also 
contributed to this process. “The (UN) Committee (on the Rights of the Child) has consistently  
promoted high minimum ages for employment, criminal responsibility and sexual consent.”
21 Improving health conditions (Sloboda et al 2009) lead to a measurable reduction in the age 
of puberty - is that an argument for reducing the age of sexual consent? With increasing 
economic difficulties, especially in the cost of housing, is that an argument for increasing 
the minimum age for child-bearing? Is it realistic to prosecute for a criminal offence two 
fifteen year olds for having consensual sexual intercourse when they are both two or more 
years post puberty? Is it sensible to consider that two sixteen year olds are fully able to 
provide a satisfactory environment in which to bring up a child, bearing in mind the rights 
of the child to an adequate standard of living?
22 At present, around half of all young people have their first intercourse by the age of 17 and 
around a third before the legal age of consent (Channel 4, 2009; Mackay 2001). If non-
penetrative sex is included then the proportions become much higher (Regenerus 2007)
133
7. What is Marriage?
Our consideration of three different scenarios has given rise to 
fundamental difficulties with some aspects of a traditional 
theological perception of marriage:
• the contractual basis
• assumptions about child rearing
• the sequence from betrothal, into marriage and then
into child bearing.
We need to examine further the way in which these three 
assumptions have influenced traditional ideas.
It is clear from our previous discussion that it is important to establish precisely what, 
theologically, is meant by the term marriage. As indicated earlier, we need to consider 
separately what marriage is, in the sense that we can measure or observe it, and what 
marriage is for: its purpose.
Clearly there is an important distinction. Laying to one side the post-modern criticism 
that an observation is never entirely independent of the observer, what marriage is 
often lies outside our control: changes happen, almost regardless of what we would 
like the situation to be. However, there is also a sense in which the purpose of 
marriage is entirely under our collective control, it is a human-made construct (albeit 
overlaid with a possible theological claim that marriage, as with anything in creation, 
was made by God and thus must have a purpose) which we can change as needed.
In this section we will consider the definition of marriage from three different 
perspectives:
• marriage as a construct
• marriage as a right
• marriage as a purpose
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7.1 Marriage as a Construct
7.1.1 Civil v Religious Construct
The concepts of civil and religious marriage often differ, marked by having distinct 
civil and religious ceremonies. In England, especially since the passage of the 
Hardwicke Act, marriages arranged through the established church have combined 
both concepts into one 1 but the more recent trend towards civil registration of 
marriages has led to a divergence between the two.
In common with a long-established notion that marriage is between two people, 
witnessed by God (General Synod, 2009), rather than something which God does (as 
in other sacramental theology), the Marriage Service (eg Archbishops' Council, 2000) 
specifically refers to a covenant made by the couple themselves. Although this aspect 
has a long heritage, (Marshall & Parvis  2004, pp305ff) it remains popularly confused 
with the concept of contract.2
Today there is a quite separate process of civil marriage, which only requires a 
declaration of consent.3 There are no commitments, promises, vows or covenants 
required.4 All that is happening is process of registration, a legally-binding process 
that declares that a marriage now exists. In this model, marriage is a status, to which 
both parties have consented. It is left to other legislation to define what, if any, 
benefits and duties accrue to married couples.
This leads the Catholic Encylopedia  to say (in a US context) of Civil Marriage: 
The municipal law deals with this status only as a civil institution. Though  
sometimes spoken of as a contract, marriage in the eyes of the municipal law  
is not a contract strictly speaking, but is a status resulting from the contract  
to marry (2007, Civil Marriage, p09691b).
It is also interesting to note that the flexibility of the civil ceremony allows other 
elements to be introduced which are not generally found in church liturgies.5 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no single popular concept of marriage, even within 
the particular domain of civil marriages. For many it is limited to a formal registration 
that both partners now have a new status with regard to each other and that there is 
nothing – formally at least – beyond that. For others, there is still a strong desire to 
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incorporate elements from the religious heritage (but without the religious content) 
especially the notion of commitment. However, a civil marriage ceremony still has 
more of a flavour of a contractual commitment rather than a covenant relationship, 
one in which the commitment of one party is dependent and conditional on the 
fulfilment of the obligations by the other party.
7.1.2 Marriage as a Status
We have already identified that the civil notion of marriage is limited to that of status: 
two people are now declared to be in a particular relationship with each other. That 
status confers certain rights and duties which flow from other legislation which relies 
on the existence of such a status. These rights and duties are not conferred on other 
people who are not of the same status. Hence there is no general obstacle to extending 
the range of relationships so considered and civil partnerships are almost 
indistinguishable from civil marriages.
The civil concept is very different from the church's theological view. Whether or not 
it is considered to be a sacrament, there is generally the view that in some way God is 
connected to the relationship in a way that is beneficial to the enduring relationship.
This discussion of the difference between a civil and a Christian marriage highlights 
the problem that there are potentially considerable differences between the two. The 
distinction might be greater in countries where two ceremonies take place, although 
there is little evidence that in such places the church has evolved a sufficiently 
different understanding of marriage than that of contract. It is as if the church 
ceremony is merely recognising what has already taken place rather than necessarily 
adding a new dimension, especially insofar as the on-going relationship is concerned.6
7.1.3 Marriage as a Context for Procreation and Child Rearing
In early history, there was little distinction drawn between procreation and child 
rearing – the task was short since children became effective adults perhaps by the age 
of nine or less when they  became economically significant. High levels of peri-natal, 
child and adult mortality gave the emphasis to breeding sufficient offspring to ensure 
survival.
Contemporary societies around the world at the start of the 21C still indicate the 
progression of change in this notion: in more developed societies, economic 
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circumstances7 have led to marked reductions on both fertility8 and family sizes. 
Children are increasingly seen as an unwelcome limitation on lifestyle ambitions.9 
In China, with the apparently unstoppable rise in population as health improved in the 
second half of the twentieth century,  the government felt compelled to introduce 
state enforced limits.
Conversely, the very sharp rise of HIV/AIDS in the African continent has led to a 
substantial drop in life expectancy10 with many children being born with the infection 
and having poor prospects from conception onwards. 
Although there is archaeological evidence of contraceptive practices dating back at 
least two millennia (Taylor, 1997) it was not until the 19C that they became reliable 
and predictable.11 Until then, the best that could be said is that they were used in the 
uncertain hope of marginal modification of the chances of conception. Indeed, whilst 
the role of women in the conception process remained unknown (that is, that women 
were simply containers for man’s seed to develop) more effective control was only 
likely to emerge by chance than by design. Eventually, family sizes became the result 
of choice.
The consequence is that, in biblical times and for the following eighteen centuries, 
procreation was an almost inevitable consequence of marriage. To assert that 
procreation was a or the purpose of marriage was to describe a consequence and, more 
often, a theological statement about God’s purpose, rather than of the married couple.
In 1999, The House of Bishops of the Church of England included the statement, “In  
deciding to marry, a couple needs to consider what will be demanded by the tasks of parenthood  
and mutual support, and what the implications may be for the career of each” (HOB, 1999, 
p3). There is the clear assumption that parenthood is the principal purpose of 
marriage, albeit accepting that there are other dimensions.
Even Thatcher (2007, p 227) still hankers after the notion that procreation is part of 
God’s creative purpose as if quantity rather than quality was the over-arching 
criterion. Catholic teaching is clearly dependent on the assumption that ‘more is 
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better’ and that any decline in fertility rates is a worrying concern regarding the  future 
of the human race (Pope Benedict XVI, 2006).
With the advent of effective choice in conception, the question has turned more to the 
intentions of the couple themselves – how do they view the purpose of marriage? It is 
little wonder therefore that attempts to use biblical texts to underpin teaching about 
procreation have proved difficult, even ineffective. The subtle shift in focus of whose 
intent is being assessed has often gone unnoticed, allowing statements which may 
well be valid in their original context to be applied to something quite different, 
without making any bridging justification.
Thatcher considers deliberate childlessness as distinct from a decision to limit family 
size, on the grounds that having had a given number of children somehow completes 
that contract with God. He asserts that, “childlessness needs an exceptional case to be made  
for it, one which has not yet been fully made” (2007, p230). Modern fertility technology 
increasingly creates a context that demands a better theology of procreation, 
encompassing our concern about the finiteness of the world’s resources; which 
recognises quality as well as quantity; and that a desire to perpetuate the human race 
is essentially instinctive rather than theological.
7.1.4 Marriage and the Delimitation and Control of Sexual Activity
Marriage, both formal and informal, became a public declaration that sexual activity 
between the partners was legitimate, that someone had checked that it was not 
consanguinous, that there were no other partners and that all necessary permissions 
had been obtained, including compliance with any social or state imposed limits such 
as the minimum age for sexual activity.
Any sexual activity outside marriage was taken as illegal, either in the state or 
religious sense. In the decades before the Matrimonial Causes Act 1974 (which is 
based on the concept of marriage breakdown) it was accepted that being found in an 
‘compromising situation’ was proof that a couple had been engaging in forbidden 
sexual activity.12 
More recently, the opposition to sexual activity between two people of the same sex 
has been underpinned by assumptions about the purpose of marriage. It is only 
necessary to show that a same-sex couple cannot procreate for them to be forbidden 
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marriage. The often not very covert intention is to use the definition of marriage as a 
means of forbidding same-sex activities.
7.1.5 Marriage as Companionship
The element of companionship in marriage has varied considerably over centuries. In 
some cases, marriage – especially amongst the wealthy – was solely for the purpose of 
generating heirs and successors without the necessity of any sense of love between the 
partners (Coleman, 2004, p51). In more common situations, the need for co-workers 
in the domestic economy was a driving force – a strong arm was more important than 
a pretty face, setting many a man's priority.13
Some writers, seeking to distance themselves from a male-dominated concept of 
marriage, talk about ‘one flesh’ and the importance of seeing marriage as the unity of 
two people. The equality of the partners is stressed and considerable weight given to 
the intention to share all things together (for example Pope John Paul II, 1979). 
However, it may be felt that some go too far in this regard and that there is a hidden 
sexist agenda lurking in the background. Implementing the ‘one flesh’ concept may 
easily lead to one partner dominating the choices – one partner being expected to 
accept meekly the wishes of the other. Male domination is so ingrained in the fabric of 
society, despite modern progress otherwise, that the preaching of ‘one flesh’ can be a 
covert synonym for female repression. 
‘One flesh’ need not be about the elimination of individual identity, indeed it could be 
argued that stronger marriages are made from those couples who seek to maintain 
their distinct individualities. If companionship is at the head of the priorities for the 
purpose of a marriage, then it seems much more likely that the couple can work out 
what they hold in common and what they exercise independently. Both partners may 
allow each other space and opportunity to develop separate careers, each making 
allowances for the needs of the other in the pursuit of these independent goals. It may 
also be that each has quite different non-work interests which make substantial 
demands on resources of money or energy.
Marriage as companionship may be seen in its absence as much as its presence. 
Whitehorn (2005) wrote movingly from her own experience of widowhood. She 
highlights what life with her husband had meant, as much by what she missed after 
his death as what she recognised at the time. She identifies that there are two parts to 
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the experience, “There’s missing the actual man” is the more obvious, but she goes on to 
identify something further which is, perhaps, at the heart of what many Christian 
writers have sought to see in marriage itself, something which is more than just the 
sum of the two individuals, “But marriage is also the water in which you swim” she 
continues as she shares with her readers what it is like to lose the origin of what it 
had meant to create a shared household, something which was not just him and her, 
but – in effect – a marriage.14
Companionship as an over-riding goal is more readily seen as a mutual and non-biased 
framework for marriage – replacing the inevitably biased goal of procreation.
However, we now run into a conundrum: if the only necessary and sufficient condition 
to identify marriage is the companionship element we run the risk of including more 
relationships than intended. It may not be helpful if we opt for a definition that is so 
general it cannot identify relationships which are not marriages.
7.1.6 Cohabitation
Thatcher (1999, 2002, 2007) has made much of cohabitation and has sought to 
distinguish those relationships where living together is a deliberate pre-cursor to 
eventual marriage from those with no conscious intent to marry, including those who 
expect to maintain as long-term cohabitation and a family as well as those who engage 
in a series of short-term relationships. In contrast, Reibstein concludes that “committed  
cohabitations that last, as far as research thus far can tell, are mostly different to marriage in  
legal status only. … cohabiting couples … who both last and stay happy together are essentially  
the same as those who marry” (2006, pp12-13).
7.1.7 Marriage as Friendship
It is worth examining the difference between companionship and friendship, and how the 
latter has evolved in contemporary society. Wilson, in looking at the phenomenon of 
singleness, writes about friendship, especially in regard to whether not the church is 
successful in promoting both friendship and friends. In fact, he seems to conclude 
that, although friendship is a central theme in Jesus’ lifestyle, the church of today is 
particularly bad about ‘friends’, “it seems that most churches have a stubborn tendency to be  
filled with people who know little or nothing of much significance about each other” (2005, 
p193). He is, of course, preoccupied by the way in which the church supports single 
people, in an atmosphere that is sometimes oppressively about family. Wilson asserts 
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from his research that the church is substantially worse at supporting the needs of 
single people than those who are married. In particular, he accuses the church of 
failing to provide an atmosphere in which friendship can flourish.
It is important, however, to recognise what he is also saying about society as a whole. 
He describes friendship as: 
Friendships can be sheer hard work. Boundaries with some friends fall into  
place more easily than with others. Our friends may let us down and forget us  
and make life unbearable to such an extent that we can sometimes wish that  
they were not there at all. Being a good friend means we will forgo … our  
own right to space and privacy. It means we will do such things as answer the  
phone and open the front door to people whom we may find quite exhausting,  
at times that may be inconvenient to us (2005, p194).
It is easy to see how contemporary society has blurred the boundaries between 
friendship, companionship and marriage. Indeed, the quotation above could easily 
have been written to describe the attitudes that should underpin a lifetime marriage: 
the willingness to sacrifice the self in pursuit of the needs of the other, even in times 
when the net return is self-evidently negative. Herein we again see a difference 
between a contractual and covenant relationship.
It is little wonder, therefore, that many couples who have established a friendship – 
one of perhaps three close relationships15 outside their immediate family – slip into 
marriage without being prepared to recognise a clear change in the nature of that 
relationship. Indeed, given the trends both to time-limited living-together 
arrangements and to shorter, serial marriages, it is doubtful if many see any clear 
distinction at all.
Sexual activity does not make a distinction either. Whilst in the decades leading up to 
up to then 1960’s there was a clear expectation that sexual intercourse was normally 
the preserve of married couples, this is no longer the case. Today, however, there is 
little to suggest to most young people that sex shortly after encounter is other than a 
norm or that sexual intercourse before the age of 16 is wrong.
Over the past century or two, most people in Western societies came to believe that 
marriage should be proceeded by friendship, not least with the growth of the romantic 
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ideal. Because marriage is for life, it was asserted, it is important that the couple come 
to know each other as friends before they commit themselves in a marriage vow.
Thatcher (2002) takes this a step further by advocating a return to betrothal as a 
transition phase from friendship to marriage. Even so, he still presumes that sexually-
expressed friendship will always anticipate marriage.16
7.2 Marriage as a Right
7.2.1 The Right To Marry
It is widely held that there is a basic right for men and women to marry17 and although 
it may even be thought self evident that such a right exists, it was not always thus. In 
Roman legislation, only selected citizens could marry freely (Dormor, 2004, p48) 
whilst many countries established limitations (beyond the standard ones of 
consanguinity) on the rights of nobility to marry whom they chose. In some cases 
these restrictions still remain.18
When slavery remained in existence, the bringing together of couples in a child-
rearing relationship would be determined by the slave owner, much like animal 
husbandry, to produce more slaves as offspring and could be terminated similarly if 
one slave was sold. The characteristics of marriage that many subsequently came to 
see as essential – permanence, exclusive and children – could not be aspired to by 
many.
Various societies have, at some stage in their development, introduced miscegenation 
laws. In the US, the Virginia state law was not repealed until 1967 as a result of the 
Loving v Virginia case taken to the Supreme Court:
Freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights  
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of  
the 'basic civil rights of man', fundamental to our very existence and survival 
(1967, Section II)
However, it seems that it is more widely accepted that the ruling gives a freedom to 
marry, rather than a right to do so.
At the time, the Hardwicke Act was seen by many as an infringement on individual 
liberties. Walpole, quoted by Dormor, said, “It was amazing in a country where liberty  
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gives choice … a law promulgated that cramped inclination” (2004, p60). It took eight 
attempts to pass legislation and was motivated by the desire to prevent hasty and 
unsuitable marriages, especially where there was wealth and property to be inherited. 
(Coleman, 2004).19
Outhwaite makes it clear that there was a widespread view at the time of the 
Hardwicke Act that marriage was not a universal right and that, if the new law 
restricted access to the status, then it was for the better, “What mattered, riposted  
Leman, was not the number of people, but the number of useful people. He was not alone in  
arguing that some good might come from building delays into the marriage process” (1995, 
p107).
Since the Act largely pre-dated the growth of the notion of romantic love, attention 
was increasingly thrown on the decision of the couple to marry, rather than on the 
families to permit or to require it. However, Dormor (2004, p60) takes the view that 
the legislation “ceded power from the individual to the state”.20
There is limited evidence that, for an underclass, formal marriage by the church and 
state was ignored (Outhwaite, 1995, p135) at least for the next century until civil 
marriages were introduced in 1836. Since 1981, more than half of all marriages take 
place in a civil form (Kasriel & Goodacre, 2007, p6).
The present situation is that couples have the right to have their relationship formally 
recognised (subject to legal limitations) regardless of their intentions about sexual 
activity or child bearing.21 The right to marry is not conditional upon the ability to have 
children.
This brings into question the earlier presupposition that an inability or even 
unwillingness to consummate the marriage meant that the marriage could be 
considered null from the outset and so could be set aside without recourse to a 
divorce. Failure to produce children could be grounds for nullity.
7.2.2 The Right To Have Children
There is a widespread belief that there is a right to child bearing. There seems to have 
been little examination of this claim but Warnock (2002) makes an attempt. In the 
strict context of her analysis she concludes that, almost self-evidently, there is no right 
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to have a child, only a right to try to have a child. However, there is a duty on doctors 
to use reasonable means to assist those who seek help. This is consistent with the 
duty of the state to assist individuals in the exercise of their rights.
In the case of learning disability, this conclusion is generally helpful, indicating that 
such couples do indeed have a right to attempt conception but that their carers only 
have a duty of reasonable action. The fact that a couple may need assistance in 
parenting is not confined to learning disability - Warnock suggests that requiring such 
help is not a reason to refuse assistance with conception.22 
Whilst she emphasises the limited sense in which people have a right to try to 
conceive, it would appear that there must also be a corresponding right to try to avoid 
conception. For if such a balancing right did not exist then there would be a 
compulsion to seek all available means to conceive in whatever circumstances. This 
conclusion is one which she does not seem to endorse.
The advent of varying degrees of medical intervention in the process of conception 
bring new ethical issues. As a result, the traditional teachings of various Christian 
denominations, especially the current views expressed by the Vatican, fail to provide 
adequate help – evidenced by the very large numbers of the Catholic church who 
ignore some parts of that teaching.
For a long time there have been contraceptive methods available and whilst they may 
not have been very efficacious until the late twentieth century, we are here dealing 
with intent. Their use was intended to limit the rate of conception. In the past the 
choice was between23:
• trying to conceive through frequent ‘natural’ intercourse
• passive abstention (e.g. rhythm method, coitus interruptus)
• active abstention through contraception
A problem for modern society lies in the extent to which traditional teaching 
emphasised positive action. When there were no means available for assisting 
conception there was no obvious problem with encouraging couples to try as hard as 
possible to conceive. The legacy is a widespread instinctive feeling that couples should 
be using all available means to conceive. When this meant avoiding active 
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contraception and having frequent intercourse, there was no difficulty but some of the 
means now available for assisting conception raise clear moral issues.
It is now necessary to consider how far couples may pursue the objective of 
conception using methods which are available but for which there may be other 
considerations – the techniques may involve doing something which is otherwise 
considered unethical (e.g. donor insemination) or have potential implications (e.g. 
disposal of fertilised eggs).
But even at the end of Warnock’s discussion we are no better off in being able to 
decide what intervention is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’. She herself tends to a 
utilitarian view which essentially depends on an analysis of outcome.24
Returning to the obligation in the parenting role, we remain in some difficulty. Are 
couples expected or entitled to use any technique to achieve conception that 
technology can devise and which can be shown to be safe?
In some ways this challenge is not unlike the Levirite law of Yibbum (Deut 25:5) for 
ancient Judaism. If a man died without an heir, it was the responsibility of the brother 
to inseminate the widow to ensure the genetic heritage. No matter that such 
intercourse later became a proscribed form of incest, the genetic imperative was, for a 
time, the greater principle.
Since a modern application of the same imperative leads, in some minds, to potentially 
unacceptable actions – cloning, surrogacy – it may be necessary to temper the strength 
of the procreative imperative with other factors. In so doing we run into difficulties 
with the continuing Vatican teaching about contraception. If we maintain the 
obligation for married couples to procreate, how do we limit that obligation and yet 
not, by implication, legitimise any form of contraception, including even abortion?
In Forbidding Wrong in Islam, Cook (2003) takes an in-depth look at the principles 
underlying the way in which right and wrong are to be analysed and treated. 
Oversimplifying and leaving to one side a large number of implications, the principle 
of ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong’ leads to a discrimination between, on 
the one hand, those things which are a duty to command or forbid that which is ‘right’ 
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or ‘wrong’ from, on the other hand, those things which are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Although 
the latter are not absolutely required or barred at whatever cost (that is a duty or 
obligation), they may or may not be permitted depending on an analysis of both intent 
and outcome.25
Such graduated responses to ethical issues that combine both inherent characteristics 
and those of outcome (utilitarian) may indeed provide a way out of the dilemma at 
which we arrived earlier (things must be either right or wrong, allowed or barred). 
Unless we are prepared to accept the principles of Situational Ethics, then we need to 
find a better solution, which Uncertain Theology in a later chapter attempts to 
provide.
This brings us close to Warnock’s conclusion which sometimes seems disconnected 
from her utilitarian base. Whilst she can see no absolute reason to ban surrogacy – if 
only because such a ban is unlikely to be effective – she does not commend the 
process in the light of potential dangers. Even so she does not resort to an inherent 
‘wrongness’ as that lies outwith her utilitarian medical principles.
Hence we may conclude that whilst there is no obligation to pursue conception by such 
extremes as surrogacy, there may be times when it is permitted and, in extremis it may 
even be good to do so.
So far we have considered in isolation the right to have a child – a right for the 
potential parent or parents - separate from any other consideration. 
However, we need also to consider whether any rights accrue to a future child. This 
situation is more complex because we are talking about rights of someone who does 
not exist, at the time the right to have a child is exercised. We may have to consider if 
it is possible to talk about the rights of someone who does not exist, whether the idea 
of a person, or the hope for a person, can also be considered to be a person.
Some genetic conditions, not necessarily limited to people with a learning disability of 
genetic origin, carry with them a very high probability that any child will themselves 
be substantially disabled. There may be circumstances under which it is necessary to 
say that the right to have a child is subordinated to the rights of a future child to have 
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a healthy life. Society may be called upon to exercise such a right on behalf of the 
future child.
For many people reacting instinctively, there is a difficulty in allowing people to have a 
child where there is a high probability of major disability. This is most clearly seen in 
the case of adults with a learning disability – establishing their rights to children 
involves modifying widespread popular opinion.
If it is believed that marriage carries with it a procreative obligation, it is tempting to 
say that adults with a learning disability may not marry, specifically because of their 
claimed parental deficiencies.
In the case of assisted parenthood (whether by fertility treatment or adoption) society 
has established the right of the state to moderate access to support and not to provide 
it to those who fail to meet some standard of parenting ability. Such a condition does 
not exist for other potential parents. In the case of assisted parenthood, the rights of 
future children (or existing ones in the case of applications to adopt a child) over-ride 
the rights of the potential parent.26 Yet the state does not consider that it can prevent 
the same parents from having a child 'naturally'. Where the treatment is expensive and 
available from state resources, clinicians are reluctant to assist conception for those 
who are seen to be unsuitable as parents, including grounds of age.
If it is agreed that a future child (not yet conceived) has rights, it may be possible for a 
child to sue its parents if they take insufficient care to prevent the conception of a 
child with a learning disability. It this were so, then the basis on which a person is 
designated as having a learning disability would be subject to detailed scrutiny to 
establish liability and we have already identified the present lack of absolute criteria.
Agencies providing sperm for donation characterise the donor according to traits 
which potential parents may consider desirable – skin colour, intellectual ability, 
physical skills and so on. On the one hand we may question whether selection on this 
basis is right and is in the same category as embryo selection, which is also ethically 
questionable. On the other hand, we may also believe that parents have a duty to 
maximise the life satisfaction of their children, giving them ‘the best start in life’. In 
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which case we might conclude that not to make such selection is irresponsible, even 
negligent.
Hauerwas rejects the notion of choosing children: 
I want to suggest that it is an extremely odd idea that we choose our  
children. In fact, from our having and rearing children, we know we do not so  
much choose them, as we discover them as gifts that are not of our making
(1977a, p153).
Whilst it is true that this was written originally in 1977, before some of the 
techniques which are currently available for selection were developed, Hauerwas was 
clearly aware of the technological possibility, yet he rejects it. Such rejection may have 
sounded agreeable when written but clearly does not enjoy universal consent today. 
The ethical issues become more complex with the arrival of saviour siblings.27 At 
present the law permits such practices and an attempt to make them illegal was 
explicitly rejected (BBC, 2008b). Leaving aside the issues to do with embryo selection 
per se, the specific consideration here is whether it is right to endanger the welfare of a 
subsequent child solely for the benefit of an existing one. At present, the cases so far 
considered are generally neutral with regard to the embryo (other than the dangers 
arising from the selection process) but it would be altogether more complex if the 
saviour aspect required a negative implication for the embryonic child.28
7.2.3 The Duty To Have Children
In the previous section we  looked at whether there is a right to have children but 
some of the issues we need to resolve also throw up the question of whether there is 
also a duty to have children. Certainly the traditional teaching of the Catholic church 
on contraception seems to suggest that such a duty does exist. The argument against 
contraception indicates that either there is such a duty or, alternatively, that the issue 
is decided entirely by God. In other words, no human intervention in the lottery of 
conception is possible.
If a marriage is considered not to have come fully into existence until the partners 
have had sexual intercourse, it follows that there is a duty to do so. This indicates 
further that there is a duty to try to have children or at least to enter the lottery. 
Otherwise, we would be left with the situation that there was an obligation to have 
sexual intercourse for reasons other than procreation, presumably because of the need 
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to meet the physical and emotional needs of one or both partners, the companionship 
element of marriage.29
In the parts of history where no medical technology existed to influence the outcome 
of the lottery of conception, it is possible to stop at the point at which the duty is just 
that of trying to have children, being open to the will of God. Until the mechanics of 
conception were understood, at the micro-biological level, even the notion of 
contraception was vague and this aspect of marriage theology and the teaching of the 
church is very much an interpretation of scripture and older teachings about marriage. 
In more recent times the Catholic church has admitted some ambivalence insofar as it 
has endorsed the so-called Rhythm Method for avoiding conception. This method 
requires conscious inaction on the part of at least the woman, if not necessarily the 
man, who must therefore have in mind that the duty to have a child may be offset by 
other considerations. The only real question in that scenario is how far may a married 
couple go in influencing the conception lottery.
On the other hand, not everyone believes that such a duty does exist. Townsend 
comments on 1 Sam vv 20-28 regarding attitudes towards childlessness, “Our preaching 
must be sensitive to pastoral issues. Some people are unable to have children and it is a source of  
great sadness; others deliberately choose to be childless and it is a valid Christian choice" (2002, 
p54).
Technology has now moved forward and there is much emphasis on assisting 
conception for those who fail to conceive ‘naturally’. The very language which is used 
immediately emphasises that adopting the technology is to invite ‘unnatural’ 
conception. But as in every other aspect of human medicine and, indeed, the 
environment around us, human beings seek to modify what occurs naturally in order 
to achieve particular objectives. In most cases the right to benefit from  technological 
advances has been clearly established. Legal cases have been brought in recent times 
(BBC, 2004) which have sought to establish that patients have a right to receive all 
available treatment. Equally, other patients have sought the right to refuse treatment 
(Anon, 2007a).30
In a statement on euthanasia, the Vatican has said, “Therefore one cannot impose on  
anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is already in use but which carries a  
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risk or is burdensome” (Vatican, 1980, Section IV). In other words, even in 
circumstances where an action is otherwise an over-riding obligation, such a duty can 
be offset by extreme consequences.
In our current context, this must surely indicate that even if there is a case against 
contraception and abortion there may be circumstances where the consequences are 
too extreme to demand adherence. Equally, even if there is normally an over-arching 
expectation that couples aim at procreation, this duty may be set aside if the only 
means available is disproportionate, especially if it involves techniques where there are 
other ethical contra-indications.
Controversy continues in the economic domain on the recognition that there is a cost 
attached to all treatments and society does not have unlimited resources to meet every 
need. Organisations such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence have 
considered whether there is a positive balance between the cost of the treatment and 
the extent of its likely outcomes. Too few successes or too high a cost and a 
potentially life-saving or life-enhancing drug is not available to NHS patients.31
The technology for assisted conception is well beyond the experimental stage, even if 
its outcome is not always guaranteed. We therefore have go beyond the question of 
whether it right to use these methods to achieve conception, to ask whether there is 
also a duty to use them. If there is an over-riding duty on a married couple to 
procreate with ‘natural’ methods then surely there has to be an extension of such a 
duty when assistance is available. Otherwise, choosing not to use such assistance 
amounts to a decision not to procreate, a decision which is as real as using the 
Rhythm Method or contraception.
If it is possible to posit the refusal of treatment, either by the recipient, the physician 
or the political economist, then we must accept that in some way the possible duty to 
have children is diminished or that an absolute duty to procreate does not exist. This 
will be uncomfortable for some church authorities, especially those that have placed a 
higher priority on child bearing than other aspects of what constitutes a marriage.
When we come to examine the case of post-menopausal marriages, this issue becomes 
of greater importance. Hitherto, it has been possible to assume that the theological 
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issue is whether someone who has no prospect of child-bearing can indeed be married. 
However, assisted conception technologies are beginning to enable post-menopausal 
women to carry embryos fertilised in vitro successfully to full term. Before long it will 
not only be necessary to decide whether such treatments are ethically and 
theologically sound, but also what impact they may have on a duty to avail oneself of 
them.
7.3 Marriage as a Purpose
We looked earlier at the nature of marriage as an objective reality but now we turn to 
the teleological question. There are two distinct ways in which we shall look at 
marriage as a purpose:
• marriage in order to deliver certain goods
• marriage in relationship with God
We have seen that there is an expectation that we can produce a definition that does 
not necessarily imply either of the following:
• contractual commitment
• potential for procreation
and, furthermore, that the relationship between a married couple and their children 
has undergone major shifts in the past 100 years, changes which continue unabated.
Christian theology asks the teleological question “What is the purpose of Marriage?” 
from which flows some of the moral imperatives which have been espoused by the 
church for a long time. For example, how does the procreative purpose for marriage sit 
in relation to other aspects such as the companionship or unitive end? (ECUSA, 2005, 
p27). Grosbard-Schectman establishes an explicitly economic model of marriage:
exploring more in depth how marriage possibly influences labor supply and  
workers' productivity and by presenting analyses of other channels by which  
marriage may have an impact on the economy: savings, consumption, and  
government programs such as welfare programs and social security
(2003, p1).
We may also wish to examine the assertion that God created marriage: for example, 
Jeffrey wrote, “The fundamental truth regarding marriage has always been that God invented  
marriage” (2006, p xii). This start point is widespread yet is often asserted without 
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question, based largely on tracing it so far back in the teaching of the church that its 
origins are no longer needed. To the unbeliever, it is patently obvious that humanity, 
not God, invented marriage – as distinct from sexuality and enduring partnerships 
which seem to arise from the nature of human beings.
If we are to rely on an assertion that marriage is God-given then we have to come to 
terms with the fact that marriage has, and continues to have, many different 
expressions and interpretations. Are all of these God-given or are we required to select 
one from the many and to promote that above all others, not only now but forever? Or 
perhaps we need to see marriage as a man-made construct (most frequently, literally 
man made!) and then seek to find out what it is that God is telling us to do with that 
construct, in much the same way as, for instance, we might need to understand God’s 
will for the use of nuclear power.
It is difficult to conclude other than that there are many different forms and natures of 
marriage, depending on culture, social and religious context as well as the intentions 
(covert or explicit) of the participating couple. To survive effectively through periods 
of such change it is highly desirable to seek a theology of marriage which probes 
deeper into the construct and establishes an understanding of its nature so that it can 
speak both with legitimacy and effect to the generality of marriage. Any theology 
which becomes ever-more specific about what is considered acceptable inside or 
outside the boundaries of Christian or secular marriage is doomed to long term 
failure. The problem is less that changes have to be made, more that the authority of 
the church and of scripture becomes undermined.
7.3.1 Marriage and the Delivery of Goods
Whilst we have separated out marriage as an observable phenomenon from 
consideration of its purpose, one way of looking at purpose is, in a sense, a 
technological or engineering32 one: that is, marriage should be constructed in 
particular ways so that it functions to deliver specified goods, in the same way that a 
piece of machinery or equipment may be designed to fulfil required operations.
It is important to recognise that this consideration is quite different from the 
Evidential process. We may however wish to measure the extent to which particular 
forms of marriage actually meet society’s expectations in the delivery of its goods, 
whether, for instance, it helps or hinders the effective process of rearing children?.
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Despite the difficulty of obtaining objective and verifiable evidence, support for 
marriage is frequently justified on the basis that it will deliver certain goods, such as 
better behaved children, receptive to better education, less prone to criminal or anti-
social behaviours and so on although  most attempts to justify this link lack evidential 
rigour As a consequence, the general tendency is, in effect, to underwrite a prior belief 
.
In truth, we do not know whether, even on limited timescales, marriage – or any other 
form of relationship – does deliver particular goods. A greater problem lies in 
obtaining agreement on what goods we might want to see delivered and what is the 
balance between benefits to the married couple and those which accrue to others: 
children or society.
7.3.2 Marriage as a Paradigm
Marriage has long been used (e.g. Hosea 2:16-23, Isaiah 62, Jeremiah, Ezekiel 16) as a 
paradigm for the covenant which exists between God and humanity. Most of the OT 
allusions are to the loving and caring relationship rather than to procreation or family 
formation – these have little sense in such a paradigm.
More recently:
The description of Christian marriage as a ‘sacrament’ … means that the  
pledged relation of husband and wife is a sign of the pledge of love that  
Christ has for his Church, the promises he has made to it, the faithfulness,  
forgiveness, and patience that he has shown it, the delight he takes in it  
(House of Bishops, 1999, p4).
But in the context of Evidential Theology, we must at least question the basis for this 
assertion.  That is to say, the evidence indicates that the idea of marriage has 
continually been subject to change in response to a wide variety of factors: cultural, 
religious, political, health and so on. Evidence (Coontz, 2006d, p 6) indicates that 
marriage first emerged in the Stone Age, that is, well after the origins of humans but 
before the development of a Judeo-Christian theology that we might recognise today. 
To suggest that marriage was created by God – at least in a way more specific than a 
recognition that we trace everything back to God – would require us to posit a time-
specific intervention. The evidence is that it has always been human-made to meet 
particular needs.
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We certainly struggle with a scriptural basis since so many different versions of 
marriage existed over the time-frame in which it was written. If we defend the 
assertion on the basis that it 'is natural' we must either show that there is no other 
form of enduring relationship in nature or that any alternatives are self-evidently 
malformed. Otherwise, the most that we can conclude is that there is a presumption 
in favour of marriage – and then run into difficulty with such notions as religious 
celibacy (which are commended but clearly 'unnatural')
Williams wrote: 
Christian teaching about sex is not a set of isolated prohibitions; it is an  
integral part of what the Bible has to say about living in such a way that our  
lives communicate the character of God. Marriage has a unique place because  
it speaks of an absolute faithfulness, a covenant of God with his chosen, a  
covenant between radically different partners (2005a, Section II).
However, there is the danger of a major logical flaw in too tightly following this course 
of thinking: On the one hand, generations have used the model of marriage (as seen in 
their own contemporary interpretation) as a means of understanding the relationship 
between God and humanity. It is potentially helpful to use expressions such as, “the  
relationship between God and humanity is like ...” for we  can do no other. We have no 
complete knowledge of what the God-humanity relationship is but rather, shadowy 
indications, partial knowledge that is shared amongst all people, both past, present 
and future .
We are here clearly using something that is more than a status relationship –  the 
attractiveness of marriage is as a paradigm. Marriage is the most common covenant 
relationship and is easily accessible to those seeking to describe the God-humanity 
relationship.
But the danger lies in what follows: whilst we can  consider the claim that, “the  
relationship between God and humanity is like …”  we cannot then turn it around and say 
that marriage must be like this just because it is a paradigm for the relationship 
between God and humanity. But this is exactly what some have tried to do, with 
sometimes disastrous consequences. Williams:
And those who have criticised the blessing of same-sex partnerships have been  
trying, I think, to say that we cannot change what we say about marriage  
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without upsetting what you might call the ecology of our teaching, the  
balance of how we show and speak of God (2005a, Section II).
It is as if we have now defined God by means of a particular form of marriage and we 
must not change that form of marriage lest we then change our definition of God. 
Many of Pope Benedict XVI's statements follow this path.
Not only is this a non sequitur, but it carries with it the greater danger that we believe 
we can define God, something which goes infinitely beyond our attempts to describe 
God. To continue to use marriage as a paradigm depends, therefore, on whether we 
continue to believe that the phenomenon which we contemporaneously see as 
marriage remains consistent with what we believe the relationship between us and 
God to be. What we most definitely cannot reasonably do is to invert that process and 
say that marriage must be shaped according to our (changing) view of God. It can 
serve as a paradigm only insofar as it retains that value. We cannot claim that 
marriage was established in order that we should know more about God. Instead, we 
must adapt our perception of marriage in the light of developments in our 
understanding the nature of God’s continuing incarnation.
Marriage, as we have already seen, has been and will in the future become, expressed 
in many different forms, none of which is an ideal paradigm, especially if we consider 
the actuality of it, rather than an idealised abstraction of what we believe it ought to 
be. There is a very real danger that, in order that marriage may serve as this paradigm 
for how we understand God, that it becomes an impossible burden on actual 
marriages to the extent that increasing numbers of people ignore the expectations it 
sets.
The use of marriage as a paradigm can seem at times as being cited without 
recognition of the more obvious defects. These problems include a contrast between 
our concept of God as a Trinity (seeing marriage as a model of the relationships 
between the three aspects of God) and marriage as (generally) about two people. 
The Inter Anglican Theological and Doctrinal Commission (IATDC, 2006) sets out a 
lengthy but modern analysis of the use of covenant to describe not only the 
relationship between God and the world but also how that understanding can be 
extended into the notion of ‘covenant community’. In other words, how our 
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perception of how God relates to humanity can inform how humanity should relate to 
itself.
Whilst admitting that there are many and, sometimes, confusing ways in which the 
term covenant is used (even within the Christian theological context)  IATDC does call 
(para 1.9) for all new developments to be seen as an outworking of the basic concept – 
in particular a re-commitment to the ‘new covenant’ established by Christ, “God is  
under no obligation to rescue humans, and the world, from their plight, but chooses to do so and  
takes the initiative to bring it about” (para 1.2).
The document also emphasises the significance that God sustains the covenant with 
humanity, regardless of how far humanity may stray from his chosen principles 
(IATDC, 2006, para 1.3). In this way it is possible to see God’s covenant as a template 
for marriage between two humans rather than the converse. If it is possible to make 
this switch then it is also possible to accept that the concept of marriage can evolve in 
parallel with the collective understanding of God’s covenant.
If we look at the relationship between God and humanity then we also have a problem 
as, for most people, marriage has some element of exclusivity – one person bound in a 
relationship with one other person, not in a relationship with the generality of 
humanity. We have different models for the wider relationship: friendship, social 
conscience.
God is necessarily asexual whilst marriage is inevitably about sexuality and 
reproduction.33 We cannot associate sexuality with God, at least in the sense that we 
maintain that God is singular, complete and eternal. God not only cannot reproduce 
(the essential origin of sexuality) but further, does not need to reproduce. God is 
permanent and eternal; sexuality is nature’s response to the inherent finite nature of 
all living things whose future is bound to the ability to reproduce rather than to attain 
immortality.
As we contemplate the nature of the relationship between God and humanity, we 
learn more about how we should interact with each other as fellow human beings 
rather than the specifics of a marriage. It may well be that the marriage relationship is 
the general human relationship writ large, but if we are to seek to justify claims that 
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marriage is more than just friendship (which we can move into and out of just so long 
as that friendship exceeds a given threshold) we need to discover something about 
marriage that is more than and distinct from the relationship between God and 
humanity.
However, it may well be that some of the older parts of scripture become 
misrepresented or misunderstood as contemporary models of marriage become 
overlaid on the original text. In particular, it is important to recognise that the 
understanding of how procreation took place was very different. It was believed that 
the woman was merely the receptacle for the man’s seed which was poured out into 
the womb for the woman to nurture on his behalf. Not only was it his seed but also 
the ensuing children were his, as matter of property.
Therefore, to say that God took humanity as his bride (e.g. Isaiah 62) is likely to have 
been read contemporaneously as indicating that God sought to entrust his divine 
purpose to humankind who were expected to nurture and develop it, just as a woman 
would do so on behalf of the man.
7.3.3 Marriage as a Model of Perfection
The civil concept of marriage is objective and thus amoral. It is defined as a status, 
something which can be proved easily, by reference to witnessed documents. It is 
therefore not possible, in the terms of that language, to talk about a good or a bad 
marriage – marriage simply exists, or does not, for a specified couple. Marriage is a 
status which you either have or not. 
We can subsequently consider the quality of a marriage in terms, perhaps, of its 
durability (easy to measure) or its effectiveness in parenting (hard but possible to 
measure in part) or its ability to create love and support the one for the other 
(impossible to measure from outside). However, there is no room in this model for 
the concept of perfection, there is no goal at which to aim. It does what it does - 
although both as society and as individuals we can seek to change the performance of 
marriage as an institution by external measures (such as financial benefits or marriage 
preparation).
Christianity has specifically adopted its particular definition of marriage as a paradigm 
for the relationship between God and humanity. Leaving to one side the difficulties 
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which arise if we force the definition of marriage to fit a particular pre-determined 
view of that relationship, we can in this context talk about a perfect marriage. It – the 
notion of perfection – derives from our view of God as perfection. Marriage tends 
towards perfection just as its performance tends towards this model of God.
To access a definition of Godly perfection requires interpretation and revelation. 
Humanity attempts interpretation based on its assumption or experience of what God 
has revealed through his continuing incarnation in and through the world. But the 
consequence of our humanity is that this process is flawed and too often we seek to 
define as revelation that which we wish to be our interpretation. God, in effect, 
becomes made in the image of humankind, rather than the reverse.
Is this a necessary direction? Isherwood (Isherwood & Stuart, 1998) and others who 
share a strongly incarnational theology, point to the difficulties that the First Century 
Hellenic traditions brought to the Judeo-Christian theology in its formative stages. 
Paul clearly tried to interpret the emerging Christian concept for those more familiar 
with the Hellenic ideas. In particular, Greek gods were, for the most part, humans 
which had been transformed from their imperfect state into an ideal of perfection – 
which included immortality. This persisted, despite the collective memory of events a 
couple centuries earlier when the temple was desecrated by Antiochus IV in a 
ferocious attempt to Hellenise the Jewish nation. (1 Macc)
On the other hand, the specific Christian notion of incarnation is about God becoming 
human, with all the risks that it entails. The movement is in the opposite direction, as 
it were. There is no longer a need to define perfection – what matters more is our 
ability as humans to engage with the incarnational process which is no longer bound 
into the time dimension. It is not so much that incarnation is continuous as that it 
happens in a dimension outside of the dimensions of space and time so that we 
perceive it as continuing.
In the context of marriage – and indeed other expressions of relationship – we seek to 
align both our expectation and our practice in a never-ending process of evolution 
which is forced to change every time we engage with the incarnation. Just as our 
knowledge of God, what God is like and what God expects of us, is never complete but 
yet moves forward (mostly!) so our expectations of marriage should  develop and 
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move forward. It is not for us to define what marriage must be like any more than we 
can say that the revelation of God is complete.
In this context we can seek to answer the teleological question, “What is the purpose of  
marriage?” in different ways. On the one hand we can look at the pragmatic 
consequences of a civil marriage, how well it achieves its ends. On the other hand, we 
can also consider how our experience of marriage leads us to a better engagement with 
the process of incarnation.
What does not seem helpful, or indeed logical, is to answer the question in terms that 
require the institution made by humanity to fit into a specific model of God. That will 
neither satisfy the objective answer related to performance in respect of human 
requirements, nor does it satisfy our desire to know more about God, through 
incarnation.
Since the earliest Christian times, the church has sought to define marriage, and its 
ideal of perfection, through its attitudes to sexual activity.34 Augustine and his 
followers started from the assumption that sexual activity was inherently sinful 
(related to views on the belief that the Fall was in some way a direct consequence of 
the gender interactions between Adam and Eve). From there he concluded that, for 
marriage to be a model of perfection, it had to exclude sexual behaviour, even in 
pursuit of procreation, to such an extent that abstinence, either within marriage or 
without, was the only course of action to be commended for true Christian behaviour.
Doriani (1996, p33 ff) traces the reaction of the Puritans and cites Gouge in saying, 
“One of the best remedies for adultery that can be prescribed to married persons is that husband  
and wife mutually delight in each other” (1996, p38). In fact, not only is the conclusion 
the opposite to Augustine’s but so also is the direction of the argument. Whilst the 
Augustinian view moved from a belief about sexual activity to advice about marriage, 
the Puritans began with the assumption that marriage aimed to be a model of 
perfection and therefore sexual activity, as a necessary component of that, was itself 
intrinsically perfect - provided, of course, that it took place within marriage and 
subservient to a procreational end. In any event, many Puritans were so taken by their 
perceived duty to engage in sexual activity within marriage in a way so as to glorify 
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God that they failed to commend it for itself. Sexual activity was still seen as a means 
to an end, even if in this case it was as much a religious end as anything else.
However, in a way that anticipates the egalitarian and feminist movements several 
centuries later, Doriani identifies (1996, p42) that, whilst marriage is in theory an 
ideal institution, in practice it is open to abuse. He also concludes that the Puritans 
“could not rid themselves of the Greek and Roman Catholic idea that lust taints the procreative  
act so that it is shameful” (1996, p44). It is also consistent with the evidence that he 
cites that the constraints which the Puritans placed on sexual activity (especially 
adultery) were a consequence of their high ideals about what objects sexual behaviour 
was intended to serve. If marriage is intended to be a sacred institution, ideally 
perfection, then there is an over-riding Christian duty to do everything to preserve 
that perfection and to urge others to the same ideal.
7.3.4 Marriage as a Sacrament
At the beginning of this thesis (section 1.2) we noted the range of ways in which 
marriage has been considered as a sacrament and I now return to this aspect35 in the 
light of the considerations thus far. (We need to remind ourselves that marriage refers 
both to an event and to an enduring relationship and to be vigilant that statements 
about one are not elided into the other without careful consideration).
The Catholic church retains marriage as one of seven sacraments, all of comparable 
status. This was firmly established by the Council of Trent but had made its way into 
church considerations a little earlier such as in the Council of Florence, “The first five  
sacraments are intended to secure the spiritual. perfection of every man individually; the two last  
are ordained for the governance and increase of the Church . . . by matrimony it [the Church] is  
materially increased” (Decree for the Armenians, Council of Florence 1439).36 
Today, the Catechism says, “The matrimonial covenant . . .  has been raised by Christ the  
Lord to the dignity of a sacrament” (Section Two, Chapter Three, Article 7) and continues 
to assert marriage as a liturgical sacrament and something with which the church is 
necessarily involved despite the fact that, in essence, it is the spouses who act as 
ministers of God's grace to confer the sacrament on each other. 
The clear emphasis is on the sacramental nature of the event which is to invoke God's 
commitment to effect grace through the on-going partnership, as seen in various 
statements of Jesus recorded in scripture. This view does not directly suggest that the 
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shared life after the marriage event is itself a sacrament – it might be more helpful if it 
did indeed have this focus.
The traditional view of sacraments, including marriage, is explored by Hahn (2004) 
who makes few, if any, concessions for the issues which have been raised in this 
thesis. Since I will conclude this section on a positive note with regard to a possible 
sacramental view of marriage, it is worth exploring a little further how far Hahn's 
particular view is helpful.
He is strongly attached to the number seven and seems to depend entirely on a 
presumed mystical quality of the number, almost magical. He even uses the subtitle 
Lucky Sevens (p103). As a result he will not admit any variation on the set of seven 
sacraments which are in the Catholic tradition but which do not form a comparable 
role in the reformed/protestant/Anglican canon. (also p146)
Consequently, he is very specific that marriage “involves one man and one woman” (p41) 
and is indissoluble (p55) once consummated (ie allowing the historic loophole of 
declaring marriage null on account on non-consummation). There is therefore no 
room whatsoever for any other form of covenant relationship between sexual partners, 
including those divorced from a prior marriage. He leaves little room for marriage 
being valid in just the circumstances in which my thesis is set to consider. “it  
(marriage) must be faithful, monogamous, indissoluble and fruitful” to be valid (p158)
His concept of oath (and there is generally an assumed equivalence 
between oath and covenant which is not substantiated) and sacrament seems at 
times contradictory: On p124 he states that the consequence of an oath is 
that, “He (God) has to act to vindicate his holy name”. That is, the outcome will be 
successful regardless of the human element. And also “When God's name is 
used in an oath, He becomes an active partner in the transaction”. (p136)Yet, 
on p126 he says, more realistically, that “the sacraments do not guarantee 
our fidelity” - (Hahn's emphasis). As I consider later in Section 8.2.2, we do 
need to discriminate between God as a party, witness or guarantor to the 
covenant as each of these has quite different consequences for how we view 
Christian marriage. (also p156ff)
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His view of Matrimony as a sacrament is firmly rooted in the paradigm school “The 
Bible presents marriage as the primary metaphor for the union of God and his people” (p54) and 
goes on to display the elision from metaphor to paradigm (eg p86, p187) which I 
earlier attempted to deconstruct.
Although Hahn sets up a close equivalence between oath/sacrament and covenant, he 
says of the former that there is a fixed number (7) whilst of the latter there is an 
indefinite number and they may change in nature - classically the move from the Old 
to the New Covenant is a primary example. He also talks (p63) of on-going covenants 
to renew a relationship – we will return to this later when I develop the concept of 
covenanted enduring relationships. On the other hand, he seems to give grace a limited 
consideration in the context of sacrament – it only makes a very brief appearance 
(p141).
Although the view has been long established that marriage as a sacrament differs from 
the others in that the role of the the church is as a witness rather than as the 
medium/channel, he asserts that marriage other than witnessed by the Catholic 
church is not valid (p55). This seems to exclude him from speaking to the very large 
number of people who consider themselves (and others consider them) to be be 
married by other means. He dismisses entirely the administration of sacraments by 
anyone other than Catholic priests (p137). His use of scripture as an authority appears 
inconsistent: in relation to oaths he is prepared to re-interpret scripture, even 
statements ascribed 
to Jesus, yet in other matters (especially one-man-one-woman) he takes a much more 
literal line.
His consequential approach to contraception leads to, “the total gift of self rules out the  
possibility of divorce, adultery, pre-marital sex - and contraception” (p160). He relates his 
own experience in which he used child bearing as a means of repairing a marriage in 
difficulties (p170) which is defended on the basis of his (new) conclusion about 
contraception and the role of child bearing within a Catholic faith. However, this 
process is one which, in others, may lead to serious harm and, in any case, treats the 
yet-to-be-conceived as a means to an end rather than something in its own right (cf 
saviour sibling). Too often this process fails and is a high risk towards relationship 
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breakdown and consequent risk of lasting damage to the child born as the result of a 
failure.
Hahn's theology allows no other means for God to act other than through the 
sacraments, “everything we need, we receive in the sacraments” (p179) - in the context of 
incarnational theology which I have set out earlier, we must surely allow God to act as 
he chooses, whether through the church or not. Hahn's approach is to institutionalise 
God, a route that ultimately sets some people on a road to exclusion from God. Whilst 
not asserting that the church is other than pre-eminent in the relationship between 
God and humanity, it seems an important antidote to institutional excess that it is not 
considered exclusive.
Whilst his use of the Real Presence (Chapter 14) is not one that would appeal to those 
not already convinced of his Catholic agenda, there may be some relevance in his 
assertion, “He is present in the covenant bond of marriage . . . it is His presence that makes the  
covenant binding” (p185). Whilst we might not interpret this as implying that marriage 
is indissoluble (in the sense of divorce although see my development of enduring 
relationships which recognise that marriage has a lasting effect beyond the boundaries 
set by divorce hence the move from contract to covenant), we could see it as referring 
to the role of God as a party to the covenant.
At this point we can see that a traditional use of marriage as a sacrament can lead us to 
conclusions which we are either unhappy about or which seem at variance with the 
evidence which we are considering. In the context of our Evidential methodology, this 
should lead us to track back along the argument – not throwing out the concept in the 
light of such consequences – but determine whether we can reconstruct the use of 
sacrament in a way which better fits with the evidence.
By contrast, the tradition which follows from Luther's attack on “the traditional Roman 
Catholic theology and canon law of marriage with unbridled vehemence” (Witte, 1007, p47) 
rejects the sacramental nature of marriage, as much as a result of the perceived 
corruption of the church's role in regulating the status conferred by the marriage 
ceremony as for fundamental theological considerations. At the time, Luther's view of 
marriage was of a higher ideal than he saw extant in many contemporary relationships 
condoned by the Catholic church authorities.
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As in many things, the Church of England, in the Thirty Nine Articles, adopted a 
compromise in which Matrimony is relegated from being a 'Sacrament of the Gospel' 
in a manner which stopped short of explicitly denying the sacramental nature of 
marriage. The Book of Common Prayer uses the title Solemnization of Matrimony and 
establishes that the role of the church is to be a witness, along with the gathered 
congregation, to the new status of the married persons. Unlike the Catholic church 
which normally conducted marriages in the context of a Mass (thus underlining the 
sacramental and ecclesiological roles) the BCP more loosely requires, “It is convenient  
that the new-married persons should receive the holy Communion at the time of their Marriage,  
or at the first opportunity after their Marriage”. Current Protestant practice37 more 
frequently does not include Communion in the ceremony.
The Alternative Service Book incorporated a sacramental-like expression, “The  
Scriptures teach us that marriage is a gift of God in creation and a means of his grace” although 
it also makes explicit the Paradigm, “they [husband and wife] shall be united in love as  
Christ is united with his Church”. Currently, the Common Worship liturgy is less specific 
and refers to the couple receiving God's blessing although it claims to innovate when 
it provides a role for the congregation of witnesses, “Your support does not end today: the  
couple will value continued encouragement in the days and years ahead of them”.
What it Means to be an Anglican echoes the Thirty Nine Articles, in expressing it, “Other  
important rites, commonly called sacraments, include . . .  marriage” (CofE, 2010).
Sacraments are generally considered to be particular means by which the Holy Spirit 
transforms those on whom they are conferred. The involvement of the church in the 
conduct of a sacrament is not directly part of that process, but rather a signal means of 
regulating their use to avoid them falling into disrepute.
In this way, across this spectrum of interpretation, it is common ground that marriage 
– as an event – is a means of involving God in the good nature of the relationship – an 
on-going process. We may put emphasis on the initial event or we may wish to see 
God at work continuously.  However, our incarnational view is at odds if it is further 
asserted that these particular forms are the only way in which God may be 
encountered or that God may be effective – this is closely-related to the way in which 
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we have seen that Marriage as a Paradigm runs into problems and, ultimately, does the 
church a disservice.
The role of the church in mediating – or even controlling – access to sacramental 
marriage has potentially extended responsibilities in the case of learning disability. As 
we have examined carefully earlier, society is often uncomfortable at the idea of 
allowing, even encouraging, people with a learning disability to have children, on the 
basis of a presumed over-riding interest in the needs of the child over those of the 
parent. The law already allows the state to intervene under particular circumstances if 
a child is believed to be in danger from either active or passive shortcomings of its 
parents. At the same time, there is a widely presumed right to marry.
If we accept that the church has a duty to ensure that people are properly prepared for 
marriage and may seek to deter those which it feels wish to undergo the ceremony in a 
way which is not true to its understanding of marriage38, then there may also be a duty 
to intervene in the case of people with a learning disability, on the grounds that they 
should not be allowed to procreate. This is dangerous territory, not least because the 
definition of learning disability is, in general, relative not absolute and inclusion in the 
category is open to abuse. Furthermore, it opens the way to suggesting that all 
prospective parents – those seeking to be married – should undergo some form of test 
to determine their fitness for parenthood. That itself is problematic as there is no 
universally accepted specification for good parenting, which may only be judged on 
outcomes rather than process. Since this is, perhaps self-evidently, a direction we 
would not want to take, it is necessary to explore what needs to change to avoid such 
a conclusion.
We consider elsewhere in this thesis the role of procreation in the definition of 
marriage, but in this context we should re-examine how far the concept of 'Marriage as 
a Sacrament' needs to evolve. The consideration of 'Marriage as a Paradigm' focused on 
the need to move away from the prescriptive elements that it encouraged – 'marriage 
has to look like this because this is how we see God's relationship with mankind'. If the 
sacramental nature of marriage is bound tightly to the role of the church, rather than 
the role of God, then we again see the emergence of the same problems that gave rise 
to Luther's condemnation. The gospel message is inherently inclusive and a challenge 
to institutions that seek to turn it into one of exclusion.
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The traditional perception that marriage is a sacrament conferred by the couple leads 
us more positively towards an inclusive agenda and puts on the church, not so much a 
duty to regulate, as a responsibility to enable. In the case of learning disability, the task 
then is not to exclude such people from a marriage blessed by God through the church 
but instead to seek ways in which it can better promote positive outcomes. Of course, 
this highlights a much more demanding task as the support may have to be lifelong 
and, in various senses, expensive. It leads us away from apparent 'bless and forget' 
approach which too frequently seems to be the case as the church acquiesces in 
demands to be used for essentially secular, often selfish, interests. Instead, the church 
needs to reclaim its ground as having a never-ceasing role in supporting enduring 
relationships but this time as servant rather than master.
In this way it is possible to see positively a sacramental nature to Christian marriage, 
one in which God acts to support and encourage, one in which the couple make 
solemn undertakings one with the other in the sight of God, rather than the 
constricting role in which the sacrament is, in some sense, owned and controlled by 
the church. Marriage as a sacrament then becomes an open-ended process, one in 
which the church – let alone God – can make a positive contribution or the better good 
of both society and individuals.
For the church this may be a liberating experience but it is also, in traditional terms, a 
dangerous one as it requires letting go of the controlling mechanisms which it has 
enjoyed in the past (but which secular society now widely disregards) and abandoning 
its right to define the details of what marriage is. In so doing it may discover that 
relationships which it previously condoned under the protection of the marriage label 
have to be considered as not in a positive relationship with God (note the 
determination to avoid the use of the notion of 'condemn') and that there are those 
which it previously excluded but which must now be seen incarnationally as a locus 
for God's positive interaction with humanity. This will necessarily invoke a reappraisal 
of what distinguishes Christian marriage from secular marriage.
Coupled with a willingness to let go of the role of acting as the state's agent in 
regulating and registering marriage, this road can lead to reclaiming the sacramental 
nature of marriage which secularisation has increasingly over-looked.
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7.4 The Evolution of The Purpose Of Marriage
Three distinct purposes of marriage have, at times, have varied in their relative 
significance, depending on cultural contexts:
• Procreation and child-rearing
• Delimitation and control of sexual activity
• Companionship
As the Book of Common Prayer says “First. It was ordained for the procreation of children  
… Secondly. It was ordained for a remedy against sin … Thirdly. It was ordained for the mutual  
society, help and comfort …”.
In 1979, a Commission of ECUSA in a report on sexuality stated, “The purposes of  
human sexuality are to contribute to human welfare, pleasure, family procreation, social order  
and a more abundant quality of life for all” (ECUSA, 2005, pp76-77). Of course there is a 
huge leap from this statement about sexuality to a parallel statement regarding 
marriage, but it is one widely made.
The balance between these three purposes has never been constant for very long, 
varying even within the same contemporary society. That it has changed so much in 
the past leaves us with no reason to suppose that it will not change yet again.
Jeffrey (2006) reviews how the Catholic church has reached its present position, 
underlining the use of covenant alongside, if not instead of, contract in the watershed 
thinking of Vatican II. He is disappointed that this use has been undermined 
subsequently.
The over-riding benefit from defining marriage in contractual terms is that this is an 
enduring and, for the most part, provable construct. Indeed, that is largely why the 
Hardwicke Act came about, to avoid the problems with clandestine marriages. Making 
conjugal love as the basis for marriage is much less permanent and opens up the 
possibility of arguing that if such love in a relationship ceases, then the marriage also 
no longer exists (Jeffrey, 2006, p51).
Jeffrey consistently argues that the repeated return by the Catholic church, notably in 
the 20C, to a legalistic framework is simplistic and only achieves a consensus at the 
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price of relevance. Pastoral work based solely on a legal (contractual) view of marriage 
is doomed to fail in connecting with the lives of most people in contemporary society. 
It actually feels as if it speaks more about maintaining marriages where the 
relationship itself has withered, than about our perception of God and how God 
relates to humanity.
Because society has itself evolved a view of marriage that is almost entirely based on a 
legalistic framework (including its interaction with divorce)  a theology based on a 
legal contract is unable to make much contribution. A theology of marriage must 
speak to the issues where the secular framework most fails.
Stackhouse contrasts a concept of marriage that is defined (and controlled) by the 
state, with one which is ordained (both defined and controlled) by God (2005, p167). 
He identifies contemporary experience as one  in which relationships exist only so 
long as and insofar as they meet the needs of both partners as individuals. The 
recognition of rights of an individual has evolved into a post-modern expectation that 
the rights of the individual seem to be wholly determining and to which the rights of 
the state or society or others such as children are subservient. Hence, marriage is the 
place in which individuals find recreation (2005, p170). A discovery that a marriage no 
longer provides such recreation is sufficient justification for concluding that the 
marriage no longer exists.
With the help of Coleman (2004), we can see how changes in the balance of the 
purposes claimed for marriage have occurred. Almost none of the aspects of marriage 
which, at some point in time have been seen as intrinsic, have been a constant. 
The issue of procreation and its purposive relationship with marriage has clearly 
changed over time:
• A (the) purpose of marriage is procreation
• A (the) purpose of sex is procreation
• Marriage gives purpose to procreation
In parallel with the changes in the understanding of marriage, there have been changes 
in the practice and perception of sexuality and sexual behaviour. Mottier (2008) traces 
the historical progression similarly to Coleman. She particularly identifies the 
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underlying purposes for which sexual behaviour has been believed to exist and traces 
the way in which authorities have sought to control and regulate sexual activities in 
pursuit of such varying objectives. In some cases the authorities have been purely 
secular (as far back as ancient Greek society) whilst in others religious institutions, 
pre-eminently the Christian church, have established the norms. In the context of 
Evidential Theology, we are able to observe that enduring relationships exist, even 
thrive, in many different ways from those which form the classic God paradigm. This 
forces us to re-evaluate whether that paradigm is tenable in the face of such evidence.
As a prelude to establishing a parallel between marriage and the blessing of same-sex 
relationships, the ECUSA report  says, “a covenant to form a household together as part of  
the Christian community of faith in its life of mutual love in service of the world” (ECUSA, 
2005, Section 2.28). This recalls the Old Testament culture in which the isolated, 
cellular concept of family with 2.4 children has yet to see the light of day. The 
extended family, which went beyond the immediate blood relations out to the whole 
tribe, was the context in which marriage took place. Many of the prescriptions made at 
that time regarding marriage relate to this wider context and placed greater emphasis 
on its relationship and function within the whole community than on the narrow 
confines of the couple themselves (Coleman, 2004, pp 38-41).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have found difficulties in the ways in which 
marriage has been used as contract and covenant, which have 
become interchangeable in a manner that no longer is helpful. In 
addition, marriage, as a contract is principally about exit conditions 
but the serious flaws in this approach can be addressed through a 
distinctive covenant basis. We have also discovered problems with 
some of the rights language used in connection with marriage, and 
child-bearing in particular. We cannot sustain the view that child-
bearing is a pre-requisite as to do so leads to impossible situations 
with the advent of modern fertility treatments. Without a new 
interpretation, fertility treatment would become an imperative, not 
an option. Furthermore, we have recognised that marriage, far from 
being a fixed construct, has evolved extensively and that theological 
arguments have been driven by changes in the social context. We 
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cannot unequivocally translate scriptural assertions about marriage 
from one generation to another without some recognition of the 
impact of such changes.
In particular, we have found special difficulties with the use of 
marriage as a paradigm and have argued for a major shift in this 
aspect of marriage theology.
170
1 Later legislation (Parliament, 1836) provided likewise for other denominations and faiths. 
Jews and Quakers were given special provision in 1753.
2 A major purpose of the Hardwicke Act was to regulate property rights which attached to 
marriage and to eliminate the problems which arose increasingly frequently from the 
clandestine and unregistered marriages which largely prevailed before that time.
3 Registration details of civil marriages are currently principally governed by changes 
introduced in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (Parliament, 1999). The civil 
ceremony is only required to contain a Declaration by both parties - the so-called 
Contracting Words – such as: I, N, take thee/you, M, to be my wedded wife/husband.
4 Although a promise or vow is not a requirement in a civil marriage ceremony, it is 
permissible to include them, with words which may either be taken from a standard range 
of texts provided by the particular registrar or written by the couple themselves, provided 
that no religious content can be discerned in the text.
5 A web site offering advice on weddings (WeddingGuideUK, 24 June 2005) addressed the 
situation of marriages where there are children (of either or both partner): “If there are  
children involved in your relationship then it is a wonderful touch to include them in your wedding  
vows … Registrar/Celebrant: Today Jonathan, Claire and their children have made a new family, and  
together they promise to consider each other, to be loving, respectful and devoted to each other. We  
ask those present to help us. Will you promise this?”
6 Whenever discussing the view of marriage it is always important to distinguish between 
the ceremony and the enduring relationship.
7 The cost of rearing children has also increased significantly. (£194,000 in 2009 up from 
£140,000 in 2003 – Liverpool Victoria 2009) In addition, the cost of housing means that 
many do not feel able to start a family until much later in their life whilst clinging to a 
lifestyle that puts an emphasis on the self rather than others. 
8 Most children survive until adulthood (99% survive at least to their first birthday - ONS 
2004)
9 The typical age of first marriage has risen to 31 in 2007 from 26 in 1961(ONS2005a)
10 Current life expectancy across the world is now 67 but for Africa as a whole is 53. (United 
Nations, 2006 p14ff) However, some countries have much lower life expectancy, falling to 
below 40 in Zambia and Lesotho. (CIA 2008)
11 Changes in contraceptive practice did occur earlier than is sometimes assumed to be the 
case. Mason (1994) records that the mass production of condoms began in the middle of 
the 19C and that soon the cost fell from 10d each to 1/2d at which point conscious control 
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over family size became an option. Mason also refers to a survey of working class couples 
in the early 20C which indicated that cost was not a major deterrent to their use.
12 Hence the phenomenon of private detectives who would follow suspected couples and who 
might only produce testimony that the couple were seen entering or leaving a hotel, not 
necessarily together, for a court to allow divorce on the grounds of adultery. Now, it may 
well have been that in many instances there was a willingness to be complicit in a divorce 
that simply recognised an already-defunct marriage, but a photograph of a couple in bed 
was as good as proving that they had had sexual intercourse. Why else were they there?
13 The masculine perspective here is deliberate.
14 Whitehorn’s reference to water, links with a comment made by Hauerwas (1977b): “It has 
been remarked that if fish ever developed intelligence and began to codify and describe their  
environment, one of the last things they would notice would be the water” (p38)
15 Wilson reports (p193) work by Collee in North America, that thirty-somethings have an 
average of only three close friends, yet have around fifty casual friendships, each typically 
lasting seven years.
16 Other cultures still adhere to procedures in which brides are chosen for the husband by 
their families whilst others choose the bridegroom for the wife – perhaps 60% of all 
marriages world-wide (Mackay 2000, 2001). 
17 Article 12 of the Human Rights Convention, RIGHT TO MARRY, states  “Men and women  
of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws  
governing the exercise of this right”. Of course this raises two key questions: firstly, what is 
meant by marriageable age and secondly what are the national laws that govern marriage 
and how far are they consistent with current theology?
18 In the United Kingdom not only must the monarch approve certain marriages but also the 
government of the day must be consulted, to avoid cases which will not commend popular 
support. Failure to obtain that consent led to the abdication of Edward VIII.
19 Despite some flouting of the new law, it quickly became effective in putting the marriage 
shops and prison chapels, such that at Fleet, out of business. (Outhwaite 1995, p126)
20 It is interesting to note that the Human Rights Declaration does not establish a right to 
sexual behaviour or even to form cohabitations or similar relationships not formally 
recognised as marriage. Article 12 is more redolent of an age when marriage did not 
necessarily bring much of the modern meaning of the term but was seen as a legal 
arrangement affecting inheritance and property.
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21 The judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Goodwin case (European 
Court of Human Rights, 2002) “the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be  
regarded as per se removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this provision.“” (para 98)
22 This was subsequently reinforced in the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities
23 Whilst passive abstention was allowed and active attempts to conceive were commended 
to married couples, active abstention was forbidden.
24 An example of how this plays out in a closely-related subject is found in Warnock (2002)
25 For example, if one is a witness to a violent assault it is not a duty to intervene if it is 
likely that in so doing one will be killed or seriously injured, but it may be good to do so if 
one believes that God so expects. On the other hand, if the situation is such that the worst 
outcome is embarrassment, then there is a duty to ‘forbid wrong’.
26 No social worker wants to be in the position of placing a child with an abusive parent, 
especially if the likelihood of abuse can be determined in advance. 
27 A procedure by which embryos are selected on the basis of creating a sibling for an 
existing child whose genetic defects could be alleviated by transplants or similar 
treatments provided that the right genetic material is available
28 Picoult examines these issues in her novel My Sister's Keeper (2004) in which a girl sues her 
parents for medical emancipation having been conceived as a saviour sibling, resulting in 
on-going procedures to save her older sister.
29 Interestingly, the Civil Partnership legislation does not allow the lack of sexual activity as 
the basis for a partnership to be declared void (Parliament, 2004) although the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 included provision for declaring a marriage void on the basis 
of non-consummation. (Parliament, 1973)
30 In Italy, where the secular law is more closely aligned to Catholic teaching, Perrgiorgio 
Welby won the right to have his respirator turned off, even though he was aware that 
without it he would quickly die. The Catholic church refused him a religious funeral (BBC, 
2006)
31 The Appeal Court consideration of the availability of Herceptin (an expensive breast 
cancer treatment drug) made it clear that it is legitimate for the NHS to take into account 
cost when deciding what treatments it will provide as a matter of policy. (EWCA, 2006) 
The use of Avastin for WetAMD is being considered on the grounds of cost despite a lower 
level of confidence than for more expensive alternatives (Guardian 2010b)
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32 Polkinghorne (2000) made the comparison between science and engineering: “scientists 
give first place to science's power to understand the world, even over technology's power 
to change it.” (p5)
33 This is not to imply that reproduction is a necessary component of marriage.
34 See for example Thatcher & Stuart (1996) for several historical reviews.
35 A complete analysis of the sacramental nature of marriage is outwith the scope of this 
thesis. To see how sacramental marriage has evolved into contractual marriage, see 
Witte(1997).
36 It is interesting to note, in the light of modern considerations of divorce, that the Council 
of Florence also said that, “The other four do not imprint a character upon the soul, and admit of  
repetition.”
37 The Established Church role of the Church of England further encourages this trend.
38 See for example the very strongly presented case by the Vatican for requiring non-trivial 
marriage preparation.
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8 Marriage as a Relationship
In our selected case studies, we have found that traditional 
theological thinking about marriage has several elements which 
appear unsustainable. In particular, the contractual and childbearing 
aspects are flawed and there is considerable difficulty in considering 
Christian marriage to be contractual in nature. However, historical 
reviews give licence to a search for new expressions and in this 
chapter we will focus on a covenant approach that recognises 
evidence from observation about contemporary society. This will lead 
to what is to be called a post-modern marriage covenant in which 
allowance is made for a much wider variety of circumstance than was 
historically accepted. Nevertheless, any attempt to create a single 
theology of marriage, in which all of the marginal cases with which 
we began are accommodated without difficulty seems elusive.






and seen that a large portion of society rejects formal marriage, replacing it with 
informal arrangements of greater fluidity. At the same time, there has been a growth 
in the way in which society has responded to demands for protection against the more 
excessive consequences of this fluidity. In particular, there are now degrees of formal 
protection over the division of assets (including children as well as property) in the 
event that an informal relationship comes to an end.
Each stage in Witte’s theological sequence evolved in response to social change, just 
as the parallel legal precepts evolved under pressure. The challenge therefore is to 
continue this process, being as responsive to change as previous generations, yet being 
faithful to an enduring sense of purpose as encapsulated in our experience of 
incarnation.
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It is possible to see something of each of Witte’s stages in how present society 
operates with respect to marriage. To a large extent, the start point for many people is 
that of companionship, set in a sexual context. That can lead into a feeling of a shared 
existence (Commonwealth) in which not just tangible possessions are shared, but that 
life together is more than two parallel lives. Married life is something in addition to 
two individuals. 
However, knowledge of the adverse consequence of fluid relationships leads to ever 
greater contractual considerations. A growing proportion of people enter into a 
relationship with the expectation that it will, at some time, probably come to an end. 
Pre-nuptial agreements1 are clear evidence of this. Until recently, such agreements 
under UK jurisdiction had little significance in the event of a divorce settlement and 
courts would generally disregard them. However, this is gradually changing.2
A classic dilemma in post-modern Western society is to want both freedom from state 
intervention at the same time as protection by the state when that freedom fails to 
deliver on its expectations.
The continued demand for religious marriage ceremonies, whether Christian or other, 
suggests that there remains a sense in which the relationship which, as we have noted, 
is an entity separate from, and in addition to, both individual lives, may have a quality 
which is more than a convenient, but temporary, domestic arrangement supporting 
both sexual and child-rearing needs.
But it is the enduring sense of covenant that we shall use as the basis of resolving the 
problems that our three critical areas throw up, whilst remaining within a Christian 
theological tradition. Yet, the kind of covenant marriage which belongs to Witte’s 
third stage long since lost its ability to support contemporary social expectations and 
needs. We will need to find something new if this is to be the way forward: a post-
modern covenant.
In restoring a more fundamental recognition of the covenant aspects of marriage 
(accepting that most people know what love means even whilst being unable to define 
it) the challenge for the church, if not society widely, is that this implies a relaxation 
of the grip of contract. In particular, it will be necessary to work with definitions (not 
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least of what we mean by marriage) which are at best fuzzy around the edges and, 
more likely, designed to be comprehensive rather than specific, inclusive rather than 
exclusive. It necessarily breaks the relationship between the church and state in the 
matter of regulating marriage.
The establishment of a legal definition for civil partnerships has already extended the 
state-defined rights of heterosexual couples to same-sex couples. It seems likely that 
further extensions will afford similar rights to cohabiting couples of whatever gender – 
even non-sexual ones such as siblings. It is possible that the consequence of these 
developments will be to recognise that we are dealing with two quite separate 
activities: a partnership contract which is defined in contractual terms which is (like all 
contracts) inherently suspicious and a relationship covenant which is defined in terms 
that depend on a mutual trust. Whether or not these two can be incorporated into a 
single ceremony is as much a social as a theological debate, but seems better avoided.
However, this is far from the American trend to define Covenant Marriage as something 
that extends a legal contract (in ways which are highly prescriptive of the nature of the 
relationship). I shall argue for drawing the contract and the covenant apart, allowing 
them to evolve to fit their own specific needs, recognising that they are fundamentally 
different, even contradictory. 
As a result, the attempt that the church has sustained for the past millennium to 
control both the covenant and the contractual aspects of marriage may finally be 
coming to the end of its useful life. The church should focus on a theology of a post-
modern marriage covenant whilst the state attends to the contractual aspects. The two 
need only relate where they touch – which in many aspects may be quite slight. To a 
degree, the church’s role in defining a purpose for marriage can seek to ensure that it 
functions better in respect of its goods whilst the state ensures that the adverse 
consequences of fluidity are mitigated and managed. We can even envisage the 
possibility of the church recognising covenanted relationships that the state has not 
(yet) registered.
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8.1 Covenant As A Relationship
The use of the term covenant in association with marriage is widespread. However, as 
Stackhouse (2005, p158) indicates, the meaning has not been constant. He extracts 
from the spectrum a central core which, he claims, is current in all, “In all cases, the  
covenantal form is understood to be a free, voluntary agreement that accords with a pre-given  
order and a divine set of purposes that correspond not only to the basic patterns of creation but  
to rightly ordered human desires” (2005, p163). The problem, however, is that there has 
been, and remains, a wide disagreement about what is ‘pre-given’, what is natural and 
what should be ‘rightly ordered’ about human relationships. He goes on (2005, p172) 
to cite Sacks who asserted that there remain only two ways of thinking of human 
association, namely contract and covenant. In this case the over-riding distinction is 
between inherent suspicion and trust.
The complex network of meanings which the term covenant has attracted complicates 
thinking about marriage as a theological construct, both within the church and 
without.  A covenant in the theological context is, typically, an agreement between 
God and humanity in which God offers guarantees in return for a specified response. 
In the context of marriage, this implies that the benefits of a marriage (whether or not 
defined in socio-economic terms or as a theological value) can only be obtained if the 
partners live according to some pre-ordained pattern. Such a statement critically 
depends on the human participants being able to ascertain exactly what are the 
requirements they have to meet, often implemented in a very private and intimate 
context. Since there are limited recipes in scripture, classically the church has claimed 
to be the means by which those requirements can be understood. However, this 
argument has been progressively eroded and even the strongest expressions are 
routinely ignored – or at least disobeyed – in the privacy of the marriage.3 It is 
becoming increasingly self-evident that for marriage to be seen as a paradigm or for 
the church to have a role to play in influencing behaviour within sexually-based 
relationships, a radical re-appraisal of the covenant nature of marriage is needed.
The Episcopal Church of the diocese of Los Angeles states: 
In the case of the sacramental blessing of life-long covenants, two people who  
have developed a committed relationship with one anther come before God  
and the community of faith. They publicly vow and express their intention to  
live together in a lifelong covenantal relationship. This relationship is  
covenantal insofar as the two persons make promises to one another that they  
will support and nurture one another without condition (2008, p3).
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The significant factor here, which clearly distinguishes a covenantal relationship from 
one of contract is without condition and so is not the same as a contract where, as we 
have seen, the essence is that something is undertaken on condition that their other 
party fulfils their part of the bargain. The above definition makes it clear that failure 
on the part of one person does not, of itself, justify an automatic break in the 
relationship. What is not helpful to this present investigation is the introduction of 
the US term Covenant Marriage, largely in certain US states. In 1997, Louisiana passed 
new legislation permitting, and giving state backing, to an alternative form of marriage 
which has been called Covenant Marriage.
In reality, Covenant Marriage (See Witte & Ellison, 2005) is little more than a 
strengthening of the exit criteria (that is, conditions for divorce) in a context where 
the alternative civil marriage permits no-fault divorce, almost divorce at will. Apart 
from the provision of pre-marital counselling in order to ensure that a couple 
understand what they are undertaking, the concept is essentially still contractual, 
albeit with different terms. It speaks little about the enduring relationship within 
marriage. 
al-Hibri says of the Louisiana law:
So, while Islamic law limits judicial divorce (as opposed to divorce at will) to  
cases very similar to those of the Louisiana statute, it is not generally willing  
to tighten the bond of marriage to the extent that would create unhappiness  
and oppression for a long period of time. … The final decision as to whether  
a person observed his or her covenant faithfully remains a matter between  
that person and God … To agree a law that imposes, except under certain  
circumstances, greater waiting hardship on an alienated couple is to expose  
Muslim men and women to unnecessary temptation and loneliness that may  
indeed affect their chastity" (2005, p 216).
Indeed, even the advocates of Covenant Marriage accept that there is little difference 
between it and the historical view taken by the Catholic church. Religious Tolerance 
states on its web site, “History of covenant marriage: The Roman Catholic Church has had a  
form of very restrictive CM in place for centuries. It is the only option that they offer”  
(Religious Tolerance, 2006).
Hay (2005) highlights the very considerable differences in marriage and divorce law 
that exist, not only between the US and most European countries, but even between 
the legislation of different US States. It therefore follows that a theological 
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consideration of marriage which seeks to have a universal validity, will either have to 
be very complex in order to accommodate these legal differences or, more usefully, 
have to begin to differentiate itself from the narrow contractual basis of marriage. 
Indeed, it may prove more effective to develop a clear gap between the two systems. 
State laws are about contracts, rights and the conditions surrounding termination of 
the contract (i.e. divorce) whilst the theology of marriage is about what happens in 
formation (e.g. pre-marital counselling) and within-marriage effects, aimed largely at 
preserving marriages and making them effective with willing partners for as long as 
possible and to the benefit of any children reared in that framework. It may also prove 
simpler to address, in the context, issues with relationships which are other than first 
time marriage between couples of a different sex. The principles will relate more to 
the relationship rather than the civil benefits deriving from of the status of the couple. 
On the other hand, for some it may be more difficult insofar as a particular theology 
may import wider considerations than the civil concept can allow, such as procreation 
and permanence. However, by making the civil law and the theology almost 
orthogonal matters, it is possible to allow developments in one dimension 
independently of the other. Furthermore, it is possible that more than one theological 
concept can cohabit within a single civil legal system and vice versa.
8.2 Marriage as a Covenant
Particular attention should be given to developing the notion of covenant as a concept 
that could not only change the way in which marriage vows are viewed (as tentatively 
introduced by Thatcher, 2007, p134) but may also provide a basis for improving the 
way in which the church affirms the parent-child relationship.
The term covenant is used in various forms of the marriage service. For example, the 
introduction to the Common Worship form says, “It is based upon a solemn, public and  
life-long covenant between a man and a woman, declared and celebrated in the presence of God  
and before witnesses” but it is unclear from the context what specifically is meant by 
covenant. In fact, the critical part of the ceremony is defined as making vows: 
I, N, take you, N, to be my wife, to have and to hold from this day forward;  
for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love  
and to cherish, till death us do part; according to God’s holy law. In the  
presence of God I make this vow.
In this particular service form, the vows are entirely symmetrical.
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The Book of Common Prayer has some differences between the words used by the 
man and those by the woman. In the case of the man, he says, “and thereto I plight thee  
my troth” whilst the woman, in addition to the word of 'obey' inserted after 'love and 
cherish' uses the phrase 'thereto I give thee my troth'. The earlier Old Sarum Rite had, 
instead of 'obey' the much earthier, “to be bonnair and buxom, in bed and boord” and both 
used the 'plight' form.
The word 'plight' indicates a pledge whilst 'troth', meaning faithfulness, has the same 
origins as 'truth' - 'betrothed' is a solemn promise to marry (in the future). The 
distinction between 'plight' (man) and 'give' (woman) is further emphasised in the 
subsequent words of the minister, “and thereto have given and pledged their troth either to  
other”. Since the origins of 'plight' indicate a legal commitment, this difference seems 
to suggest an inability of the woman to make the same kind of undertaking, albeit that 
in this context the effect is meant to be similar. 
In the current position statement of the Church of England (HOB, 1999) the use of 
either contract or covenant is avoided and the term 'pledge' is used instead. Wesley 
(Coe 1996) preferred to use 'faith' instead of 'troth'.
The asymmetry in the Book of Common Prayer is continued when the man alone 
makes a promise in giving a ring to the woman. The 1922 Prayer Book dispensed with 
the difference in vows between the man and the woman whilst retaining it in regard to 
the ring.
However, it is important to note that the Common Worship vows are restricted to the 
relationship between the two people being married and makes no reference to other 
parties. The introduction refers to child rearing in terms which are ambiguous; it is far 
from obvious whether the words are meant to indicate that child rearing is a necessary 
and essential part or whether this is an optional part:
Marriage is intended by God to be a creative relationship, as his blessing  
enables husband and wife to love and support each other in good times and in  
bad, and to share in the care and upbringing of children.
Whilst the use of the word 'creative' in the first phrase could be interpreted more 
widely, it is likely than most people would take it to intend to refer to creating 
children. Further, the purpose of 'love and support to each other' is stated on the same 
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basis as 'sharing in the care and upbringing of children'. If the second is meant to be 
optional, then so may be the first purpose. It is hardly likely that this is intended.
Whilst the term covenant is used, there is little evidence to indicate how the vows are 
intended to be different from a contract. It is therefore important to understand what 
the difference might be, especially as when it comes to ending a marriage with the 
legalities of a divorce: it is much more like a process of adjudication when a contract is 
broken. The failure of one party to a covenant to meet their intentions expressed at 
the outset does not invalidate that covenant.
8.2.1 The Legal Concept
A contract is a two way process. The essence of a contract, in legal terms, is the 
consideration – what one party will ‘pay’ in return for what the other party undertakes 
to provide or to do. Without a consideration, no valid contract exists.
 
The ability to enter into a legal contract is still considered important, even if accepted 
uneasily in Opening the Doors (General Synod, 2009) as something that state-sponsored 
protection of vulnerable adults indicates.
Distinctively, a covenant is a commitment to do something for another without there 
necessarily being anything in return. The action is to be done for its own sake, not for 
what it yields.
Websters Dictionary gives a definition, “A mutual agreement of two or more persons or  
parties, or one of the stipulations in such an agreement” and cites 1 Sam 18 v 3 “Then 
Jonathan made a covenant with David, because he loved him as his own soul”. It also indicates 
that a covenant may two-sided as in Genesis 17: “and God said to him, ‘As for me, this is  
my covenant with you: … God said to Abraham, ‘As for you, you shall keep my covenant”. 
In a legal context:
Under the common law a covenant was distinguished from an ordinary  
contract by the presence of a seal. Because the presence of a seal indicated an  
unusual solemnity in the promises made in a covenant, the common law  
would enforce a covenant even in the absence of consideration (AskDefine, 
2010, Define Covenant).
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8.2.2 The Biblical Concept
The term covenant occurs frequently in the Bible, right from earliest times. It is often 
used to describe the relationship between God and humanity. It is not our task here to 
develop a detailed analysis of such a covenant theology, other than to understand how 
it has informed and affected the development of marriage theology.
For example, in Lumen Gentium, Pope Paul VI (1964) refers to the unbreakable covenant 
(§6) as the relationship between Christ and humankind. This is either tautological 
(that is, all covenants are unbreakable) or it is deliberately singling out this particular 
covenant from amongst the generality of covenants which may or may not be 
breakable. An agreement or gift, merely by being a covenant, is not necessarily 
unbreakable.
Also, in §9, “God therefore chose the race of Israel as a people unto Himself. With it he set up  
a covenant”. Here we see a clear indication of the unidirectional nature of this 
covenant. That is, God established the covenant, regardless of the response from 
humanity, either individually or collectively.
The same paragraph goes on to say, “I will make a new covenant with the House of Israel” – 
it is not suggested that we (God and humankind) together made the covenant.
It is also interesting to note that the old covenant was replaced unilaterally by, “Christ  
instituted this new covenant” (§9). Clearly there are some circumstances under which it 
is possible to repudiate one covenant and to replace it with another. Whether this 
implies that a covenant can be repudiated altogether and not replaced by one which 
offers at least as good terms as its predecessor, is uncertain.
What is important, however, is that the term covenant has become used in many 
different ways, usually to underpin a specific and sectional theology. The rise of 
Christian Zionism, especially in the United States, has led to many different claims 
being staked in this territory. In most, but not all, biblical cases, one party to a solemn 
oath – a covenant – is God. The other party is generally either a nation (the Jewish 
people in one sense or another) or with an individual as representative of a tribal or 
national group (for example the Abrahamic Covenant).
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If the marriage covenant is modelled on a presumed covenant between God and 
humankind (sometimes expressed as between Christ and the church – a parallel but 
significantly different relationship) then we have a problem. Such a relationship is 
clearly asymmetric: God and humanity are not equal partners in the covenant.4 The 
pressure in this post-modern age is to ensure that our perception of marriage is 
symmetric, that there is an parity of status, purpose and commitment between the 
partners to the covenant.
All of this accumulation of covenant-based theology generates increasing difficulties in 
determining how to assess covenant as the basis of marriage. If the use of covenant is 
to introduce a theological dimension then it is necessary to determine whether God is 
considered to be a party to the covenant or is a witness or guarantor of it.
If God is a witness then the role is broadly passive – only being needed if there is a 
question about the validity of the undertaking. If the couple mutually decide to 
terminate their agreement then there is little for God to do unless others are involved, 
such as children. In any event, a witness is not an effective role in the on-going 
relationship. A witness merely testifies to the original undertaking and is not 
necessarily equipped to arbitrate its application later on.
If God is a guarantor, then there is an implication that God will intervene to ensure 
that the marriage meets its objectives – as set out in the covenant agreement – and 
that both parties, jointly and severally, as well as the society or community in which 
they live, can rely on God to maintain the institution. In this case, there is a clear 
implication that by entering into the agreement in the first place, the parties (which 
includes the broader society) specifically want each and every marriage to persist 
indefinitely. A failure to do so is a failure of the guarantor, as well as that of the 
covenant being guaranteed.
However, if God is a party to the covenant then it is necessary to determine what it is 
that God is promising to provide – presumably to the couple, if not to society. 
Obviously there have been those who have expected, and still do so, that God will act 
to ensure the persistence of the relationship, similar to that of guarantor. 
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If we then link this approach to one which denies or severely restricts any exit 
procedures, there is an underlying arrogance, namely that we constrain what God can 
or is required to do to and for the married couple. The evidence we accumulated in 
earlier sections points us very much to a God that operates in many different ways in 
and through inter-personal relationships, of which marriage is one form.
8.2.3 The Marriage Covenant
We seem to have reached the point at which it seems that covenant rather than contract 
is a much better basis theologically, not only for marriage but also parent-child 
relationships – as well as other enduring relationships. Seeing marriage as two 
mutually supporting covenants maps more clearly onto the Pauline teachings, even if 
the nature of the covenants may have developed in the interim and will continue to do 
so into the future. The uni-directional nature of a covenant is a better understanding 
of the parental role which can be developed as a commitment to the child without 
expectation of reward. Of course, it is easier to undertake such a development now 
that child rearing is no longer such a significant part of providing for old age as it was 
in pre-pension societies. Indeed, our earlier evidence showed that parenting has 
become more of a responsibility than a benefit.
Jeffrey  highlights, “the debate that took place at Vatican II over marriage, where it was  
insisted that marriage is a covenant, and that the essence of marriage is found in conjugal love” 
(2006, p xvii). However, this change of perspective may not have been all that it 
initially seemed (especially in the light of the fact that the Catholic church continues 
to hold to a legalistic framework, especially when it comes to annulment. Jeffrey 
continues:
Revolutionary though this concept was in defining the limits of the  
contractual concept of marriage, and overturning Duns Soctus' definition that  
the contract was about the exclusiveness of sexual relations between the  
partners, it was only a return to the Scriptures and the teaching of the  
Fathers of the Church that renewed the concept of Christian marriage (2006, 
p xvii).
It is perhaps less useful to our present considerations that he concludes, “The concept  
of covenant necessarily brings out the personal dimension of marriage, yet describes the merging  
of the human with the divine” (2006, p xvii). In this and elsewhere, Jeffrey seeks to 
sustain a circular argument: marriage is a paradigm for the relationship between 
humanity and God, so therefore our rules about marriage should imitate our 
understanding of God. Not only is this approach circular but also sits uneasily 
185
alongside other arguments about sexuality still supported by the Catholic church 
which base themselves on a recourse to what is natural, rather than what can be 
manufactured in imitation of God’s nature and our perception of that nature.
Taken more objectively, the idea of covenant can also help us to understand better the 
process of divorce if we see that as an agreed release from the covenant. The effects of 
the relationship breakdown on any children can be ameliorated by a re-affirmation of 
the individual parent-child covenants.
So much of what John (2000) says in Permanent, Faithful, Stable about same-sex 
relationships is a good model for a renewed vision of relationships generally 
(including heterosexual marriage, first time, procreative or otherwise) 
In this way we might also use a theology of enduring relationships to speak about any 
context in which two or more people make vows one to the other. Not only can this 
say something about learning disability and post-menopausal marriages, but could 
also, for example, generate better insights into employer-employee, or carer-client 
relationships, both of which are somewhat in disarray, lacking a broad acceptance of 
their theological basis. 
We need to be clear about what is meant by the marriage vow. If we assume that part 
of the vow is to sign up to the requirements of parenthood, we can either abstract a 
timeless and universal concept which can last as long as the lives of those making the 
vow, or we may have to admit that the parenting obligation changes over time and 
place. If so, we have to consider whether the couple signed up to the view of parenting 
at the time of making the vow and whether they are exempt from any subsequent 
change rather than necessarily committed to changes which they could not reasonably 
have foreseen at the time of marriage.
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8.3 Post-Modern Marriage Covenant
In this section we shall seek to develop a concept of Post-Modern Covenant, responding 
to the contemporary social context.
The essence is that the state (acting on behalf of society) establishes rights in the form 
of a contract and the state becomes a party to that contract by undertaking to arbitrate 
in certain future situations. Individuals cannot freely define these rights, particularly 
when they intend to rely on the state to enforce these rights. More often than not it is 
ironic that such rights are only exercised when a marriage has come to an end (by 
death or by divorce) rather than having an impact on the relationship whilst it is still 
functional. They are largely a means of making explicit an exit strategy, saying very 
little about the nature of any on-going relationship. This observation serves to 
emphasise further that secular marriage is about status whilst, theologically marriage 
is about the nature of an on-going relationship.
Separately, a covenant can be established by various means, one of which is that which 
the church seeks to identify. Its essence is to identify ‘best practice’ in terms of ways 
in which marriages should operate and to establish duties (rather than rights) of one 
partner to the other (the undertakings given as part of the covenant). The tradition of 
the church is consistent with this since it has long seen marriage as an undertaking 
between the couple with God as the medium, acting as the guarantor of the covenant 
parallel to the role of the state in maintaining the rights.
Sitting outside a legal framework, covenants may take on various forms depending on 
the context of each relationship, with the church having a pastoral role in determining 
the boundaries of such flexibility. Where appropriate, these covenants can be extended 
to others such as pre-existing children or even responsibilities to elderly parents.
It is inherent in these concepts that anything which is contained within the covenant, 
rather than the contract, cannot be enforced by the state, whose role is largely 
restricted to the exit conditions. In the event of a disagreement on covenant matters, it 
is to the guarantor of that covenant that either or both of the partners must resort. In 
the case of Christian marriage, God is the guarantor and such resolution should be in 
ways which Christians understand and experience in maintaining their relationship 
with God.
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It may, depending on circumstance, be that prayer (individual or joint) is the 
mechanism or it may be that recourse to the church (acting in a pastoral not legal 
role) is effective in mediation and resolution. Clearly, it will not be easy for the church 
to relinquish its historical attachment to a quasi-judicial role which gives judgemental 
effect to narrow perceptions of what the Christian marriage commitment should 
imply. (This description has echoes of the controversy of whether Sharia Law should 
be recognised by the state when exercising its role in overseeing exit conditions).
Yet the term covenant also has the other meaning, that of a unilateral commitment and 
is thus distinguished from a contract in which something promised in return from 
something else of equal value. This particular use of covenant also helps in defining a 
post-modern covenant marriage.
Instead of marriage being an undertaking that depends on the fulfilment by both 
parties of their undertakings one to another and thus comes to an end if one fails to 
do so, a covenant cannot be so readily broken. It can only come to an end with the 
withdrawal of the commitment originally made. As such it is not particularly helpful 
in defining the end of a marriage (in the way that a contract does) but is more 
significant in identifying the nature of the on-going relationship between the couple. It 
identifies that each partner has made a unilateral commitment to the other and will 
continue to support that commitment regardless of what the other shall do, or not do. 
Hence we see that this concept also focuses attention on what happens whilst a 
marriage is in existence, rather than seeking to define its endpoint. It is also pastorally 
potentially helpful in giving the partners a further guideline to their life together, as 
well as pointing beyond any possible end to the contractual relationship.
A post-modern culture places an emphasis on the individual and, perhaps, the 
relationship between an individual and society as a whole. In particular it seeks to set 
a limit on the extent to which the state, or society as a whole, prescribes or proscribes 
personal behaviour. The assumption is that individual choice is the norm, unless 
proven otherwise. 
Post-modern developments seem to encourage people in marriage to view themselves 
as individuals as having a greater importance than the marriage itself. The form of 
covenant which is being considered here seeks to emphasise the undertaking that one 
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makes to the other, regardless of what the other may or may not do in return, setting 
the marriage above the individual.
Whilst this might superficially seem very different from many post-modern ideas, it is 
by creating a focus on the relationship of the individual to the marriage (and in that 
sense is post-modern) that it is distinctive. This idea is hinted at by Brinig and Hock 
when they say, “Covenant is a concept that takes us beyond contract. … While contracts  
presume rational self-interest and seek to promote it, trust is inherently non-rational. Covenant is  
more like trust than contract” (2005, p276). And later, “marriage … features unconditional  
giving rather than a series of reciprocal gift-givings. The many things spouses do for each other  
cannot simply be regulated as a series of contracts because so much of the giving is  
unconditional” (2005, p277).
This notion of covenant could be argued from a purely secular position, primarily if 
not exclusively concerned with outcomes. Indeed, writers such as Spaht justify the 
Louisiana Statute on exactly that basis (2005, pp249 ff). What we are seeking to do 
here, however, is specifically theological - and Christian as well. In particular, whilst 
we have used the term post-modern covenant we are not implying that such a covenant, 
as applied to marriage (or even comparable relationships) is only about the giver and 
receiver of the covenant. Rather, we continue with the understanding that God 
remains guarantor to the covenant and, through his on-going care for this world, will 
act beneficially to mediate advantageous conditions for that covenant to fulfil its 
expectations. God is guarantor to the on-going relationship: the state is a guarantor to 
the exit process.
There is a further possible distinction to be drawn between secular and Christian 
marriage: we have seen that the state is concerned to define marriage as a status – it 
specifies which people are married and which are not when it comes to the application 
of particular benefits. On the other hand, underlying much of what the church has 
sought to teach is an ontological imperative – even to the extent that the marriage 
service marks an ontological change: the nature of both the individuals and the 
covenanted relationship has altered as a result of solemnising it in conjunction with 
God, witnessed and supported by the wider community which the church represents.
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Conclusion
Our concept of post-modern marriage covenant has taken on several 
new dimensions, not least the recognition that its context may vary 
and, possibly, include other parties, such as pre-existing children. 
Indeed, Christian marriage, on this basis, becomes radically 
differentiated from the contractual status guaranteed by the state 
which focuses primarily on exit strategies. Instead we have a 
collection of covenant relationships (each a unilateral undertaking by 
one person to act to the benefit of the other), mediated in the 
context of an incarnational God who is thus present in and becomes 
part of the covenant and the way in which it operates.y) (2005b) 
Richard Hooker(1554-1600) The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity Revisited  
ACNS 4059. London: Anglican Communion Office
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1 Pre-nuptial agreements are relatively recent developments set up in an attempt to forestall 
disagreement over property allocation between the couple in the event of a divorce – 
especially where there is agreement to a division very different from that which otherwise 
the courts would administer. The extent to which couples in the UK actually complete 
well-founded pre-nuptial agreements is not clear, although there is a growth in the 
number of law firms offering their services. In 2000, The Independent reported on an 
opinion poll which showed growing support for them being available and that they would 
not generally deter people from marrying if their prospective partner insisted on one 
(Independent, 2000)
2 The Radamacher v Granatino case (EWCA, 2009) has changed that position and pre-
nuptial agreements are now much more likely to have the role that is expected by those 
entering into them. (NB The Court judgement uses the term ante-nuptial contract) Lord 
Justice Thorpe said, “Nor would I accept that the seekers are the predominantly male super-rich,  
anxious to ensure that the contemplated marriage will not prove too expensive on its future  
dissolution. There are many instances in which mature couples, perhaps each contemplating a second  
marriage, wish to regulate the future enjoyment of their assets and perhaps to protect the interests of  
the children of the earlier marriages upon dissolution of a second marriage. They may not  
unreasonably seek that clarity before making the commitment to a second marriage. Due respect for  
adult autonomy suggests that, subject of course to proper safeguards, a carefully fashioned contract  
should be available as an alternative to the stress, anxieties and expense of a submission to the width  
of the judicial discretion.” Nevertheless, the judgement makes it clear that, at this stage in 
the development of the law, pre-nuptial agreements will not necessarily be enforceable 
without proper consideration by the courts of the basis on which they were formed. 
3 Allegedly, 96% of sexually active Catholic women in the US exercise birth control. (Bates, 
2010)
4 Some might see in this the origins of the unequal partnership which long persisted as the 
basis of marriage – Lawler, 1993.
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9. Methodology Revisited : Uncertain Theology
We have reached the point at which we appear to have exhausted the 
possibility of creating a single, universal Marriage Theology, 
incorporating all of the challenges which our marginal situations 
present, yet which still satisfies those who are primarily concerned 
with the ‘mainstream’ considerations evolved through many 
generations both of experience and theological thinking.
In each of the three selected areas for detailed consideration, we have identified 
aspects which appear to run contrary to any received theology of marriage, such as the 
nature of the commitment being made, whether or not to make a presumption of child 
bearing, the role of existing children and so on. We have thus far made the tacit 
assumption that we are looking for a deterministic and universal theology that will 
allow us to reach a single set of descriptors of what – at least in our contemporary 
context – constitutes Christian Marriage. We could, at this point, become entirely 
radical and reject all that is identified with received thinking and replace it with 
something entirely new but which works better at the margins than in the centre, 
ignoring all of the accumulated experience which conventional teaching provides.
We could even accept the possibility of resorting to an unlimited set of 'special 
theologies', in the manner of Situational Ethics, each designed to cater for a specific 
marginal case. However, that almost certainly will lead quickly to an geometric growth 
in the number of marginal cases – places where each special case overlaps – mirroring 
the way in which, historically, the church has dealt with issues by creating schisms. 
Alternatively, we could seek a further aspect of Evidential Theology which allows us to 
accommodate all strands of experience and teaching, a methodology which is more 
conducive to this variety in a way that does not require some situations to deny the 
integrity of the others. O'Murchu (2004, p25ff) draws extensively on parallels with 
how the scientific understanding of the universe has evolved and highlights the 
dangers of  deterministic and reductionist approaches to theology. In an analogous 
way, what I intend to develop is a basis for recognising that when we translate general 
and universal ideas about God into practical, ethical precepts, we may not always 
come to the same conclusions, independent of our prior experience, contemporary 
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cultural context, scientific knowledge and theological framework. I shall call this 
approach Uncertain Theology.
To begin to understand how we might build such a methodology we turn, again, to 
the experiences of scientific method, in particular those which underpinned physics in 
the first part of the 20C. At the end of the Victorian period, there was a widespread 
expectation that the then-known laws of physics could, if applied with sufficient 
complexity and diligence, explain the behaviour of the known universe and predict its 
future course. However, observations on the behaviour of light gradually created a 
conflict. Some studies showed that light behaved as a wave whilst others suggested a 
corpuscular (discrete) structure. Conventional logic demanded a resolution: only one 
could be true, something could not possible be both. Recently, Robinson highlighted 
the impact of: 
the logical principle of non-contradiction, a basic philosophical concept  
identified by Aristotle, (which defines) the idea that two opposed things  
cannot both be true. Aristotle put it that, ‘One cannot say of something that  
it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time.’
(White, 2008).
In the first part of the twentieth century a flurry of developments in physics 
introduced both the duality principle and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. 
Although Heisenberg is best known for his work on the Uncertainty Principle as part 
of the development of Quantum Mechanics in Physics, in a later book (Heisenberg, 
1955) he looked at the consequence of those ideas in a slightly broader context and, in 
this section, we will examine how to apply analogous ideas to a theological context, 
especially with reference to incarnation.
The Uncertainty Principle states that if we can measure one parameter (location) 
exactly then we have infinite uncertainty about other related parameters (energy, 
momentum) However, if we know the energy level precisely then we know nothing 
about location.
Applied theologically, we could say that the more precisely we focus on one aspect of 
incarnation or whatever, then the less we now about other aspects. Conversely, the 
more we focus on a precise definition of a particular ethical issue, then the less we can 
be sure about God as revealed in the incarnation.
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This formulation is similar to a comment made by Williams in his review of Pullman's 
The Good Man Jesus and the Scoundrel Christ (2010) in which he endorses an essential 
paradox in Christianity, “It seems to recognise the irony that the more you say about Jesus, the  
more you risk getting it wrong” (Williams, 2010).
This runs counter to the Modernist expectation that we are making continuing 
progress towards a full comprehension of God and what that means in this life. Even 
Post-Modernist thinking does not really escape from that idea, but simply remarks 
that some ideas seem very different when looked at from different positions. That 
state of affairs is rather like physics just before the arrival of Quantum Mechanics - 
different observers explained the same situation in very different ways: some saw 
behaviour that was best explained as an object having mass and position, others saw 
behaviour which could best be explained in wave energy terms. What the Uncertainty 
Principle and Quantum Mechanics did was to bring these different views into a single 
framework, but at the expense of being able to explain everything precisely at the 
same time (what Newtonian mechanics aimed to do).
Hence we might say that the more we focus on - let us say – certain principles about 
sexual behaviour (e.g. marriage) the less we are able to see of other factors such as 
God's care for humanity in all its manifestations, the less we are able to see the totality 
of creation as part of God's intentions.
There are two ways in which we can resolve such apparent contradictions. Robinson’s 
example suggests that we have to balance the opposing principles and locate individual 
solutions somewhere in between the extremes. In one sense this remains compatible 
with a Modernist approach in that there remain objective realities and a common 
balancing force is used to apply them to individuals. It is also able to address some of 
the Post-Modern concerns, in that each resolution is tailored to particular 
circumstance – leaving unresolved the question of the authority on which the 
resolution takes place. Is it up to the church authorities (as in past generations) to 
provide ever more complex manuals of what behaviour is acceptable? (as in 
confessional manuals for priests to be used in deciding what activities, such as sex 
positions, were acceptable and those which were not). Or is it up to the individual to 
make their own judgements upon which others are not free to pass comment, except 
on a utilitarian basis?
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However, as with the analogous development in fundamental physics, the number of 
special cases tends to undermine the ability to predict future behaviour.1 It is, of 
course, possible that we reject the absoluteness of the conflicting principles and 
resolve the differences from outside of their scope. By reference to agape, this is how 
Fletcher (1966) proceeded: leave the principles in place but allow an extra dimension 
in which to determine the appropriate action.
The basic postulate then of what we might call Uncertain Theology is that there is 
inherent uncertainty2 in determining what God expects of humanity and what our 
experience of God tells us about God's nature. Furthermore, if we accept that God is 
both continuously incarnate in our universe as well as existing outside our limitations 
of space and time, then our perception of God will depend on our particular place in 
that universe.3 Kauffman (2009) examines the objective of science, ultimately to 
explain everything, as being unattainable – the Theory of Everything, he contends is 
not possible. This is analogous to our assertion that God's incarnation cannot 
ultimately be contained within our collective experiences. Indeed, in the context of 
Evidential Theology it is a necessary consequence: if our way of knowing God is in and 
through the created world and we concur that we can never have a single theory of 
how that world works, then we can never know everything about God.
Uncertain Theology goes further and asserts that our ability to experience God and to 
interpret what that means for ethical behaviour (for example) are inter-related via an 
infinite dualism of uncertainty: the more we know of one then the less we know of the 
other. If we wish to be absolutely certain that a particular ethical principle is correct at 
all times and in all places then we lose all hold on our knowledge of God. As a result, 
we know that we must live with apparent inconsistencies, not as a result of a 
Postmodernist focus on the rights of the individual to make their own decisions, but 
because of inherent uncertainty, an ambiguity that will always and necessarily be with 
us and which no amount of Church Councils can ever resolve into certainty.
The only way to obtain some degree of certainty is to balance all factors at a macro 
level where the combination leads to being able to state conclusions with increasing 
confidence levels although such conclusions will necessarily be very broad.
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Uncertain Theology therefore argues that having complete certainty in our knowledge 
about God (even an infinite time into the future) implies complete uncertainty about 
specific ethical issues. Our perhaps innate desire to seek ever more specific certainty 
about acceptable behaviour is inevitably at the expense of our knowledge of God, even 
through an endless amount of revelation through observation of the universe.
In some ways, this is reminiscent of a comment by Sacks, quoted by Spencer when 
looking at various objections to ‘Doing God’,“The unity of God is to be found in the  
diversity of creation” (2006, p26). Spencer himself then says, “A diversity that makes life  
possible, interesting and dignified” (p26). He might also have said that by accepting such a 
diversity – and its acceptability to God – we may find a better basis on which to 
resolve some of the pressing issues on sexual and marital behaviour.
Reactions to the notion of an Uncertain Theology may reflect the Tolerance of Ambiguity 
as found in different personalities. Initially proposed by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) and 
developed by many others in the field of psychology (see Furnham and Ribchester, 
1995 for a review) it may help to understand why some people press for a resolution 
of uncertainty in matters of faith and ethics, whilst others are more willing to accept 
fuzzy formulations.
9.1 Revelation and Incarnation
Thus far in this thesis we have not always made a clear distinction between the notion 
that God is continuously revealed to humanity through the continuing evolution of 
the manifest world, and the notion of continuous incarnation.
Continuing revelation begs a question: is God the same now as God was in the past? 
Continuing revelation may – or may not – be consistent with the proposition that God 
is, was, and always will be exactly the same. It is only our human perception of God 
which changes. There is clearly a lot of support for this idea.
On the other hand, continuing incarnation suggests that God himself is inherently 
evolving. This is more consistent with the sense that the God of the Old Testament is 
manifestly different from the God of the New Testament. The idea also offers the 
possibility that the God of today is different from the God of yesterday and will 
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become different as the God of tomorrow. It also recognises that the OT Covenant was 
not unending as it was overtaken by the very different NT Covenant.
Neither concept is necessarily inconsistent with the idea that there is an eternal 
quality to God nor that there is an inherent personality discontinuity between God as 
perceived in each generation, any more than I am inherently a different person now 
than I was as a teenager. Equally, the process of living in the world and reacting to its 
experiences has led me to be an evolution from the personality I once was. With luck, 
I am now more experienced, perhaps more mellow and willing to tolerate the process 
of change around me which is both faster and slower than I might want. With even 
more luck, I am still as committed to the values that I have always seen as important.
A God who continues to be incarnate in the world is a God that gains from the 
relationship with that world, most especially with humanity, and becomes a different 
God in consequence. In this way we can identify a loving relationship – between God 
and humanity – that has both a reason and a purpose.
From this observation we can also derive a sense that we can never tie God down to a 
single representation, whether derived from scripture, tradition or reason. What it 
does do, however, is to emphasise more strongly the need for us to pursue an 
inclusive agenda, in which the whole of humanity is not only accommodated but 
which must equally become part of relationship with God and our understanding of 
God's nature and intent.
9. 2 Application to Marriage Theology
In each of our case study areas we found aspects of received marriage theology which 
are, at least apparently, inconsistent with the evidence. For example, we found that 
the use of contract as an essential component of Christian marriage (rather than 
covenant) is incompatible with the evidence that people with a learning disability can 
successfully marry and, indeed, have a right to do so and to be supported in that 
process.
We could, of course, resort to a Situational Ethics approach and allow judgement of 
the context to over-ride broader principles in individual cases. However, in the case of 
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marriage as currently established, this is particularly difficult as it involves legal 
processes (contract) where such variation is not readily permitted.
Applied to the main thrust of this thesis, we see further reason to establish a theology 
of enduring relationships, including those which we may call 'marriage'. It must apply to 
people with a learning disability, to couples with no prospect or intent to procreate 
and to those whose life comprises more than one such relationship and where children 
from different relationships have to play a well defined role. 
The more certain we become that God calls us to an inclusive agenda in which, 
through time, we have had to accommodate an increasing variety – the essence of 
liberation, feminist, black agendas – then the more uncertain we become that a 
particular formulation of marriage can be adopted both in practice and as a paradigm 
for our understanding of God.
Conclusion
By accepting such inclusive agenda, we allow the God of today to 
become different from the God of yesterday, one where our paradigm 
is based on all such relationships rather than the much narrower one 
we  analysed in an earlier section. In the process we discover a God 
whose focus is on the integrity of loving relationships rather than the 
specifics of gender, intellectual capability, procreative capacity or 
human fallibilities.
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1 It is a fundamental objective of scientific method that seeks to establish formulations that 
enable us to predict future behaviour as well as to record past behaviour. Occam's Razor 
suggests that we should always seek the explanation with the least complexity of 
conditions. We can see the same principles at work in the development of ethical formulae 
where there is a tendency to simplify at the expense of completeness.
2 Uncertainty, in this context, is very different from ignorance or waywardness but has 
within it a consistency of behaviour.
3 In the same way that a house looks very different front and back or a century after it was 
built, yet – in a real sense – is still the same house.
199
10. Challenges to the Church
We have now reached a situation in which it seems possible to 
accommodate the variety of circumstances found in contemporary 
society. A Christian post-modern covenant, tailored to individual 
circumstance, has been advocated, which allows for people with a 
learning disability and marriages where child-bearing is either not 
possible or is rejected. The problems of pre-existing children and 
other factors arising from modern domestic relationships have been 
addressed. We now face the issues which this will create for a church 
which has hitherto presented a clear and narrow expression of 
marriage, but which is no longer widely accepted. As well as a 
number of pastoral issues, we will also have to look at how this sits 
with our argument to separate the state's and church's roles, with the 
latter abandoning the historical registration role, which is principally 
concerned about the contractual aspects of  exit conditions. Instead, 
it can focus on enabling the marriage to achieve the goals it sets itself 
at the outset.
Unlike, the more divisive issues, the challenges presented by the three marginal 
situations identified at the outset are likely to be accepted as deserving of a 
sympathetic and universal recognition. Any theology which seeks to address these 
factors must be developed in an inclusive manner, not just because the Disability 
Discrimination Act encourages us to be non-discriminatory, but more because of the 
universality of God’s gospel message – Christ came to redeem all humankind, not just 
those at the centre (e.g. Acts 11).
Fagan (2003) reminds us that evolution in nature is reflected in a need for the 
church’s teaching to evolve as our collective understanding of the world moves on. He 
rejects the idea that there is a static core of morality which can be derived from an 
unchanging view of what is normal or to be preferred. He also rejects the position of 
the church – and here he is especially critical of the Catholic church – that it is 
somehow a custodian of a set of moral values which have to be defended at all costs 
from the evolution of society, a criticism that may also be levelled at Radical 
Orthodoxy.
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Of course, this does not mean that there are no absolutes nor that the church does not 
have a role to play in being critical of change in society. Some change is for the better 
and some for the worse, but what cannot be challenged is that change is inevitable. 
God gave humanity minds which are both curious and inventive and the natural 
consequence is to create change. The challenge for the church and theologians is to 
discern that which is essential and that which is culturally and contextually derived.
The examination of our three case studies must inevitably lead to changes in the way 
the church responds. It has done so before and must do so again. We might even 
rejoice that God has given us these challenges as, by responding to them, we become 
less stuck in our ways and more responsive to the actuality of humanity and its 
relationship with God, rather than a rigid adherence to a formulaic repetition of 
historical dicta.
Evidential Theology means that we can establish areas where conventional marriage 
teaching must adapt in order to avoid being in contradiction to the revelation of God 
through our perception of the universe. Uncertain Theology allows us to consider 
whether these contradictions lead to a revised universal marriage theology (uniform) 
or whether we must accept that certain matters are both true and not true, depending 
on the circumstances (unified).
By learning more about the basis for marriage at the margins we can derive a better 
understanding about the general case for marriage and how the church can better 
support the institution whether or not this is uniform or unified in its fundamentals.
We have seen that the connection between procreation and marriage has varied 
considerably dependent on the prevailing cultural context and place in history. Yet, 
the examination of both post-menopausal marriage and those where one partner, or 
both, has a learning disability highlight even more sharply the fact that procreation 
cannot be a necessary condition for Christian marriage. Social trends have clearly 
indicated that the secular view is that procreation is no longer a sufficient condition 
either.
The advent of divorce has put a considerable strain on the use of marriage as a 
contractual arrangement – what was originally largely meant to be used in the event of 
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the death of one partner (more especially when a wife survived her husband) has 
increasingly been pressed into service to help untangle a marriage where both partners 
are very definitely alive – and usually kicking.
The more recent rise in the number of cohabitations has meant that there are now 
many more cases where a couple split up without the assistance of a marriage contract 
to help in deciding the basis on which their joint assets are divided. As ever, the issue 
is largely focused on questions to do with property – in some cases the most valuable 
asset is the right to a pension fund. Consequently there is pressure for similar rights 
to those given to married couples to be given to those who have cohabited and 
established a joint household but remain unmarried.
None of this bodes well for the concept of Christian marriage as a contractual 
arrangement. It is high time that the church began the process of re-establishing its 
role in the formation of marriages but in a way which is not only distinctive but which 
is both helpful to the couple and enables the church to be more inclusive in its 
mission. A priority is to re-appraise the use marriage as a paradigm and seek release 
from the limitations which it has imposed.
Politicians in many countries still find mileage in claiming to be supportive of The  
Family, whilst being surrounded by ever increasing evidence that the nuclear family of 
the mid 20C is no longer the principal basis of society. If anything, there is growing 
evidence that that period was one of unstable transition from a time when marriage 
was primarily about those other than the couple themselves (such as procreation and 
rearing to sustain the family line) to a time when the focus is primarily on the 
relationship between the couple themselves. The Romantic element of Modernism 
introduced the opportunity for marriage based only on love, not property, whilst 
simultaneously bolstering the view that an essential element of the expression of that 
love should be seen in procreation.
The tensions that this transition caused began at least as early as the time of the 
Hardwicke Act – see the debates which preceded the passage of the legislation 
(Lemmings 1996) although it is always difficult to ascertain how far parliamentarians 
are reflecting general social views rather than replicating that which they think society 
wants to hear.
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The evidence indicates the extent to which, at least in the UK, secular attitudes 
towards marriage have become very much more focused on the relationship – and its 
quality – rather than some teleological notion based on what the outcome of the 
marriage should be. This has led us to question the extent to which both marriage 
liturgy and church teaching have continued to be based on outcomes with the result 
that the nature and quality of the relationship being celebrated and pastorally cared for 
have been restricted and, in some cases, marginalised.
10.1 Each To Their Own Last
We have established the distinction between the Nature (ontology) and Purpose 
(teleology) of marriage as well as distinct uses of contract and covenant as well as 
differences between secular and theological perspectives: it is time to clarify where the 
church has a role. Historically, the church has been heavily involved in many societies 
in collaborating with state authorities in establishing and maintaining legal controls 
over marriage laws. For some periods, the church generally, but the Catholic church 
especially, has combined both a secular and a theological purpose in seeking to control 
not only what is legally defined to be a marriage, but also to use this as a springboard 
for controlling what happens inside a marriage, notably sexual behaviour.
Following our Nature/Purpose dichotomy, we can assert that there should be a 
continuing evolution in distinguishing the roles of state and church. Whilst the 
Nature of marriage could be seen as largely an observational matter, and we can 
simply stand back and track the changes and developments within society in an 
entirely passive way, the state (in almost all cases) reserves the right to enact 
legislation that sets limits - for example, the minimum age for sexual activity. Since it 
varies from one state to another, and from one generation to another, such matters 
cannot be a reflection of an enduring theological insight, even if countering the effects 
of child abuse clearly remains an important matter for the church. The role of the state 
is frequently related to its role in rights and responsibilities, viewed broadly in a 
functional manner.
The legal code is determined, and evolved, on a utilitarian basis. For instance, limits 
on the familial relationship between those allowed to marry is largely based on an 
awareness of the genetic implications. Incest is barred, not because it is ethically 
‘wrong’ but because it adversely affects any progeny, whose ‘rights’ may not be 
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protected by the incestuous parents. Debates on first cousin marriages continue 
because of uncertainty over the evidence (BBC, 2005b; BBC, 2008a; Public Library of 
Science, 2008; Paul & Spencer, 2008).
The church’s teaching on marriage becomes increasingly dysfunctional when it 
confuses the Nature and Purpose aspects, especially by continuing to participate in the 
state functions. The Nature/Purpose dichotomy validates a role for the church in 
pursuing a teaching and prophetic role with respect to marriage and relationships, 
based on its perception of Purpose, rather than an unsatisfactory attempt to assert 
statements about Nature, which have generally tended to be out of step with 
contemporary behaviour.
If the church lets go of its involvement in the state function, then it is more able to 
speak prophetically about Purpose. It can, for example, more clearly distinguish 
between statements about marriage in general and Christian Marriage in particular. If 
it abandons attempts to control the rights of every citizen to behave in a specific way, it 
is free to define the subset of those who accept the principles based on Christian 
theology. Attempts to make the legal registration of marriage a purely state matter 
date back at least as far as the immediate follow-up to the Hardwicke Act (Outhwaite, 
1995, p116) although others still asserted that only the church could validly make a 
marriage.
Accepting this more specific role provides a clearer basis on which to promote 
behaviour based on an overall perception of Purpose, in the same way that it does so 
for behaviour more generally. For example, in a social context in which the state 
definition of marriage clearly assumes a probably finite and terminable relationship – 
divorce or even cohabitation are enshrined in law often formulated in a Human Rights 
context – it has become increasingly difficult for the church to sustain a teaching that 
indicates otherwise, as a requirement for everyone. Instead, it could become free to 
advocate or commend a principle for anyone, generally consequent on an acceptance of 
the Christian theological context from which it flows.
Similarly, it might find itself able to be a much more effective participant in debates on 
fertility treatments, abortion, saviour siblings and similar matters, if it stood back a 
little from the general legislative process. Whilst accepting the right of the state to 
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legislate to make specific practices legally permissible, it could more actively seek to 
proselytise and increase the proportion of the population who voluntarily accepted a 
rejection of some of their rights.
Further, this distinction makes it possible, if no less difficult, to address the marginal 
cases which this thesis has established as a litmus test for Christian marriage 
theology. Establishing a clear basis on which children born before a marriage should 
be identified as a component of a Christian marriage now becomes possible. By 
withdrawing from the Nature argument, we can more readily accept presenting 
situations for what they are, rather than for how they challenge a potentially 
inaccurate perception of what marriage is.
A greater challenge is presented by an Uncertain Theology analysis which seriously 
reduces the scope for the church to talk in terms of absolutes: 'divorce is a sin and 
should not be permitted' may well be true in some contexts but not in others. 
Uncertain Theology challenges us to seek a deeper understanding that can 
accommodate both situations without each denying the integrity of the other.
10.2 Church v State
Spencer (2008) has developed an important framework within which we may resolve 
some of the difficulties in the church’s role in marriage. Neither Private nor Privileged 
seeks to establish a role for Christianity in contemporary society.
He begins with four methods of engagement in the public square which are to be 
found in the first five chapters of Acts, even though “this earliest period of the Church’s  











Recognising that there is a wide spectrum within which these methods can be 
developed, Spencer first establishes that neither extreme – privatisation or theocracy – 
is tenable. He demolishes the notion that Britain is a Christian society whilst 
simultaneously recognising that much of the legal and social mores of British society 
are so deeply founded in earlier interpretations of Christian teaching that it is also not 
yet possible to describe Britain as post-Christian. However, he discerns a strong 
tendency towards individualism. In a sense, he argues that British society is neither 
Christian nor anti-Christian.
The theocratic temptation1 is thoroughly demolished as if there were no element of it 
left. Yet, we find in the church’s role in marriage registration, a theocratic residue. The 
way in which this role is hung onto is closely related to a claim that Christian 
marriage ought to be the way for everyone and that secular options for marriage 
registration outside church are poor substitutes. It is clear that there remains a 
hankering after a theocratic result and that alternatives (including civil partnerships) 
are so wrong that they should be argued against – for anyone, not just those that 
accept the basic Christian premise.
On the other hand, Spencer recognises that Christianity is an essentially social faith, 
dealing inherently in relationships as its Unique Selling Point. Whether we are talking 
about the collective or personal relationship with God, or its reflection in inter-human 
relationships, it is clear that Christianity can never become wholly privatised or it 
loses its raison d’etre.
In finding a way forward, Spencer begins with an essentially incarnational view, 
“(Christianity) is first and foremost a story to be told … in public, about what God has done, is  
doing and will do” (2008, p33). In so doing, “the Church will be a challenge to society just by  
being itself” (2008, p39) and cites the Evangelical Alliance, “Movement from being heard  
primarily to convey a message of condemnation to proclaiming the language of compassion is an  
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imperative for people claiming to advance the Kingdom of God in the current context” (2008, 
p41).
Should the church be ‘public’ or ‘political’? “Frustratingly, neither Scripture nor tradition  
gives a particularly clear steer on the answer” (2008, p53). “We should not … seek after the  
demonstrably and eternally correct model for the Church’s public witness, but rather for the most  
appropriate one in the given circumstances” (2008, p55).
Spencer concludes, as a methodology upon which the church can better engage with 
society: 
The answer lies neither in privatisation nor privilege. Instead … it may be  
found in the slippery and shifting concept of the ‘public good’. Christianity is  
a public religion and nothing is going to change the Christian imperative to  
public proclamation, public assembly, public action and, if necessary, public  
confrontation. However, the precise role that Christianity plays within the  
public square can and does change (2008, p64).
Finally, “Ultimately, the role of Christianity in the public square of twenty-first century Britain  
will depend on the extent to which, by doing what it must do, it can persuade the public that it is  
‘doing good’” (p85).
If we apply Spencer’s methodology to the specific issue of marriage, then we see that 
the church must reject any temptation to theocracy – not seeking to impose a specific 
notion of marriage on unbelievers – but work towards a conclusive argument that its 
teachings represent an insight into what works best for humanity.
However, as Spencer identifies, this process has to cope with tendencies in society to 
produce not only unified dicta which are applied to everyone, but also at the same 
time following the trend towards greater individuality and private choice in many of 
these matters. This brings us back to Uncertain Theology where we may find more 
lasting truths that are general in their expression, allowing for considerable variation 
in local application. Thus, to take a small example, it may continue to be useful to 
support the notion of the state sponsoring ‘contract’ marriage in order to give 
universal exit rights, whilst advocating a ‘covenant’ as the basis for distinct Christian 
marriage. A God-sealed relationship may or may not be backed by a contract – even if 
there is no doubting the God-sealing component. Equally, it may be possible to omit 
the contractual aspect altogether from the religious marriage, leaving such matters 
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wholly to the state where it may be willing to deal in more precise terms which may 
change in time and context in a way that is a challenge to a theological perspective.
10.3 Meeting Social Change
Changes in marriage practice in the period since biblical times have been charted by 
various writers(e.g. Coleman, 2004; Coontz, 2006d) and the pace of change seems to 
be greater now than ever before. Whether or not that is a true perception does not 
alter the sense of threat which many people believe to be present, both within and 
without the church. 
The reaction generally is for the church – despite Spencer’s stance – to create ever 
greater defences for what is understood to be a traditional position, even if tradition 
often reflects the (transient) status of perhaps two or three generations previously. 
For example, reacting to the decline in birth rates across many European countries, 
Pope Benedict has suggested that Europe seems set on a path to oblivion (Traynor, 
2007). The clear implication is that it remains the duty of all women to procreate to 
maintain the existing population. Despite various attempts to replace this primacy of 
procreation in the purposes of marriage, it still underlines many responses to 
contemporary change. (Current concerns about the sustainability of modern society in 
the face of climate change may well question the moral basis for even sustaining the 
current population size).
Occasionally in the past, the church has led a recognition of social change and the 
implications for ethical and theological beliefs. The abolition of the slave trade was led 
from an evangelical purpose, yet even as the 1807 Act was being passed, many 
religious organisations (including the church and missionary societies) were still slave 
owners. The acceptance that slavery and slave ownership was unacceptable took 
longer to be the orthodox view, even within Western countries – and slavery still 
continues in the 21C in parts of the world whose economic and political development 
is reminiscent of the early 19C. Equally, the need to establish a more formal basis for 
marriage registration, which led to the Hardwicke Act, necessitated a positive 
response from the church and its active involvement.
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Formal events such as these are often catalytic changes which have resulted from a 
long term underlying change, driven by informal change within populations. There are 
several important lines of evolution regarding marriage to which the church will 
eventually have to react, including:
• legal protection for unmarried cohabiting couples
• divorce protection for legally unmarried couples
• growth in cohabitation
• abolition of stigma of illegitimacy
• growth in proportion of children born to unmarried parents
• growth in serial monogamy
• decline in religious marriage ceremonies.
The role of the church in response to these developments may be found using 
Spencer's methodology:
Firstly, we must seek to identify where God is revealing himself in this process: are 
these changes part of the incarnation – God in people – that must be accommodated in 
contemporary marriage theology and teaching?
Secondly, the church needs to be confident in what elements of its past teaching are 
inherent to an eternal gospel message and which parts were a response to a former 
situation.
Thirdly, it must be prepared to identify the public good which results from an 
adherence to its teachings, clearly addressing the situation as it is found and not seek 
a further theocratic temptation to impose its view on the whole of society through the 
process of law.
Finally, it must be prepared to confront society on those aspects where there is 
fundamental divergence between prevailing Christian principles and those found in 
society at large, especially when embedded in state provision. But, as Spencer points 
out, confrontation must be a last resort and the aims of the church are generally better 
prosecuted by persuasion.
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10.4 The Decision to Marry
We need to consider how the stance of the church towards marriage impacts on the 
attitudes of those whom it seeks to influence.
Current trends (ONS, 2007c) indicate the continuing growth in the proportion of 
cohabitations and children born to unmarried and/or single parents. Turned around, 
we see a marked decline in the proportion of children born into a so-called traditional 
nuclear family, with both parents:
• married to each other
• married before children conceived (or at least before first birth)
• living together
• having no previous children by another partner
• no previous marriage
Kasriel & Goodacre (2007) report on studies aimed at providing the Church of 
England with a greater understanding of the attitudes in contemporary society 
towards formal marriage, especially in church. They identify barriers to marriage, 
including:
• belief that marriage is no different from cohabitation
• rejection of idea that a relationship needs to be affirmed by an external 
institution
• belief that cohabitation is less stressful than marriage
• negative experiences of marriage
• fear that marriage will change relationship for the worse
• not ready to make long term commitment
• preoccupation with outlays
• desire to wait to be able to afford an expensive dream wedding
They highlight the rise in perception of a wedding as a particular event, only loosely 
connected with the formation of a life-long relationship (p2). Consequently, they 
distinguish between barriers to marriage and those to a wedding. One result is a 
widespread confusion about who the day is for.
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Reibstein concludes that a married legal status appears to have little correlation with 
long-lasting relationships (2006, p13).
Since the church remains prominent in espousing and promoting the above 
characteristics as an ideal Christian form of marriage, it is likely that this is having a 
declining effect. It may even be argued that by doing so, the church is accelerating the 
trend. This is certainly consistent with the findings of Kasriel & Goodacre (2007, p5).
Some writers (e.g. Cherry, 1998) have examined varying marriage rates on the basis of 
the perceived value of marriage: the greater the apparent value of entering into a 
marriage, the greater the number doing so. Cherry postulates that decisions are based 
on the net balance between what each partner contributes into and receives from the 
relationship. If this is the basis of decision-making then it is clear that anything which 
underpins or promotes such a sense of value should result in increased numbers of 
marriages.
Grosbard-Shechtman (1993) has developed an economic analysis of marriage and the 
way in which the numbers of people entering marriage are related matches supply and 
demand. This approach to marriage rates is essentially market-oriented: supply and 
demand are moderated by a price mechanism, assuming that decisions on such 
matters are taken rationally. Using non-monetary price mechanisms, she identifies 
ways in which the perceived value of a marriage affects its take-up. In any event, the 
decision is based on the perception of value going into a marriage. As we see below, an 
alternative approach is took look at the perceived costs of coming out of a relationship.
We are currently seeing an increased resistance to the concept of marriage with fewer 
numbers deciding to become formally married (Kasriel & Goodacre, 2007), although, 
as Thatcher(1999) postulates, many who cohabit may have a similar perception of 
their relationship as those who have legally married. Haskey & Lewis (2006, p41) 
highlight respondents in their survey who spoke of the risky nature of marriage in 
contrast to other forms of enduring relationships.  This trend is in defiance of the 
continued promotion of marriage by the church and other institutions. 
It is possible, therefore, to postulate that society has moved from a situation in which 
the decision to marry is based on its perceived value to something different.2 A 
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possible explanation can be found in Game Theory3 and the MiniMax Theory,4 
suggesting that social decision-making has become inverted – the cost of marriage is 
now more important than its value and, especially, the exit costs if either partner 
wishes to terminate the relationship formally. This may explain why increasing 
numbers opt for cohabitation rather than marriage.5
In such circumstances, the effect of the church’s promotion of marriage, in the terms 
set out above, serves only to worsen the situation since it heightens the perception of 
the cost of a failed marriage. Whilst few people probably enter into marriage (or even 
cohabitation) with an explicit consideration of its finiteness, nevertheless, the 
omnipresence of relationship failure must have a significant impact. Church 
marriages, in comparison with civil marriages, are likely to be perceived as having 
higher costs associated with failure. In the Spencer model (2008) it is clear that the 
need to persuade society of a public good has failed.
Thatcher writes:
Since only about half of households (in Britain) consist of or contain married  
couples, churches need to get better at welcoming ‘non-traditional' families.  
They need a theology of marriage which assumes that marriage is normative,  
while at the same time accepting without reservation alternative relationships  
and family forms, and providing encouragement and support for them (2007, 
p134).
Kasriel & Goodacre issued a clear call for the Church of England to clarify not only 
what it stands for, in relation to marriage, but also to explain how it can support 
individual couples.
The same dilemma faces political parties who seemed doomed to failure in squaring 
this particular circle. If they advocate ‘family friendly’ policies – especially those that 
give some financial or taxation discrimination in favour of heterosexual couples – then 
they are accused of consigning half of all children to adverse life chances, including a 
higher probability of growing up in what is officially described as poverty. Equally, 
when social benefits and taxes are defined in terms that are as inclusive as possible – 
such as recognising without discrimination children whose parents are not formally 
married or where there is a civil partnership – they are criticised for undermining the 
role of marriage and ‘the family’.
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Is there a way to reverse this trend in perceiving marriage as having a high cost of 
failure? If our analysis is a reasonable reflection of what is increasingly happening in 
western society, then it is necessary to reduce the perceived cost of failure associated 
with a church marriage. This will entail the church developing a presentation of 
marriage which diminishes the sense of failure and the elements which make up the 
perception of cost as well as reducing the risks of failure. It might be much more 
effective to talk in terms of the degree of success – positive rather than negative.
In particular, it is likely that this will not happen without a radical re-appraisal of 
attitudes towards:
• child-rearing as the principal purpose of marriage
• children from different partners
• cohabitation (including child-bearing) before marriage
• serial monogamy
as well as replacing the creation of guilt associated with relationship failure with a 
more understanding and healing approach. Whilst avoiding the trap of suggesting that 
it is acceptable to enter lightly into relationships, especially those involving child-
rearing, or that failure is irredeemable, similar attitudes to the wider aspects of sin 
should be re-imported into marriage theology. 
In the above, the ‘cost’ of marriage is couched in non-monetary terms. However, it is 
also significant that church weddings are often associated with expensive ceremony 
and celebration, to the extent that they are becoming the preserve of the more well-off 
families. Of course, a church wedding at the essentials need be little different from a 
similarly based secular wedding but it is popular perception which a determining 
factor. It is interesting to note that some of the more outspoken opponents to the 
Hardwicke Bill were similarly concerned that the expense involved (traditional 
marriage by consent  was essentially free) would be beyond the means of many of the 
“laborious and industrious sort of people” to the extent that it would encourage “abortion,  
bastardy and infanticide” (Outhwaite, 1995, pp88-89). Such claims might have been 
excessive but there was real concern that a Bill, originally aimed at protecting the 
interests of families with significant assets, would be to the disadvantage of everyone 
else.
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The church encourages, in all aspects of life, that each person should aspire to ‘godly’ 
behaviour, but fundamentally addresses the consequences of what happens when this 
is (necessarily) not achieved. Although some generations have emphasised a negative 
attitude to sin and redemption, Christian thinking has, for the most part, found 
benefit in placing the healing nature of redemption and forgiveness to the fore. In 
some, but not all, churches, the theology of marriage and divorce has also embraced 
this possibility. This inherent characteristic of Christian thinking has not (yet) 
dominated the broader perception by society of what a church marriage entails – 
especially in the context of failure.
Opportunities exist for offering liturgical support at the end of a relationship (both 
marriage and cohabitation), similar to support for bereavement and death – as well as 
the involvement of existing children (and even their parents) in marriage liturgies.
In so doing, it may well be that that a more comprehensive theology of relationships 
will emerge which will have increasing application and benefit in other circumstances 
than the narrow concept of marriage, at least as it has been understood hitherto. 
Christian theology is dominated by a concern for relationships – whether between 
humans individually and collectively or as between God and humanity.
10.5 Spiritual Work with Learning Disability
Services for people with a learning disability are patchy (Powrie, 2001) and there are 
important gaps not only between different professions but even in the individual 
strands of service delivery. In particular, the spiritual needs of clients have only 
relatively recently been taken seriously (Swinton, 2004b). In a review of the work by 
the Mental Health Foundation, Carter says:
Far too often, the religious and spiritual needs and experiences of people with  
intellectual disabilities go unrecognised or unsupported. Although growing  
attention has been given to understanding the contributions that  
congregations can make to include people with disabilities, less guidance is  
available for agencies and direct care staff concerning their roles in supporting  
religious expression (2007, p83-84).
The Care Standards Act (2000) led to the creation of National Minimum Standards 
which included, “Standard 11.4: Service users have opportunities to fulfil their spiritual  
needs”, although there is no indication of how this is to be measured. The previous 
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legislation, Registered Homes Act, (1984) made no comparable provision and was, in 
any case, much less prescriptive about the nature of care.
Swinton has been developing an understanding of spirituality and disability and 
produced a report in 2004, Why are we here? It presented the findings of a two year 
nationwide research programme designed to explore the spiritual lives of people with 
learning disabilities:
The people with learning disabilities we spoke to talked about spirituality in  
different ways. Some people said it was about God. They felt that God loved  
them and cared for them and that this was the most important thing in their  
lives. Other people thought that spirituality was about having friends and  
this gave meaning to their lives. People felt that it was important they  
belonged to a group or a community. Some people liked to go into the  
countryside. Some liked music and art (2004a, p6).
This makes it clear that there is no overall reason why people with a learning disability 
should be excluded from full participation in spiritual activities – and this must clearly 
include support for entering into enduring relationships, including formal marriage.
Memmott, the Oxford Diocese adviser on autism, has published guidelines for 
welcoming into church people with autism or Aspergers Syndrome.  She makes it clear 
that people with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have difficulties in forming 
casual relationships, but once they form a relationship with a person that they can 
trust, it can be a fulfilling part of their life. She sets out specific guidance to enable 
churches to advise people with ASD who wish to marry and have children:
Marriage, sex and relationships for those with an ASD can present a number  
of challenges. It may work extremely well and lead to a long and loving  
relationship, but equally it may not if there is a lack of compatibility and  
understanding. One might, of course, say the same of any new relationship 
(2008, p25).
We have already noted the General Synod initiative: Opening the Doors. It sets a 
baseline for spiritual work with people with a learning disability:
In modern times, being made in the image of God has also been understood as  
the capacity for relationship. … all people are capable of having a  
relationship with God and with their fellow human beings and are entitled to  
be treated with dignity and understanding (2009, p10).
and, “There is one further misconception that must be dispelled. People with learning disabilities  
are not objects of charity but subjects of the Kingdom of God” (2009, p14). The report sets 
no limit to confirmation or communion based on a learning disability, although it does 
make it clear that historical practices may have to be adapted to allow an equality of 
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access. For example, it highlights the need for sensitivity over such liturgical actions 
as the laying on of hands with some ASD people where there is such a heightened 
sensitivity to touch that the negativity may outweigh the significance of the liturgical 
action.
If there is no reason to exclude people from the sacrament of communion on the basis 
of a learning disability then it seems to follow that neither should the church exclude 
from marriage on the same basis. This is not to diminish the practical issues which 
might ensue but the argument that such people are not sufficiently capable of 
understanding or appreciating the spiritual aspects clearly does not stand.
10.6 Uncertain Marriage Theology
Using Evidential Theology has led us to call into question a number of traditional 
elements in marriage theology, solely on the basis that they are incompatible with our 
observations of the world around us and the way in which it has evolved.
A deterministic approach to this conflict would necessarily require us to re-define 
marriage as a theological concept and to do so in a radical way. It is clear that some 
long-held views would have to be rejected, leaving us without the benefit of 
accumulated experience forming the basis of pastoral advice given by the church.
Alternatively, we may be persuaded of Uncertain Theology, enabling us  to consider 
that certain apparently contradictory statements may both be valid – if only we can 
identify the circumstances under which each holds true.
From a legal point of view, Dewar (1998) recognises that marriage law is necessarily 
incoherent, although Barlow and James would prefer it to be not so: 
we argue that notwithstanding what Dewar has termed ‘the normal chaos of  
family law’ (whereby we should not expect family law be anything other than  
incoherent given it is dealing with an area of social and emotional life itself  
ridden with paradox and contradiction, and given that such lack of coherence  
may often be politically convenient), legal regulation in this sphere should be  
guided by a family’s function rather than its form if the functions of family  
law itself are not to be rendered obsolete (2004, p145).
Thus, to take one of our example areas, it may be appropriate in many cases to include 
reference to future child bearing and rearing as one of the elements of a Christian 
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marriage whilst recognising that where it is neither possible nor chosen, may still 
contain a proper marriage which the church validates and supports as positively as 
that which is seen to be more conventional.
As we shall see below, this uncertainty leads to a need for a much more flexible liturgy 
which can accommodate the variety which is found in 'nature'. The evidence is that the 
church's model of marriage is neither the only context for success (by whatever 
measure) nor does it guarantee it. Responding to where people are at, provided that 
we are convinced it is neither contrary to Scripture (using whatever interpretative 
methodology we choose) nor Evidentially incompatible, will lead the church into 
being better able to support those who are prepared to come to it for support. It will 
also be better able to fulfil a prophetic role, calling to account those whose approach 
to enduring (or not so enduring) relationships is clearly incompatible with the 
principles just identified.
10.7 Liturgical Developments
The development of specific liturgies lies outside the scope of the present work. 
However, we can identify several elements which our research suggests should be 
made available in new liturgical forms, allowing the church to express its role in 
relation to those who come to its doors. Based on Uncertain Theology, the 
underpinning principle should be to set as few boundaries to inclusion as is possible, 
consistent with any overall theological principles.
For example, those arranging funerals for people who have not been practising 
Christians sometimes seek to have all religious elements removed, using the church 
only as a convenient meeting space. It would be unreasonable to seek to reduce a 
Christian liturgy to purely secular elements. In any event, our thesis has established 
important differences in principle between a secular and a Christian concept of 
marriage. At the very least, a liturgy must contain evidence of a covenant undertaking 
between two willing partners, with an understanding and expression relevant to their 
natures and context and which is made in the presence of God as a party to the 
enduring relationship.
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Beyond such irreducible elements – and the above may not be a complete or exclusive 
list – the remainder of the liturgy ought to contain many optional parts which can be 
included or excluded as befits the particular Christian ceremony:
• the ability to make a contract is not relevant
• the couple may not be able to envisage having children in the future
• there may be existing children whose parents are either or both of the 
couple
• the couple make a covenant with existing children or dependants
• the role of the wider Christian community is recognised
In addition to developments to the marriage liturgy there are important life events for 
which the church should also make provision, seeking to make it evident that, as a 
body of those dependent on grace from God, it is being alongside individuals and 
couples wherever they are:
• relationship breakdown, whether or not a legal marriage
• infant baptism when there are complex parenting situations
It may also prove possible, even desirable, to provide a liturgical context for those who 
wish to enter into an enduring relationship as a covenant made in the sight of and 
with the support of God's grace, supported by the church, without necessarily calling 
that relationship 'marriage' – or those who had a legal marriage some time in the past. 
In the context of Evidential Theology, this is where people are found and, unless we 
insist on a very specific notion of marriage based on a fixed paradigm for the God-
Human relationship, we should not deny.
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1 The accusation that Christian engagement in the public square naturally tends towards 
theocracy.
2 Various writers on contemporary attitudes to marriage and child-rearing relationships (eg 
Coontz, 2006d) suggest that increasingly marriage in a formal and legal sense is perceived 
as high risk, especially given the complications in extricating from a failed marriage 
(Lawler 1993 xi). Cohabitation is seen as more comfortable and requiring a lower level of 
commitment, both from self and from the partner. (Of course, many people may well drift 
into cohabitation and child-rearing without taking a conscious decision, but these 
arguments may equally apply as an explanation of why they do not move on to marriage). 
Note that we are here not talking about the ever-rising cost of weddings as that is probably 
only second-order.
3 Game Theory is a well-established approach to strategy and the manner in which people 
make decisions. Insofar as couples decide for or against formalising their relationship on a 
rational basis, then Game Theory may offer some insight. (However, Kasriel & Goodacre 
indicate that people “do not necessarily think about relationships logically or ‘rationally’”. (p12)
If we are able to assume that decisions are taken rationally in the light of available 
evidence on outcomes then, in a pure form, Game Theory suggests that the outcome of a 
decision is predictable (even if stochastically).
4 A fundamental theorem in Game Theory is the Minimax Theory in which it is postulated 
that decisions are generally based on minimising the maximum loss. That is to say, people 
choose not to pursue the largest gain if that choice is associated with the risk of largest 
loss.
5 Whilst many still accept the church’s claim that successful marriage offers the best 
outcome and the highest level of well-being (both for the couple and for children they may 
rear) they also appear to believe that the cost of a failed marriage is equally high, if not 
greater.
As Kasriel & Goodacre put it, “Instead couples choosing to get married make their 
decision either on the basis of the attraction of marriage for them as individuals (‘pull’ 
factors) or of the perceived problems of remaining unmarried (‘push’ factors’).“ (p14)
On the other hand, successful cohabitation may not bring the same level of well-being 
(such as a sense of security, stability and so on) but it is also seen to be very much less 
stressful if it fails.
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11. Conclusions
This project was undertaken as a response to a general observation that the church has 
gradually lost ground in its direct role in the formation and recognition of marriages. 
In part it seemed that this was because the theological and practical definition of what 
constitutes marriage has diverged from actual experiences in contemporary society.
We could have tackled this dissonance head-on but this would have required us to 
cope with all the attendant difficulties of addressing the accumulated baggage of 
traditional representations. Instead, this project has sought to use three situations in 
which there are very new aspects to marriage which the church needs to incorporate 
into its theology and practices, but which do not directly bring with them the problems 
of historical attitudes. In this manner it has been possible to look at some of the 
fundamental assumptions regarding marriage, as well as extending consideration into 
areas where there is limited existing work. In particular we have sought to establish a 
theology for learning disability which stands in its own right, rather than as an 
extension of physical disability.
Firstly, by application of Evidential Theology we argued that the use of a particular 
definition of marriage as a paradigm for other theological constructs is problematic as 
much as feminist theologies have found that other male-oriented paradigms have been 
for the consideration of gender issues. As a result, it is concluded that our notion of 
what constitutes marriage should primarily be derived from what we observe to occur 
in nature, rather than to impose a specific, culturally-dependent definition on nature.
Secondly, our consideration of marriage at the margins reveals that a number of 
elements which have historically been seen as part of the theological sine qua non of 
marriage are far from being universal truths, only true in a possibly majority of cases. 
In particular, the contractual basis and the procreational elements are found to be 
theologically non-essential. That there are some marginal cases where such 
characteristics are justifiably not present, casts doubts on the necessity for them in 
other situations. Indeed, the church needs as a matter of urgency to develop a positive 
pastoral and theological relationship with those who remain childless, either by choice 
or as a matter of fact.
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This leads us to posit the following assertions:
a. The church should primarily be engaged with an inclusive agenda, being convinced 
that all of humanity is made in the image of God, not simply (in the Old Testament 
approach) those who are seen not to embody significant defects. Our incarnational 
understanding of God should be seen through the whole of creation and we should 
reject any beliefs about the nature of God and God’s purposes with and through the 
created world which require us to disregard some section of humankind.
b. As a consequence, a major task for the church is in promoting, supporting and 
healing inter-personal relationships including, but not limited to, those which are 
procreative. We should reject any approach which focuses instead on regulation and 
limitation. Rather, we should wonder at the complexity of God’s creation of human 
relationships and that, as with every other aspect of scientific investigation, we 
continue to discover more knowledge about that complexity in an unlimited manner.
c. Enduring relationships, including but not limited to those which society is prepared 
to call ‘marriage’, require particular theological consideration.
d. Human relationships should only be used as a paradigm for a relationship with God 
after very considerable care and a concern not to use them to limit either type of 
relationship.
e. People with a learning disability should be allowed to form and be supported in 
personal relationships, including those with a sexual dimension which may sometimes 
be called marriage. A particular responsibility falls on society to support in parenting 
those who, for whatever reason, find themselves not fully able to perform that role on 
their own. We must be very wary of any approach which seeks to define certain 
sections of humanity as not having a right to seek to have children.
f. There is no duty to procreate, regardless of the marital status. Such an activity 
should be set within a more comprehensive understanding of how humanity should be 
responsible stewards of God’s creation and not subvert that intent to specific, often 
political, ends.
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g. Equally, there is no right to have children, only a right to engage in sexual 
intercourse, taking due consideration of the responsibility for any ensuing children. 
Access to means to influence fertility both positively and negatively is not an intrinsic 
right, but must be considered on the basis of more fundamental rights and 
responsibilities.
h. The rights and duties of parents have evolved considerably and a theological 
perspective can no longer assume the uni-directional model of:
virginity -> marriage -> procreation -> parenting - > dependency
i. Churches should provide pastoral and liturgical support for people entering into an 
enduring relationship (which in itself may or may not have an explicit beginning), 
including but not limited to those called ‘marriage’. In particular, attention has to be 
paid to the formation of enduring relationships where children of either partner 
already exist, whether or not biologically related. In so doing, enduring relationships, 
including those known as marriage, should be presented in a manner that places more 
emphasis on the positive rather than the negative outcomes such that people are not 
deterred from seeking the church’s support in such relationships because of the 
perceived emotional costs of failure.
j. The church should distance itself from the legal regulation of marriage or other 
formal enduring relationships, especially where that regulation is primarily concerned 
with establishing the possible subsequent exit conditions. This regulation should be 
the task of the state which has the right and the power to establish the necessary 
contractual framework and the means to enforce individual judgements.
k. The church should focus its practice on the formation of an inter-dependent 
covenant basis for enduring relationships which in itself is not dependent on the 
contractual structures. Such an approach should be primarily positive and enabling 
rather than negative and restrictive, concentrating more on the quality rather than 
form of the relationship. There should be a presumption in favour of offering the 
church’s support, including invoking God’s blessing, on enduring relationships 
regardless of their form – distinct from a current widespread perception that the 
church is more concerned to set strict limits.
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l. A theology of enduring relationships – which may encompass marriage but extend 
significantly in scope – should recognise the incarnation progressively revealed in and 
through an ever-changing pattern of personal and social relationships. All human 
beings are created in order to evidence that incarnation, not just some of them. The 
church should seek to liberate everyone (regardless of age, gender, sex and physical or 
mental ability), supporting those who face social, legal, economic or other boundaries 
to achieving fulfilment within and through enduring relationships.
Finally, this leaves us with the task of assessing:
• how to apply the findings of this research
• if the work has been successful in achieving its objectives
• what further work is indicated
This thesis was undertaken in order to challenge some of the current perceptions of 
marriage within the church in order to promote a means of connecting more effectively 
with a society that increasingly rejects the church's views. 
We have found a number of areas where there is particular dissonance and have 
proposed solutions which would require a substantial shift in current practice.
For the most part, any effective change will have to come through the institutions of 
each church. In the case of the Church of England, the focal point of change has to be 
General Synod which has, in the past few decades, been more concerned with same-sex 
relationships than heterosexual ones, including marriage. A clear break with past 
traditions would be involved in forgoing the legal registration role. It is likely that 
there will be a concern that to do so would risk losing more ground to civil marriage 
ceremonies. This is a regrettable defensive stance which risks further alienating the 
church from more of society. If the church's view of marriage does not appeal to those 
it seeks to influence then, with no compulsion to come to the church for marriage, 
there will be further erosion of its role. This is not to suggest that principles have to be 
foregone but rather that the church needs to be much clearer on what are theological 
imperatives and disentangle these from contextually dependent specifics which may 
have to be changed.
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It is asserted that the solutions put forward in this thesis form a basis for a new agenda 
which would lead to greater pastoral effectiveness in a wider range of contexts than at 
present. In practice, it is equally clear that significant mind-set changes would be 
needed at all levels in any institutional church, with a clear lead being set from the 
top/centre.
However, some areas which we have identified need further work, especially those 
relating to the spiritual support for people with a learning disability as well as 
preparing specific liturgies which encompass the developments we have highlighted.
In an Evidential Theology model, it is clear that the reasons why individual couples 
reject the church as a locus in which to form their enduring relationship need greater 
investigation. The fact that this is happening is well established but the reasons are 
less clear and probably more dynamic and socially contextual.
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